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Foreword
S uccessful reform has to resolve two separate and conflicting dimensions: people and time. Reforms, by their very nature, challenge the status quo, often threatening those with a stake in the current system—from society’s 
power brokers, to better-off stakeholders who may benefit unintentionally and 
disproportionately from a policy, through to the intended beneficiaries, even if the 
status quo is unsustainable over the long term. Their changed influence, incentives, 
and behavior, as a result of reforms, have to be managed, until the success of the 
reforms becomes apparent for both them and society more widely. 
Time, too, has to be assuaged, in the sense that while technocrats may see cuts are 
needed in, say, subsidies because of a weak budget, the near-term negative effects 
on low-income groups will be on the minds of both those supporting the political 
status quo and reformers. And the technocrats know this, so we come full circle.
This is what the Asian Development Bank (ADB)—and many other development 
agencies—in an admittedly long process of trial and error have found out over more 
than 2 decades of supporting reforms. The more deeply these agencies became involved 
in reform efforts, the more they recognized that, although there is no blueprint for 
success, there are clues as to what may work in particular situations, and how the 
reform process can be better managed. This recognition and acceptance of the wider, 
political economy dimension of reforms began in ADB in the late 1990s and led to early 
work to better understand reform processes to improve reform outcomes.
The book’s intended readers are development practitioners involved in the policy 
reform process. It aims to help them understand political economy factors that shape 
actual outcomes, and to simplify the complexities of policy reform and the loans and 
technical assistance that support such reform. 
It attempts to summarize some aspects of ADB’s experience with the political 
economy aspects of securing policy and institutional reforms—aspects that can 
fundamentally affect the “rules” and means through which an economy operates 
and adjusts. The purpose of its case studies is to highlight applications of earlier 
ADB operations experience in Southeast Asia and, more recently, evaluations of 
ADB’s support for reforms in the Pacific. 
xiForeword
Chapter 1 provides key concepts in a political economy approach and a framework 
to show how government commitment, politics more widely, and institutions in the 
term’s widest sense interplay as reforms move through various stages of a process, 
drawing on examples from ADB experience in supporting policy-based loans. 
Chapter 2 provides a case study of the “EVAT” reform process in the Philippines, 
using the political economy framework. It looks at continuing reform implementation 
issues, highlighting how an otherwise successful initial reform process needs further 
iterations to deepen and sustain the original objectives. 
Chapter 3 shows how the political economy of reform framework was applied 
to an evaluation study of ADB support for a series of reforms in Pacific countries 
between 1997 and 2007. Although many reforms were similar, each had very different 
outcomes, reasons for which can be identified along the stages of the reform process. 
Chapter 4 analyzes reform of state-owned enterprises in Viet Nam and shows how 
Chapter 1’s political economy framework can be applied to understand these complex 
and fundamental reforms for the country. 
Chapter 5 discusses specific factors that influenced reforms and why their 
identification can help to better manage the reform process. It offers suggestions 
and lessons on managing reform processes, and provides pointers as to how 
the framework can be applied in ADB-supported operations, both during 
implementation and post-implementation to analyze their success—or otherwise. 
The publication builds on working papers prepared by ADB’s Economics and 
Research Department over the period 2002–2005. It was a collaborative effort of 
ADB’s Southeast Asia Department, the Pacific Department, and the Economics and 
Research Department. 
The chapters, in order, were written by George Abonyi (visiting professor, 
Department of Public Administration and Executive Education Program, Maxwell 
School, Syracuse University); Romeo Bernardo (board member of the Institute for 
Development and Econometric Analysis and Philippine Partner of GlobalSource, 
and undersecretary of finance during the Ramos and first Aquino administrations); 
Richard Bolt (advisor to ADB’s Southeast Asia Department); George Abonyi; 
and Ronald Duncan (emeritus professor, Crawford School of Economics and 
Government, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University) 
with Christine Tang (executive director of Lazaro, Bernardo, Tiu and Associates, 
and advisor of GlobalSource Partners). Juzhong Zhuang (deputy chief economist, 
Economics and Research Department) provided guidance on preparation of the 
framework and selected case study chapters. Xianbin Yao (director general, Pacific 
xii Foreword
Department and former assistant chief economist, Economics and Research 
Department) provided key guidance in preparing earlier working papers upon 
which chapters of this book are based and this book. Jonathan Aspin (consultant 
editor) and Richard Bolt edited the volume.
Changyong Rhee 
Chief Economist 
Economics and Research Department
Kunio Senga 
Director General 
Southeast Asia Department
Xianbin Yao 
Director General 
Pacific Department
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Chapter 1
A Framework for 
Political Economy of 
Policy Reform and  
Policy-Based Lending 
George Abonyi
Introduction
Reforms and Development
T he current general approach of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to policy-based lending (PBL) originated in 1987, signifying a shift from the financing of imported inputs to increase capacity utilization to an emphasis 
on sector policy reforms to better facilitate growth and development. 
The basic rationale for PBL is clear: it is more difficult to have effective projects 
that meet expectations in the context of a weak institutional or policy environment 
(Ali 1990). Persistency of a poor enabling environment may reduce real returns to 
projects, implying that a high rate of return to policy reforms may be generated by 
correcting distortions in policy environments. Yet the choice between investment 
projects and policy reforms is inextricably linked, and making choices between the 
two can use a similar analytical approach. Policy changes relating to market and 
institutional reforms address the economy- or sector-wide causes of inefficiencies, 
structural constraints, and failures. Although ADB support for reforms tends to be 
more focused on sector and institutional reforms, the effects can feed back to have 
economy-wide impacts.
The practice of PBL has changed significantly with experience. The mixed 
performance of structural adjustment lending in the 1980s led the World Bank to 
rethink how to support reforms in its borrowing countries. Following its 2001 review 
of structural adjustment lending, the World Bank shifted from adjustment lending 
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to a development policy approach that supports structural, social, and institutional 
reforms over the medium term linked to country assistance strategies. Development 
policy support and lending are based on an assessment of the country’s economic 
situation, policies, governance, and institutional capacity, as well as a country policy 
ownership assessment.
ADB has experienced a similar trend of mixed performance but with recent 
improvements arising from changing practice. ADB’s periodic reviews on the 
performance of PBL show that policy reforms are relevant and needed instruments 
to effect development and to complement project financing (ADB 1978, 1987, 1999), 
but have evolved in response to mixed results and the changing needs, and demands, 
for more effective approaches to support (ADB 2011). 
Reasons for improvements include better practice such as improved sector analysis for 
policy dialogue, wider use of programmatic approaches reflected in program cluster 
approaches involving a series of single-tranche loans using prior actions and “triggers” 
for lending to further address the problems of over-specification and sometimes 
unrealistic nature and number of post conditions. Despite these improvements in 
the design of PBL instruments, the implementation of reforms remains challenging 
for financiers and client governments alike, involving a complex set of issues and 
processes that fundamentally differentiate PBLs from investment projects.
The Challenge
Policy reform is about change. It involves changing rules, regulations, laws, 
institutions—and ultimately changing incentives, expectations, capabilities, and 
behaviors to bring about improvements in the quality of life. Reform involves 
government action that addresses specific problems to achieve a variety of societal 
goals related to issues such as economic growth, poverty alleviation, social services, 
and environmental protection. The basic challenge of policy reform, and associated 
PBL, is to design and implement effective reform measures—reforms that will address 
key aspects of specific problems, and do so in a way that will lead to improvements. 
Reform is about achieving the possible, as distinct from a preoccupation with the 
“theoretically optimal.” PBL, in its various forms (Box 1.1) by international financial 
institutions (IFIs) such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), is intended to provide 
support to developing economies to undertake effective reforms.1
Governments and IFIs need to have a clear and shared understanding of the reform 
process to bring about desired changes. In practice, such understanding is not always 
complete. A key part of the problem is the very different world views of technical 
1 In this chapter, support for reform includes policy-based (formerly program) loans; technical assistance; 
and the dialogue between, for example, international financial institutions (IFIs) and government 
representatives. As shorthand, the chapter uses “reform,” “reform program,” and “reform program and 
related support” (which may be policy-based lending or project lending with policy reform content). 
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experts and policy analysts (e.g., economists) on the one hand and of politicians 
and policy makers on the other. Thus, reform measures and related loans are rarely 
implemented as expected, and are often mired in controversy (Box 1.2).
A central question is: “Why do the seemingly good ideas in policy reform and related 
support often experience significant difficulties in the real world?” And “What can 
we do about it—how can we make the process of policy reform in general, and PBL 
support in particular, more effective?”
Returning to the example in Box 1.2, conceptually, the use of the price mechanism for 
allocating irrigation water seems to make sense and is consistent with economic theory 
and international best practice. Yet, as the farmers’ reaction illustrates, presenting the 
Box 1.1
Policy-Based Lending in the Asian Development Bank
The term policy-based lending (PBL) refers to any initiative by international financial 
institutions—such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund—that is intended to support change, adjustment, or reform in 
policies, the policy process, or policy-related institutions. 
As PBL initiatives usually encounter similar constraints, they can benefit from similar types 
of concepts, frameworks, and methods aimed at strengthening their design. In ADB, PBL 
initiatives primarily take the form of policy-based loans and sector development program 
loans but, in some cases, may also include investment projects that incorporate policy-related 
measures.
Source: G. Abonyi.
Box 1.2
Thailand’s Agriculture Sector Reform
A key problem facing the agriculture sector in Thailand at the time of the Asian crisis (which 
began in 1997/98) was the increasing scarcity of water in the once water-rich country.
There was general agreement that measures were needed to ensure more efficient use of 
water as part of a more general reform of the sector, triggered by the crisis. Reform measures 
(based on the principle of cost recovery through the use of markets and prices) were to guide 
the allocation of water, aimed at strengthening the long-run productivity of farmers. These 
measures were included in an Asian Development Bank policy loan supporting Thailand’s 
agricultural reform. However, a coalition of farmers and nongovernment organizations 
blocked the introduction and implementation of these reform measures.
Source: G. Abonyi.
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technical or economic rationale for optimal policy reform is insufficient for persuading 
policy makers to undertake a policy reform, let alone guarantee its successful 
implementation. This often results from underestimating the challenges of effectively 
communicating to the range of stakeholders both the appropriateness of particular 
policy reforms and what is involved in the associated process of change.
Such stakeholders include public decision makers such as politicians who are 
involved in key policy decisions and their implementation, and intended beneficiaries 
such as the farmers in the example who must live with the consequences of  such 
decisions. The  technical or economic rationale for “theoretically optimal” policies  is 
not enough: they need to lead in particular country contexts to desired and expected 
results—to sustained, improved performance and to improved quality of life—and 
key stakeholders must believe in these as the likely outcomes of proposed policies.
There is a tendency to group difficulties with reforms under the umbrella of 
“implementation problems.” The implication is that the design of particular reforms 
and related support is generally fine; it is the messy implementation process, involving, 
perhaps, alleged wavering government commitment, political games, or institutional 
weaknesses, which throws good ideas off track. 
But this perspective is misleading: design and implementation are intimately 
interconnected in any process of change. They should not be separated conceptually 
or operationally in the reform process or in the design of reform measures. Difficulties 
in implementation are the usual characteristics of the policy reform process, often 
caused by political and institutional factors.
The design of reforms and their related support initiatives needs to reflect an 
assessment and understanding of the policy reform environment as it is, including 
actual implementation conditions, constraints, and requirements. From this 
perspective, issues such as the politics of the reform process and institutional 
constraints on implementation are key factors to be identified and addressed at the 
policy analysis and reform design stages, and monitored and managed as the reform 
and related support evolve.
Basic and recurring problems associated with reform go beyond issues of 
implementation. These problems arise because of the very nature of the policy 
environment—the political economy context in which the design and implementation 
of reforms take place. “Political economy” (as used in this chapter) refers to 
the interrelationship between political and economic processes and institutions, 
particularly as related to policy issues, interests, decisions, and reform implementation. 
Considerations of political economy factors need to be explicitly recognized and 
accommodated in the diagnosis of policy issues and in the subsequent design and 
implementation of PBLs. This is likely to reduce, even if not eliminate, the gap between 
expected and actual results in policy reform. How we recognize and accommodate 
such considerations is the subject of the next section.
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A Framework for the Political Economy of Reform
Introduction
Policy reform involves many groups with a stake in the reform process and 
its outcomes, with government playing a key role as the formal initiator and 
implementer of reforms. Perceived government commitment to reform, and its 
credibility over time, has a central role in the policy reform process and PBL. 
Government commitment, in turn, is shaped by political economy factors that 
play a critical role in generally structuring policy reforms and in conditioning the 
effectiveness of PBL. A political economy perspective signals the central role of 
politics and institutions throughout the policy reform process. Reform involves 
politics, because it requires collective choices in an environment characterized by 
conflicting perceptions and interests, with no simple unifying incentive scheme for 
resolving such differences. Policy reform also takes place in a world of institutions 
that conditions the initiation, design, implementation, and sustainability of such 
reforms (see Rodrik 2003).
Politics and institutions play a critical role in shaping reforms as they move through 
various stages of the process. This process, in turn, conditions policy reform in terms 
of what it is (i.e., reform measures that are selected and their design), and what it 
does (i.e., the outcome and impact of such reform measures). The stages of the policy 
reform process, as well as their relationship to the role of politics and institutions in 
policy reform, and how these core political economy factors constitute key sources 
of uncertainty and risk in reform—including government commitment—together 
comprise a useful framework for assessing the political economy dimension of 
reform (Figure 1.1).
The stages of the policy reform process comprise the following:
•	 Initiating reform: getting issues on the policy agenda for priority attention;
•	 Managing the complexity of policy issues: giving both policy issues and associated 
actions tangible shape through the design of specific reforms and PBLs;
•	 Endorsing reform: approving reform measures, leading to issuing related 
implementation guidelines and allocating necessary resources;
•	 Implementing reform: undertaking reform actions and implanting change; and
•	 Sustaining reform: ensuring that reform measures endure over time.
In practice, the stages of the process are more iterative than sequential given their 
interplay with the politics and institutions involved in the reform process, which is 
where the importance of the political economy perspective arises.2
2 The stages are discussed further in Stages of the Policy Reform Process, p. 15.
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Government Commitment
Meaning of Government Commitment
Since reform involves government action, government commitment plays a central 
role in the policy reform process. Stakeholders, such as domestic and foreign investors, 
see government commitment to specific changes as the guarantor that reforms will be 
implemented as planned, and sustained over time. The implication of such commitment 
is that government will make the necessary policy approval decisions, issue binding 
instructions to implementing agencies, and allocate the necessary resources.
Figure 1.1
Political Economy of Policy Reform and Policy-Based Lending: A Framework
 
 
 
Government
Commitment:
Stability of 
Expectations  
Politics:
Policy Reform as
Collective Choice
Institutions:
Shaping Reforms 
and Implementing
Change
Initiating Reform:
Getting Issues on 
the Policy Agenda
Managing 
Complexity of 
Policy Issues:
Reform Program
Design
Endorsing Reform:
Policy Decision 
Process
Implementing 
Reform:
Implanting Change
Sustaining Reform:
Sustainability of 
Reform Strategy
and Initiatives
Notes:  The framework draws on a range of developments in the literature, particularly M. Grindle and J. W. Thomas. 
1991. Public Choice and Policy Change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries, as well as 
S. Haggard and R. R. Kaufman. 1992. The Politics of Economic Adjustment; D. W. Brinkerhoff and B. Crosby. 
2002. Managing Policy Reform: Concepts and Tools for Decision-Makers in Developing and Transitioning 
Countries; A. Drazen. 2002. Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach; 
and G. Abonyi. 1986. Technique, Experts and Planning. University of Ottawa Quarterly. 56 (4, October–
December). It also reflects the author’s discussions with John Thomas of the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, on issues related to elements of this framework in the context of joint 
teaching executive courses on policy analysis and reform at the Asian Development Bank.
7A Framework for Political Economy of Policy Reform and Policy-Based Lending
Government commitment is a key factor in the reform operations of IFIs, and the 
degree of government commitment is usually explicitly noted in the loan document. 
That is why potential changes in government commitment to reforms are key sources 
of risk and uncertainty in the reform process.
Lagging endorsement or implementation of reforms may mean that government 
did not have a full understanding of what was actually involved in the reforms in 
the first place, or that it has a different understanding from IFIs of the operational 
meaning or implications of particular reform measures.
Or it may involve a lack of sufficient interest in or intention to implement certain 
reforms—the usual meaning of “(lack of) commitment”—perhaps because they are 
seen as either not relevant or feasible, and were accepted initially only to secure needed 
IFI funds and support.3 What is clear is that simple with and without arguments do 
not provide sufficiently compelling reasons to embark on a reform path (Box 1.3).
3 In practice, a government may agree to policy conditions quickly but seemingly not move effectively 
to implement them because of political and/or institutional constraints. Alternatively, a government 
may take a long time in negotiations but, once agreement is reached, move decisively to implement. 
Furthermore, what seems like “firm government commitment” at the time of PBL agreement may turn 
into a lack of commitment as implementation evolves.
Box 1.3
With and Without Reform: A Better Postreform Scenario— 
But Worth the Near-Term Trade-Offs?
Many policy makers are aware of the general difficulties inherent in policy reform. They 
understand that reforms entail economic, political, and social costs, creating losers and 
meeting resistance. Thus, the basis for initiating and sustaining reforms has to be convincing.
The expected benefits of reform should be clearly reflected in its rationale. One way is 
through an explicit comparison of scenarios “with reform” and “without reform”—despite 
the inherent problems in identifying the counterfactual.a However, this is a comparative, 
static formulation focused on the technical analytic dimensions of reforms, and on its own is 
inadequate for designing a reform with a high likelihood of success. For example, it does not 
reflect the potentially extensive organizational changes, political negotiations and trade-offs, 
and consensus building required and/or triggered by proposed reforms. 
Policy makers need to move beyond this static approach, and introduce an explicitly dynamic 
perspective.
a  Bolt, R., and M. Fujimura. 2002. Policy-based Lending and Poverty Reduction: An Overview of Processes, 
Assessment and Options. ERD Working Paper. No. 2. Manila: ADB.
Source: G. Abonyi.
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Yet government may have had both an understanding of the reforms and a genuine 
intent to implement them, only to find (as the reform process unfolds) that it does not 
have the capability to do so, either because of strong political resistance or because 
of constraints on institutional capacity. As this suggests, government commitment is 
complex and dynamic: it changes over time. 
Furthermore, it is likely to differ among countries. Similarly, there may be differences 
among policy issues: the challenges of reform and therefore of government 
commitment related to the provision of transport systems may be quite different from 
reform related to agriculture, finance, or public administration. 
But what does “government commitment” mean? Three aspects are central:
•	 Understanding: At the most basic level, commitment relates to the degree of 
a government’s understanding of policy reforms; and in terms of the support 
for reform, the congruence or mutual understanding and shared expectations 
between the government and IFIs on the reform measures in the PBL.
•	 Intent: At a deeper level, and in the usual use of the term, commitment involves 
the intention or willingness of the government to implement particular reforms.
•	 Capability: Commitment is also a function of the ability to do things. This 
may be limited in practice by constraints arising from the political and 
institutional context of reforms. Government commitment requires sufficient 
political support to initiate, implement, and sustain reforms. It also requires the 
institutional capacity to undertake necessary actions by agencies involved in 
reform implementation. Unless such political and institutional conditions are—
and remain—in place, government may have the intention but not the ability to 
undertake reform measures.
Government Commitment and the Ownership of Reforms
The critical importance of country ownership of reforms is well recognized; policy 
reform is essentially a domestic “game” where a country’s particular circumstances 
shape the process and outcomes of reform. It is the responsibility of government to 
define the direction, scope, and strategy of reform; to balance various stakeholder 
interests; and to manage the policy formulation and implementation process so that it 
yields the desired results—that is, to “own” the reform. Even if external stakeholders, 
in particular IFIs, play a supporting role by providing resources, information, and 
advice, and policy reform is therefore a partnership between the government and 
IFIs, the ultimate ownership of the reform and PBL must rest with the government.
Ownership is related to the concept of government commitment. If government is 
perceived to be committed to reforms in the sense of “intent to implement,” this 
is often taken to be the same as the government having a sense of ownership of 
reforms—in effect, a concept of “commitment-as-ownership.” “Ownership” of 
policy reforms is, to an extent, also a political concept. It means that a coalition 
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of stakeholders supports a set of reforms and has sufficient power in the context 
of the country’s institutional setting to ensure that these reforms are placed on 
the policy agenda, endorsed, implemented, and sustained. It is then reasonable to 
assume government commitment to reforms in terms of intent—as long as such a 
pro-reform coalition holds.
In cases where reform measures are not implemented as planned, a credible 
measure of commitment-as-ownership of a government is its track record—
the extent to which similar reforms have been implemented in the past (see, for 
example, World  Bank 2005). For IFIs, this suggests that unless a sufficient track 
record of reform exists for a country, PBL is unlikely to be successful in bringing 
about change—money cannot buy reform, or so the argument goes. 
Yet this view of reform, in some situations, may undervalue the commitment to 
change in a country that is faced with heavy practical constraints. For example, using 
the earlier multidimensional concept of commitment, a government may have a 
genuine intention of introducing reforms, yet be faced with the practical challenges 
of creating a consensus for change, or with significant institutional constraints on 
implementing reform measures. 
In either case, an IFI may be able to provide key support for inducing change, for 
example, by helping to demonstrate the expected tangible benefits of reform, perhaps 
through pilot initiatives, in order to build stakeholder support; or by helping to 
develop the required institutional capacity necessary for reform implementation. 
In both cases, an understanding of the political economy factors by the government 
and the IFI can play a key role in identifying the potential political and institutional 
constraints on government commitment to carry out desired reforms—a function of 
the proposed framework. This knowledge can then be used to design a reform and 
supporting loan that is more likely to bring about the desired changes.
Politics and the Process of Policy Reform
The Role of Politics in Policy Reform
The process of change that constitutes policy reform is both shaped by politics and is a 
shaper of politics. As policy reform and associated support aim to change an existing 
set of policies and the associated distribution of benefits, costs, power relations, and 
interests, there are likely to be stakeholders who see themselves as “reform losers,” 
and so resist change. At the same time, there will be stakeholders who see themselves 
as “reform winners,” and so support the reform process.
Policy reforms rarely involve a single or unitary decision maker such as “the 
government” (Box 1.4) with a well-defined and stable set of objectives, and the power 
to control all aspects of the reform process to implement a preferred course of action. 
Inherently political in nature, policy reform entails a process of collective choice. Such 
choice involves mutual adjustment among diverse and often conflicting stakeholders, 
10 Managing Reforms for Development
through a process of negotiation, bargaining, and consensus building, which shapes 
and can modify—or even block—reforms at any point in the policy reform process.
The politics of reform may become especially pronounced during implementation. 
This is when the tangible consequences of reforms—including threats to particular 
interests—become increasingly clear. More generally, political acceptability plays an 
important role in influencing any and all the stages of the policy reform process, 
from inception through implementation and sustainability—hence, the importance 
of consultations.
Thus, since policy reform and related support may be altered, put on hold, or reversed 
at any stage by the actions or resistance of stakeholders, including implementing 
institutions, the sufficient and continuing support of key stakeholders is essential. 
Otherwise, policy reform measures are unlikely to be implemented or sustained.
Into this domestic political game, support for reform is, in effect, thrown. Unless the 
specific political context is understood, policy design may include reform measures 
that are unrealistic for what the government can actually do in an environment 
of differing and conflicting interests and limited control. This, in turn, could also 
weaken government ability to introduce the needed reforms at a later stage under 
Box 1.4
Bureaucratic Politics
Government is not a unitary actor. It is composed of multiple agencies with differing roles, 
perspectives, interests, and incentives. The ministry of finance (MOF) may sign off on 
the policy-based loan, but is rarely the agency responsible for implementing the reforms. 
It may be line agencies, state-owned enterprises, different levels of government (provincial, 
municipal), or even organizations outside government that act on reform, and therefore must 
have ownership of the reform measures.
Yet these institutions may have little incentive to “own” the reform and associated support, 
especially if they have limited access to needed resources from policy-based lending that 
goes to the general budget. This means that, even if the MOF is the policy-based loan 
signatory and “commits” to the policy reforms, it may be unable to ensure compliance or 
implementation by relevant line agencies or different levels of government.
For international financial institutions, the result is that a formal commitment by, say, the 
MOF may not be enough to ensure implementation of required reform measures. There 
are likely to be constraints on their capacity to deliver on such commitments within the 
framework of the domestic policy and political process. Reform design, therefore, requires 
an appreciation of what the government can realistically do over the relevant time horizon, 
and of who the key decision makers in government are.
Source: G. Abonyi.
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more appropriate conditions, by undercutting the credibility of the reforms and/or 
the ability of the government to implement them. At the same time, difficult reforms 
may be introduced deliberately, for example, by reformers in the government, in 
coalition with external IFI partners, to bring about policy changes that otherwise 
might not be made.
Winners and Losers
Reform creates “winners” and “losers.” A better appreciation from the outset by 
those designing reforms and loans of the political dimension of reforms can help to 
identify both the potential constraints on specific measures, as well as the options for 
addressing such constraints. In an environment of differences among stakeholders on 
policy issues and reforms, it may not be realistic or wise for a government or IFI to 
proceed with a reform design that assumes consensus.
Scope of a Reform and Related Policy-Based Loan
If the scope of a reform and related PBL is narrow (e.g., in terms of the number 
and range of reform measures), the scope for domestic conflict is also likely to be 
more manageable, as there are likely to be fewer conflicting interests involved. The 
policy may involve a simpler political game with fewer players, and it may be easier 
to build and maintain consensus. This is part of the reason for a preference, often by 
governments, for a step-by-step approach to reform (Box 1.5; see also Chapter 4).
If the scope of a loan is very wide, more potentially conflicting interests are likely to 
be involved, especially as each reform measure is, in effect, a “political game” in its 
Box 1.5
Reform in Viet Nam
A step-by-step, gradual approach has been a characteristic of Viet Nam’s reform process. 
This  is, in part, a reflection of a society where, although the Communist Party holds a 
monopoly on political power, many stakeholders and different levels participate in a 
consensus-driven reform process. 
For example, reforms of state-owned enterprises involve central authorities such as the State 
Bank of Viet Nam, ministries, individual enterprises, the Communist Party, provinces, local 
governments, and workers at state-owned enterprises. Consensus and a shared understanding 
need to be built among them for reforms to proceed and to be sustained. This takes time, 
resources, and a process of mutual adjustment among potentially differing interests. In this 
environment, a reform that begins more modestly, for example, with pilot projects that build 
support for reforms, may be more effective than an ambitious comprehensive policy of 
change, even if the latter’s proposed measures are considered relevant.
Source: G. Abonyi.
12 Managing Reforms for Development
own right, involving particular stakeholder winners and losers. It may therefore be 
more difficult to reach and maintain the necessary consensus. IFIs often prefer PBLs 
with wider scope, to address a greater range of issues simultaneously. In some cases, 
the government may have an incentive to expand the scope of reforms in order to 
build additional support by including measures valued by some stakeholder groups.
The Role of Consultations
An important means for both testing and strengthening the feasibility of proposed 
reforms is stakeholder consultations, but these can be time-consuming, complex, 
intensive, demanding, and their outcomes not fully predictable. However, they can 
play an essential role in ensuring the relevance (as perceived by key stakeholders) 
and the political feasibility of reforms by achieving consensus, or lessening resistance 
to change. Simplifying, and similar to the scope just above, two basic strategies may 
be followed: general consultations on broad issues related to policy reform and PBL 
design, and consultations on specific reform measures (see Elliot et al. 2005).
Sources of Reform Measures
The push for reform and for particular reform measures may arise domestically or 
externally. If key elements of a policy reform originate domestically—proposed by the 
government—chances are that the necessary domestic political consensus building has 
already taken place, or is in progress. There are likely to be domestic supporters of 
reform (and thus of reform measures) who have an incentive to build and maintain such 
consensus. Alternatively, if the reforms originate primarily externally—IFI driven—it 
may be unclear how the domestic political process and consensus building will evolve. 
The domestic political process of consultation and consensus building will likely 
require much more time and effort in the former than in the latter case—which 
loops back in to the consultation process.
Operational Implications for Reform Design
Operationally, assessment of the political context of reform involves identifying key 
stakeholders and their likely positions on specific reform measures, and includes the 
checklist in Box 1.6.4
4 For a discussion of the method of stakeholder analysis and its applications, see Chapter  6 in 
D.  W.  Brinkerhoff and B. Crosby (2002). For a discussion of the relationship between stakeholder 
analysis and assumptions analysis, see G. Abonyi. 1982. SIAM: Strategic Impact and Assumptions-
Identification Method for Project, Program, and Policy Planning. Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change. 22. For a more complex and dynamic analysis of stakeholder interactions that focuses on 
the stability of agreements see N. Howard. 2004. Resolving Conflicts in a Tree: Drama Theory in the 
Extensive Form.
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Institutions: Shaping Reforms and Implementing Change
Role of Institutions in Policy Reform
Policy reforms are institutional in nature. As used here, the concept of “institutions” 
has two specific meanings: (i) at the macro level, institutions as “rules of the game” 
and enforcement mechanisms, for example, in the form of property rights, legal 
systems, and political systems; and (ii) at the micro level, institutions as organizations 
that implement policy reform measures, for example, government agencies. Policy 
reform involves institutions in both dimensions.5,6
5 The first meaning corresponds to the use of the term in “the new institutional economics,” e.g., 
O. Williamson. 2000. The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead. The second 
meaning corresponds to the traditional use of the term in the management literature. 
6 An interesting discussion of the origins and role of institutions in selected East Asian developmental 
states can be found in R. F. Doner, B. K. Ritchie, and D. Slater. 2005. Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins 
of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective.
Box 1.6
Broad Political Economy Questions in Preparing Policy-Based Loans
•	 What are the boundaries of the proposed reform, as implied by key inputs, core 
activities, and associated outcomes?
•	 Given the above, who are the key stakeholders with an interest in the given reform, or 
who will be affected by and/or likely to affect the proposed reform measures in terms of 
its inputs, core activities, outputs, or outcomes?
•	 What must be assumed about the existing or future behavior and preferences of each 
key stakeholder for the reforms to be successfully approved, initiated, implemented, and 
led to the desired outcomes?
•	 What specific elements of the reform are likely to lead to resistance or conflict, or result 
in perceived decreases in net benefits by particular stakeholders?
•	 Do these stakeholders have the power and means to influence—or even block—the 
reform process (e.g., initiation, endorsement, and implementation of the policy or 
specific reform measures) either individually or in coalitions?
•	 If yes, do the stakeholders have (or under what conditions are they likely to have) the 
incentive to do so?
•	 How can stakeholders with concerns be induced to support, or at least not oppose, the 
proposed reform measures? For example, how can the design of the reform be modified 
to account for differing needs and preferences not at present accommodated, while 
ensuring the basic contribution of the policy-based loan to policy reform?
Source: G. Abonyi.
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The effectiveness of reforms will be a function of a country’s institutional capacity 
to formulate, endorse, and implement reforms and related PBLs, including different 
organizations working together well (Box 1.7). An important objective of reform may 
be to modify institutions, in either sense (i.e., institutions may themselves be key 
targets of reform measures).
Ensuring the Institutional Infrastructure for Reform
For reforms to be effective, the basic institutional infrastructure must be—or has to 
be put—in place. If it is not, there is a high risk that the reforms will reflect unrealistic 
expectations and contain unimplementable reform measures. Yet the design of 
reforms rarely recognizes that policy reforms vary in their organizational intensity 
and complexity, and therefore in the nature and extent of the skills and institutional 
capacity required to implement them.
Box 1.7
A Delicate Balance for International Financial Institutions 
in Supporting Reforms
Developing country governments in the past used to feel that international financial 
institutions (IFIs) often attributed unrealistic capabilities to such governments in the policy 
reform process. IFIs were, thus, often seen to prefer a comprehensive package of reforms 
which, according to lessons learned elsewhere, should bring about quick change. The implicit 
assumption is that the government of a given country is robust and strong enough to build 
and maintain the political stability necessary for reform, and that the institutional capability 
is there, or can be put in place, to carry out the whole reform quickly. The focus is then on 
obtaining government commitment to reform, which is generally identified with decisions by 
the IFI’s central agency counterpart, such as the ministry of finance.
An effective strategy of policy reform should ideally draw on both general approaches. In 
an environment of limited knowledge, uncertainty, change, and diversity, the design of a 
reform and related loans should not be constrained by the rigid application of general rules, 
or international best practice that may not fit particular country settings.
At the same time, given accumulated knowledge and experience, neither should policy 
reform start from scratch. Best practice and experience can provide guidelines for the design 
of reforms and loans, but measured against a particular country context. Where such best 
practice guidelines do not fit, appropriate reform measures will need to be devised based on 
the characteristics of the specific policy issues and particular country circumstances, but also 
reflecting accepted general principles, e.g., the role of markets and prices.
An important challenge for an IFI is to ensure that the implementation requirements of 
reform measures in the policy-based support document are fully considered in the loan 
design by identifying potential gaps and constraints to feasibility.
Source: G. Abonyi.
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In particular, those who formulate PBLs have often overlooked the fact that reforms 
demand administrative, technical, and organizational capacities that tend to be in short 
supply in countries undertaking such reforms. The design of PBLs must, from the 
outset, consider institutional capacity building, often involving considerable time and 
resources. Again, if this is not done, problems can surface at the implementation stage, 
when institutions cannot or do not undertake required activities or deliver the expected 
outputs—and when compensating for capacity constraints is likely to be harder than 
earlier in the process.
Beyond individual organizations, policy reform generally involves getting a number 
of institutions to work together within a common framework. This requires a level 
of sophistication in coordinating a network of institutions involved in implementing 
policy reforms. The alignment of incentives and the coordination necessary for 
implementing reform measures involving multiple agencies cannot be assumed, 
for example, as following automatically from the establishment of a coordinating 
committee. It is essential to explicitly identify and assess the relationships among 
relevant institutions with respect to the implementation of specific reforms, including 
the associated coordination and cooperation requirements. The design of a reform and 
related support should reflect the ability of governments to make credible commitments 
in terms of the implementation capacity of a relevant set of key institutions.
Operational Implications for Reform Design
The assessment of the institutional capacity gap and its implications for reform design 
requires a detailed analysis of organizations involved with the implementation of 
the reform measures. The approach is similar in logic to stakeholder analysis, but 
focuses on institutions. It begins with identifying the set of institutions working 
with, contributing to, and supporting all the measures in a reform. It then requires 
identifying the specific role of each institution in key activities and outputs for each 
reform, as well as tracing the interinstitutional (network) linkages that exist (or may be 
required) to implement particular measures. Making explicit key assumptions about 
institutional capacity requirements provides a basis for identifying and assessing 
potential capacity gaps and resolving them. The institutional analysis involves asking 
questions systematically (Box 1.8).
Stages of the Policy Reform Process
Politics and institutional factors influence each stage of the policy reform process, 
as  well as the outcome of the process as a whole, through the participation of 
multiple stakeholders and institutions. What happens in practice can, therefore, 
often be quite different from any expected optimal outcomes—for example, in terms 
of initiating or endorsing reform, and in constraining available policy options. For 
this reason, the preparation of a reform and related support should reflect a realistic 
appreciation in the particular context and constraints of the policy process, and their 
implication for reform design and implementation. 
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Box 1.8
Key Questions for Assessing Institutional Factors 
in a Political Economy Context
•	 Which are the core institutions involved in implementing each reform measure?
•	 What are the key decisions and actions required from each of these institutions for 
each measure?
•	 What are the key assumptions about the implementation capacity of each institution 
implicit in the proposed reform measures?
•	 Are these assumptions about institutional capacity realistic in light of the existing 
capabilities of these institutions?
•	 How do decisions/activities of individual institutions necessary for implementing each 
reform measure relate to each other?
•	 What are the significant gaps between the existing and required institutional capacity 
that could constrain implementation of particular reform measures—at the level of 
each individual institution, and in terms of coordination and cooperation requirements 
among the network of institutions?
•	 What is required to reduce each gap—in organizational capabilities, resources, time, or 
institutional linkages and coordination; or alternatively, how can the reform measures be 
modified so they are more in line with existing institutional capacity, yet stay relevant?
Source: G. Abonyi.
This appreciation should begin with how policy issues get on the policy agenda—the 
set of issues that key public decision makers regard as problems—for priority attention, 
including the steps and actors involved in endorsing reforms. It can help identify key 
issues and constraints early so that they may be accommodated in the design of the 
reform (such as how specific reform measures are structured) and what supporting 
activities may be required (such as capacity building) in estimating the time required 
for the reform and related support. 
The policy reform process, which is often both sequential and iterative, involves a 
set of interrelated decisions and activities. Its five stages—outlined in Figure 1.1 and 
highlighted in Box 1.9—are now discussed in more depth. 
Initiating Reform: Getting Issues on the Policy Agenda
Just because a policy issue is seen by some stakeholders as not meeting its 
expectations does not mean that it will be seen as a collective (or societal) priority and 
addressed through the policy reform process. Policy reform tends to involve readily 
understandable costs for identifiable groups—the “reform losers”—who therefore 
have the incentive and may have the means to block or blunt proposed change. 
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The expected benefits, on the other hand, often take longer to materialize and are 
therefore less certain, providing less of an incentive for prospective “reform winners” 
to mobilize support. Furthermore, multiple issues are competing for the attention 
and resources of policy makers at any given time.
For these reasons, reforms are rarely made simply because they are a good idea. They 
are pushed through because evidence accumulates about perceived policy problems, 
or about the expected benefits of change. But reform also usually requires deliberate 
actions to initiate change on the part of key public decision makers, including 
politicians, legislators, and senior government officials. They control the necessary 
Box 1.9
Stages of the Policy Reform Process
•	 Initiating reform. The following questions need to be answered. How did the issues 
addressed by the reform get on the policy agenda as priorities, particularly as there 
are generally many policy issues competing for attention at any given time? Were they 
put on the agenda primarily by domestic stakeholders or pushed by external interests 
(e.g., international financial institutions)? And through what means, in what forums?
•	 Managing the complexity of policy issues. Since policy issues are inherently complex, 
the design of a reform involves reducing this complexity by the selection of certain 
aspects of the policy issue for attention—the diagnosis—so that policy makers and 
implementing agencies can act on such issues. Questions include: What is involved 
in this selection or diagnosis process? What is the subsequent design process used 
to generate a policy-based loan? Who are the participants? How relevant is the 
resulting policy-based loan in addressing the policy issue? How feasible in terms of 
implementation in the country context?
•	 Endorsing reform. Reforms need to be legitimized, through endorsement or approval. 
Questions include: Where and when in the policy process are such endorsement 
decisions made? By whom? Do they credibly signal the government’s binding 
commitment to these reforms, for example, issuing guidelines/instructions for 
implementation and allocating required resources? What is the relationship between 
endorsing and implementing reforms: What is actually needed for implementation 
to proceed?
•	 Implementing reform. This involves institutions that transform proposed reform 
measures into organizational actions. Questions include: Can the issuance of a decree 
or law—“stroke of the pen reforms”—assumed to be the same as implanting lasting 
change? What else is involved or required in implementing reform measures? And in 
practical terms, what is the meaning of “policy implementation” in a world of politics 
and institutions?
•	 Sustaining reform. Policy reform entails a process of change over time. Sustaining reform 
is particularly important when fundamental institutional changes are involved, such as 
judicial reform or introducing a value-added tax.
Source: G. Abonyi.
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resources and can influence the actions and outputs of key institutions, e.g., the 
implementing agencies of government.
In addition, an issue needs to be placed on the policy agenda, since so doing transforms 
it from the private concern of particular stakeholders to one that is formally recognized 
in the policy process as requiring a collective response.7 Getting an issue on the 
policy agenda may be the result of domestic pressures, for example, from a coalition 
of sufficiently influential interest groups, e.g., civil society organizations, business 
associations, or political parties, and brought to public attention through forums such 
as the media, legislature, or even street demonstrations. Alternatively, issues may end 
up on the policy agenda because of pressure on government from external agents with 
sufficient leverage, such as IFIs, which may control access to resources.
7 An extensive literature discusses policy agenda setting. See, for example, J. W. Kingdon. 1995. Agendas, 
Alternatives, and Public Policies; and F. R. Baumgartner and B. D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability 
in American Politics.
Box 1.10
A Note on Crisis Versus Noncrisis Conditions
Given the challenges of change, a crisis may create conditions and pressures for policy reform.a
A crisis can provide an opportunity for reforms that may be far more difficult to put on 
the policy agenda when there is no sense of urgency. In practice, reforms initiated in crisis 
conditions may or may not be linked to the nature of the crisis.
However, from a process perspective, unless the necessary conditions, such as political 
support and institutional capacity, are put in place to sustain reform measures beyond the 
crisis, reforms initiated in such conditions may be temporary at best. When the sense of crisis 
is over, opposition to reforms may strengthen, and government commitment may weaken.
The challenge is to ensure that reforms introduced in crisis conditions are sustained, 
particularly given the extended period involved in the reform process. Care is needed in 
using crises as an opportunity for policy reform, as the implementation and sustainability of 
reforms are conditioned by the general political and institutional environment of a country. 
Crisis conditions may therefore be used to initiate reforms, but it is essential to ensure that 
conditions, e.g., political and institutional factors, are in place such that the reforms are likely 
to persist beyond the crisis.b Although there are important differences in reform in crisis and 
noncrisis conditions, from a process perspective the core issues for an effective reform and 
policy-based loan are similar. 
a  For an excellent discussion of this general issue, see M. Tommasi. 2004. Crisis, Political Institutions and 
Economic Reforms: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. In Toward Pro-Poor Policies: Aid Institutions and 
Globalization. Copublished by the World Bank and Oxford University Press, pp. 135–164.
b  This general issue is often reflected in “second-tranche problems.” This involves difficulties in a borrowing 
country meeting conditions for disbursing the second tranche of a policy loan, often attributed to a lessening 
sense of urgency for change (and financing), and thus weakening government commitment to reform.
Source: G. Abonyi.
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Given the uncertainties and risks associated with policy reform and an 
understandable reluctance of public decision makers to undertake such changes, 
particular factors tend to influence how the policy agenda is set. Crises may provide 
a window of opportunity for focusing attention on issues (Box 1.10). Alternatively, 
there may be trigger events, such as changes in the external context, that give a 
policy issue priority. Or there may be individuals—policy champions—who are 
particularly effective in getting issues on the agenda.8
Furthermore, how issues are framed also influences the perception on relative 
priority and acceptability they are likely to be accorded. Issues framed as problems—
stressing the expected rising costs of no reform—are likely to be given greater and 
earlier attention than policy issues framed as opportunities, focusing on the expected 
benefits of reform.9 It is important that those involved in preparing a reform and its 
related support understand the nature of the agenda-setting process. This involves 
asking questions, as exemplified in Box 1.11.
Once the issues have been placed on the reform agenda, agents need to focus on how 
to simplify the complexity involved in the proposed policy reform.
8 Some of whom appear in Chapter 3.
9 The pioneering work in this area is that of D. Kahneman and A. Tversky. 1979. Prospect Theory: 
An  Analysis of Decision under Risk that shaped the field of behavioral economics. See also 
D.  Kahneman. 2003. Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics. 
The American Economic Review. 93(5). pp. 1449–1475. December.
Box 1.11
Questions for Initiating Reform
•	 How did the policy issue come to be recognized as a “problem”? By whom?
•	 How did the policy issue get on the government agenda, e.g., through what channels—
in what forums; brought by which stakeholders?
•	 Which additional stakeholders exercised strong influence on setting this agenda? What 
has been the role of external stakeholders, e.g., international financial institutions?
•	 Are there stakeholders with an interest in the policy issue that feel excluded from the 
agenda-setting process? What is their interest in the policy issue? What is their power to 
influence other stages in the policy process, e.g., endorsement, implementation? What 
reform-blocking or reform-delaying coalitions among such stakeholders are possible?
•	 In light of opposing stakeholders, how strong or stable is the coalition of interests 
(stakeholders) to keep the issue on the policy agenda?
•	 How is the issue framed on the policy agenda, e.g., stressing more the expected benefits 
of reform, or alternatively the costs of not initiating change?
Source: G. Abonyi.
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Managing the Complexity of Policy Issues:  
Why Policy-Based Lending Design Matters
How an issue is posed or structured on the policy agenda plays a significant role in 
shaping the response. PBL design defines the scope (the range and number of reform 
measures) and focus (the specific aspects of the policy problem to be addressed) 
of the reform, setting its political and institutional boundaries and characteristics. 
This also determines the associated gains and losses from specific reform measures, 
and therefore potential reform losers and reform winners. In turn, this shapes the 
political debate. Similarly, setting the scope and focus of reforms delineates the 
set of institutions and institutional relationships that will have a role to play in 
policy reform.
Political decision makers at the outset of the reform process may have a broad 
understanding of the issues and needs for reforms but need much advice on 
articulating the policy problem and required solutions. This often gives the IFI-led 
PBL design teams latitude, early in the reform process, to define the boundaries of 
the policy issues, as well as scope for specific reform initiatives. The design process 
may also include some form of public participation or consultation that may touch 
key reform measures prepared by the design team. However, in practice, the design 
of a PBL is often controlled by a small group of technocrats or policy planners, and, 
if IFI financed, international experts and IFI staff as well.
The scope, focus, and structure of a reform and related loan reflect the diagnosis of 
the initial policy issue. The diagnosis involves constructing a “model” in some form, 
even if only a qualitative or verbal representation of the policy issue, to identify 
where specific reform measures are likely to be most effective in bringing about 
desired outcomes.
Given the complexity of policy issues, defining the scope, focus, and boundaries is 
a balancing act. Traditionally, this has involved the technical and economic analysis 
of the policy issue to ensure the relevance of proposed reforms, e.g., identifying 
key variables, relationships, and possible areas where reform measures are likely to 
make a difference. To ensure the feasibility of reforms, it is equally important to 
include analysis of the political and institutional dimensions of both the policy issue 
and policy-based design options. This will reveal the gains and losses associated 
with the initial problem and with alternative reform measures considered—thus 
reform losers and reform winners—as well as the set of institutions and institutional 
relationships related to loan implementation. Thus, the design of the reform and 
loan should reflect both the technical and economic relevance, and the political and 
institutional feasibility of proposed reforms.
Indeed, understanding such feasibility is essential in order to assess, in advance, 
the likely effectiveness of reform. Technical analysis is just one key input. Whatever 
their technical or economic merits, if reform measures are politically unacceptable, 
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they will be difficult to implement and sustain. Therefore, governments generally 
need to have—as should IFIs—a level of confidence that reform measures will be 
able to command and sustain the minimum necessary political consensus to be 
implementable.
Thus, the reform and loan design process and its participants are crucial in 
shaping the content and outcomes of policy reforms. Policy-based design decisions 
(Box 1.12) then shape the subsequent policy reform debate and implementation.
Endorsing Reform: The Policy Decision Process
The policy decision process has both formal and informal dimensions. The formal 
dimension depends on a country’s existing institutional framework. For example, in 
a parliamentary setting, it will include political parties that discuss, debate, and vote 
in a legislature on the reform and PBL. In a non-parliamentary setting, it can involve 
a specified procedure for the executive or presidential endorsement of proposed 
reforms. The informal dimension can include lobbying, informal bargaining and 
negotiations, use of the media, as well as public demonstrations by stakeholders to 
influence the actions of policy makers.
Understanding a country’s policy decision process involves these two dimensions. 
It requires knowledge of the government structure, systems, and functions—the 
formal policy decision process in general, and agencies and requirements related 
to specific policy areas in particular. It also needs an appreciation of the informal 
process likely to be operative on endorsing policy reforms (Box 1.13).
Box 1.12
Policy-Based Design Decisions
•	 The design stage (and later as the policy reform unfolds) requires an appreciation of the 
time required, sequencing, and capacity requirements for undertaking implementation 
actions by particular stakeholders and organizations.
•	 The role of political and institutional assessments is to link explicitly the design of the 
reform and loans to their implementation; that is, they need to be made at the design 
stage in order to identify potential constraints on implementing reform measures.
•	 The design stage should explicitly consider the fact that reform implementation involves 
(i) consensus-building and mutual accommodation among key stakeholders, changing 
systems, processes, structures, incentives, behaviors, and cultures in organizations; and 
(ii) the development of effective interlinkages among implementing agencies.
•	 The design phase has to explicitly consider sustainability, including issues such as 
budget implications, staffing capacity, and institutional considerations.
Source: G. Abonyi.
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Box 1.13
Endorsing Conditions in Policy-Based Lendings
In policy-based lending (PBL), certain reform measures are given special significance and 
are designated as “conditions” that must be met for money from such loans to be disbursed. 
Conditions link or intermediate the policy issue and PBL design, defining the primary 
operational focus of PBL. They simplify the complexity of policy issues by specifying key 
actions expected to be of particular importance in resolving the policy issues addressed by 
the reform.
The concept of conditions implicitly assumes a great deal of knowledge about the policy issue 
and its relationship to development—about effective actions for bringing about reforms and 
desired results. The greater the number of conditions or of details (or both), the greater the 
assumed knowledge about the policy issue, its development context, and the feasible means 
for its effective resolution. 
In an environment of complexity and uncertainty, care should be taken not to include too 
many conditions and excessive details in specific conditions. “Overdesigning” reforms 
has generally not been the most effective means for PBL to support implementable and 
sustainable reform, prompting international financial institutions to reduce the number of 
conditions in PBL and to shift toward outcome-based approaches. Yet results to date have 
been mixed.
Still, it is essential not to lose sight of the basic intent of PBL in the number and details of 
conditions. The purpose of PBL is to contribute to effective policy reform. What is essential 
is to make explicit the assumed logical relationship between the policy context and PBL; to 
ensure that proposed reform measures in general, and conditions in particular, are anchored 
in (and responsive to) key elements of the policy issue; and that the measures and conditions 
are clearly linked to the expected outcomes. This can also provide a clear, common frame of 
reference for discussion among stakeholders, including international financial institutions 
and the government.
As a rule of thumb, the following questions can be asked to test the relevance of each proposed 
reform measure that is selected as a condition:
•	 What is the logical relationship between it and particular elements of the policy issue to 
which it is intended to respond? What is their relevance and importance to the rationale 
for policy reform?
•	 What is the logical relationship between it and particular expected outcomes, and in 
what particular ways do these outcomes contribute to the broader purpose and desired 
results of the policy reform?
•	 What difference to the policy reform results would be seen if it was left out of the PBL? 
Is that difference significant?
Source: G. Abonyi.
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Stakeholders (such as domestic and foreign investors as well as IFIs) expect 
the output of the policy decision process at some “stopping point” to lead to a 
decision endorsing a PBL, signaling the binding commitment of the government 
to undertake the approved reform measures. They then expect this endorsement to 
become the basis for instructions for implementation to, for example, government-
related agencies, and for allocation of required resources, as through the budgetary 
process.10
Stakeholders often take this stopping point and associated binding commitment as 
having been reached when the head of government formally announces a reform, 
or in the case of a PBL, when the minister of finance or head of the central bank 
commits in writing to the IFI-financed loan. However, in practice, the output of the 
policy decision process as a binding commitment to reform can prove illusory.
The policy decision process (Box 1.14) can be represented as a sequence or network 
of linked decisions and actions that result in particular policy outputs (such as a 
bankruptcy decree or law, or a policy to remove fertilizer subsidies).
10 See, for example, Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002), Grindle and Thomas (1991), and Grindle (2002).
Box 1.14
The Policy Decision Process
This process entails
•	 Key decisions or actions required, as related to the endorsement of specific reform 
measures, and to the reform as a whole, and associated inputs needed for such steps to 
be taken;
•	 Actors: institutions, groups, roles involved in each decision or action;
•	 Sequence: logical precedence relationships among decisions or actions and associated 
institutions and roles, e.g., what step is required to be completed before another step 
can begin, and by whom;
•	 Time frame: estimates of the time required for key decisions or actions for each reform 
measure, and for the reform as a whole; and
•	 Potential constraints that could have a heavy impact on the process, including timing 
or content, of key decisions or actions, and factors likely to influence the occurrence of 
such constraints.
Source: G. Abonyi.
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Detailed information on the policy decision process provides inputs essential for the 
design of an effective reform and related loan.11 For example, it allows the identification 
of a “critical path” for the policy process (e.g., critical steps, key institutions, key 
stakeholders, associated time frame) and potential constraints that could affect the 
approval, content, and initiation of the reform—for example, key legislation. Such 
information can be used to assess the feasibility of proposed reform measures, 
including their timing, in order to identify additional supporting activities and 
resources that may need to be accommodated in the design of the reform and related 
support. Alternatively, this information can also be used to modify proposed reform 
measures to increase the likelihood of their timely endorsement and implementation.
The formulation of public policy in general and the design of PBLs in particular do 
not automatically result in successful implementation. Once a reform has been put 
on the policy agenda, designed, and then endorsed, its success lies in how well it is 
implemented by relevant stakeholders and institutions, and whether it endures over 
time. The following section discusses some of the aspects seen in successful reform 
implementation, while the one after that looks into sustainability.
The more general the focus of stakeholder consultations, the easier will consensus 
likely to be reached, and the less time may be needed. However, the risk is of 
differences emerging as the details of reform measures and, in the case of a 
PBL, associated conditions are revealed during the policy-making process and 
implementation.
The more specific the focus of stakeholder consultations, as on particular reform 
measures, the more difficult it may be to reach consensus, and the more time is likely 
to be needed. However, once such consensus is reached, there may be less risk of 
differences emerging later, during policy making and implementation.
Implementing Reform
Implementing reform successfully involves introducing reforms and ensuring 
that their core elements are undertaken as planned and that the reform measures 
are accepted by key stakeholder groups and institutions. Such success largely rests 
on the ability to implant change through the cooperation and collaboration of 
key stakeholders, and the actions of relevant organizations.
There are two general types of policy reforms: changes in rules and regulations, or 
“stroke of the pen” reforms; and changes in stakeholder and organizational behavior 
and performance—implanting long-term change. Both are important, but have 
different implications for implementation.
11 Information on the details of the policy decision process may be summarized in a “process map.” There 
are a range of tools and extensive experience with process mapping. For an introduction and examples, 
see Process Mapping Associates. 2007. Process Mapping. http://www.processmaps.com/mapping.htm
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Implementation of reforms may involve the issuing of decisions, decrees, and 
regulations by the government. These are often the types of measures that are 
included in the first phase of a reform as they are often easier to manage. Examples 
include a bankruptcy decree or law, an executive decision to establish a commercial 
court system, and the development of a comprehensive program for watershed 
protection. In each of these cases the reform is a type of decision or a plan of action. 
These reforms are important in initiating change and in signaling to government 
agencies and the general public the direction of further changes. However, they 
do not automatically lead to the implanting of reforms in terms of basic changes 
in incentives, behavior, organizational activities and performance, or outcomes.12
Box  1.15 outlines the factors that relate to the implementation of reforms as 
implanting change.
12 The following is based, in part, on Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002), which takes an explicitly 
implementation-based perspective on policy reform.
Box 1.15
Reform Implementation
•	 Reform implementation is generally not a linearly sequential, coherent, or predictable 
process. Implementation-related activities may move in many directions and in many 
forums at the same time; may be fragmented; interrupted by technical, political, or 
organizational factors; unpredictable; uncertain; and long term.
•	 Implementation of reforms and policy-based loans generally involves many 
stakeholders and organizations of different types that need to change individually and 
collectively.
•	 An important dimension of implementation and sustainability then involves aligning 
incentives, tasks, and activities of multiple organizations that are collectively involved in 
reform implementation. This requires an analysis of these organizations—individually 
and as a group—to identify existing and required task-related linkages and potential 
constraints on cooperation.
•	 Policy implementation is political not only among stakeholders and institutions but 
also within organizations. For example, redefining an organization’s role, strategy, 
activities, and associated resource and power distribution creates winners and losers 
in the institution.
•	 Policy implementation at the institution level is fundamentally about organizational 
change. It involves the need to motivate change, to manage the transition or change 
process within the organization in terms of expected performance, and to understand 
and shape the political dynamics of organizational transformation.
Source: G. Abonyi.
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Sustaining Reform
The challenge of sustainability is to ensure that reform endures over time in a 
complex and dynamic environment. Meeting this challenge requires maintaining 
the core purpose and wide acceptance of the reform against pressures that seek to 
block, erode, and reverse such changes, and against constraints on organizational 
effectiveness that may emerge. This is of particular importance when a reform 
is introduced under crisis conditions and must be sustained in a postcrisis 
environment. Since the pressures that emerge against reform are largely political 
(such as opposing stakeholder coalitions) and institutional (including capacity 
constraints on maintaining the reform measures), sustainability is primordially 
shaped by political and institutional factors.13
Furthermore, reforms must persist against basic changes in the environment of 
reform that are not directly related to PBL but that condition its sustainability, 
including a fundamental shift in the country’s political system.
Sustainability often requires introducing new measures that were not part of 
the original reform or PBL but emerge as supplementary initiatives essential for 
protecting the core purpose of the reforms—for example, for ensuring that watersheds 
are maintained for the common good and not for private exploitation by particular 
stakeholders.
Sustainability involves a political and institutional assessment of planned reform 
measures over an extended time to identify and anticipate potential pressures. Since 
such pressures often arise from changes in the broader environment of reform, 
this assessment requires an explicit analysis of the country context. It also requires 
building into a PBL an effective monitoring system that can identify changes in 
the immediate and larger policy-based environment that may require adapting the 
original reform measures, while maintaining their core integrity and purpose.
Finally, sustainability involves an appreciation at the design stage that enduring 
reforms are built on changes in culture—of stakeholders and of institutions 
involved in the reform process. This, in turn, requires developing incentives and 
building capabilities that provide opportunities for stakeholders and institutions 
involved in reforms to learn and change over time.
13 An important book that looks specifically at the sustainability of reforms and focuses on the political 
economy dimension is E. M. Patashnik. 2008. Reforms at Risk: What Happens after Major Policy 
Changes are Enacted? See also J. R. Century and A. J. Levy. 2002. Sustaining Change: A Study of Nine 
School Districts with Enduring Programs.
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Conclusion
This chapter suggests that the design of effective policy reforms in general, and PBL 
by IFIs in particular, requires a more fundamental and explicit recognition and 
accommodation of political economy factors that condition the reform process. It 
presents a framework for the analysis of the political economy dimension of reform, 
in order to strengthen the loan design and implementation process. Understanding 
the implications of the political economy factors in policy reform, through the 
application of such a framework, is unlikely to eliminate all the difficulties associated 
with policy reform and PBL, given the nature and challenges of policy issues and 
the characteristics of the reform process. However, with better understanding and 
explicit consideration of such factors, the frequency and intensity of the problems 
associated with policy reforms may be substantially reduced. The result is likely to be 
more relevant and feasible reform initiatives, and a strengthening of the contribution 
of PBL by IFIs to the development process.
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Political Economy of the 
Reformed Value-Added Tax 
in the Philippines
Chapter 2
Romeo Bernardo and Christine Tang
Introduction
U sing the framework in Chapter 1, this chapter zeroes in on the political economy aspects of the reformed value-added tax (RVAT)—a critical reform underpinning the program of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for the 
Philippines—in the context of government efforts to achieve fiscal consolidation. 
For a time perceived as hostage to political events, the law’s eventual implementation 
unlocked donor financing, restored market confidence in the country, and placed 
the government in a position of strength to manage the impact of the 2008 global 
financial crisis.
Reflecting the seriousness of the reform situation, when ADB unveiled its 2005–2007 
country strategy and program for the Philippines in July 2005, political economy 
concerns were plainly at the forefront of program designers’ minds. In a “clear 
break with past practice,” it announced that “new lending could range from zero 
to as much as US$1.5 billion” as “the strategy acknowledges the complex political 
economy of the Philippines and how this affects the pace and quality of reforms.”14
The shift in lending approach came just 2 years after the Philippines’ first country 
assessment program evaluation where a third of completed projects reviewed were 
rated unsuccessful on a host of political economy factors, such as lack of institutional 
capacity, inadequate budget allocations, and lack of political will. The country 
strategy and program also came at the height of a politically turbulent period in the 
14 www.adb.org/media, “ADB’s Three-Year Lending Program for the Philippines will Depend on Pace of 
Government Reforms,” 13 July 2005.
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country that cast a cloud over the dialogue between the government and the donor 
community and palpably reminded reform workers of the need to tread carefully in 
pushing change.
The chronicle presented in this chapter supports some stylized facts about reform 
in a developing country context, such as crisis as trigger, political change as 
window of opportunity, sound economic analysis as guideposts, and information 
campaigns as awareness tools to garner public support. It also brings out challenges 
to committing government to reform in a politically charged environment 
and to sustaining reforms in a young democracy where politicians’ motivations 
are dictated by the electoral cycle, where this policy myopia allows institutional 
deficiencies to fester, and where, therefore, civil society becomes an active player to 
fill institutional or governance gaps and complement efforts of reform-minded civil 
servants in securing needed change.
In contrast to the other chapters, the authors here approach the subject from 
an outside observer’s perspective, melding firsthand insights of key players, 
observations of other experts in the field, and records of facts in publicly available 
documents. An account of the historical and institutional contexts of value-added 
tax (VAT) reform in the Philippines begins the story. To guide readers, Annex 1 
provides a timeline of events and Annex 2 outlines the Philippines legislative 
process through which the reforms had to pass. 
Political Economy Context
The revolutionary government installed following the 1986 People Power Movement 
carried out an extensive program to restructure the Philippines tax system. The VAT 
was introduced under the 1986 Tax Reform Package and, after a massive information 
drive, was implemented at a 10% rate in 1988 to replace a number of sales taxes 
on goods.
With democratic institutions restored under the 1987 Constitution, subsequent 
efforts to expand the VAT base to enhance its efficiency became a harder struggle as 
sectors falling outside the VAT net lobbied Congress to keep them exempt. Hence, 
Republic Act (RA) 7716 passed in 1994, which sought to expand VAT coverage, 
was challenged in the Supreme Court and the amended law, RA 8241, passed in late 
1996, expanded anew the list of items exempt from the VAT (the list used up all 
the letters of the alphabet). Moreover, a provision in the law to impose the VAT on 
professionals, supposed to take effect in 1998, was deferred thrice by three separate 
pieces of legislation (RA 8424, RA 8761, and RA 9010), with images of the country’s 
top actors and television personalities demonstrating outside Congress still vivid in 
people’s minds. The exemption accorded to professionals expired in 2003 when they 
were finally subjected to the VAT. Unfortunately, another law (RA 9238) came into 
effect the following year, restoring the VAT-exempt status of doctors and lawyers.
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Figure 2.1
Public Sector Financial Performance
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Similar defects elsewhere in the tax system (such as non-indexation of excise taxes 
and proliferation of tax incentives), traced partly to a weak tax reform law in 1997 
(RA 8424), coupled with the changing domestic economic structure (growing sectors 
lightly taxed) and persistent difficulties in tax administration (linked to resource and 
capacity constraints in collection agencies), saw the government tax effort (defined 
as tax receipts as a share of gross domestic product [GDP]) on a steady downtrend 
starting the late 1990s, from 17% in 1997 to 12.4% in 2004 (Manasan 2002).15
Initially, the need to engage in stimulus spending after the late 1990s’ Asian crisis 
increased the government’s budget deficit. However, as tax and revenue effort 
continued to decline (due also to fewer privatization deals given reduced investment 
appetite for Asian assets), concerns over fiscal sustainability started to threaten 
macroeconomic stability, and the government resorted to significant expenditure 
compression to rein in the deficit and avoid a debt spiral, something that markets 
were closely monitoring in light of Argentina’s 2002 debt default. As the government 
continued to miss deficit targets and pushed out the date for balancing its budget, 
international rating agencies downgraded the sovereign credit and, as part of its 
postprogram monitoring, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) urged the 
government to consider raising the VAT rate. Soon after Finance Secretary Jose 
Camacho resigned in November 2003 after roughly 2.5 years in office, he warned of 
a fiscal crisis (Figure 2.1).
All this coincided with a politically tumultuous period in the country sparked 
by another people power uprising in early 2001 that forced the popularly elected 
President Joseph Estrada from office. In contrast to the 1986 revolution, the 
2001 movement alienated a large segment of society—the lower class that formed 
Estrada’s support base—which at one point attempted a people power of their 
own to oust Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Estrada’s vice-president who succeeded 
him. International and local experts likewise saw the Philippines’ failure to follow 
constitutional processes in removing a misbehaving president from office as an 
indictment of the country’s formal political institutions, revealing an immature 
democratic system.
In light of the manner in which President Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, 
legitimacy issues hounded her as she served out the remaining 3  years of her 
predecessor’s term. The situation made it very hard for her to push any reform,16
much less one that would raise people’s tax burden. Governance, particularly 
in terms of indicators of political stability, control of corruption, and the rule of law, 
suffered as well (Figure 2.2), as she was seen as pulling all the stops to stay in power, 
employing populist measures that worsened the fiscal situation (by not, for example, 
increasing electricity tariffs).
15 Data are computed using 1985-based GDP series for comparability with earlier years (data for new 
series start only in 1999).
16 Notable economic legislation passed in the early years of the administration included the Electric 
Power Industry Reform Act (which was started under Estrada’s term) and the Anti-Money Laundering 
Act in 2001, and the Procurement Reform Act and Special Purpose Vehicle Act in 2002.
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To her credit, realizing that raising taxes was not an option, she tried early on 
to improve tax administration by appointing, in late 2002, Guillermo Parayno as 
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which accounts for roughly 80% 
of government’s tax revenues. Commissioner Parayno’s systems-driven approaches 
(such as improving input VAT audit trails) and high-profile enforcement 
programs,17 which were intended to raise the risk–reward equation for tax evasion, 
were widely commended. But revenue gains from introducing administrative 
changes take time, and this was evident in the flattish change in the tax effort at 
that time, despite the reforms.
Still, despite the deteriorating fiscal situation, economic growth even accelerated 
from less than 2% in 2001 to 6.4% in 2004, albeit not quite enough to make a 
significant dent on poverty. Growth was propelled by rising overseas workers’ 
remittances, which cushioned the country’s external payments position and were 
a source of comfort to jittery investors. However, given risks to macroeconomic 
stability from weak government finances, businesses held off new investments and 
the economy became stuck in what analysts regarded as low-level equilibrium.
17 These are Run After Tax Evaders (RATE), Run After the Smugglers (RATS), and Revenue Integrity 
Protection Service (RIPS).
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Explaining the Odds: Reform Process of the RVAT
Even with the fiscal problem simmering, as various parties inside and outside the 
public sector prodded the executive to fix its weak finances, the government could 
not immediately do so. A basic lesson from past experience with tax—or any—
reform in the Philippines is that presidential leadership is a necessary ingredient for 
pushing change. This meant that any initiative to impose new taxes would have to 
wait until after the 2004 elections. Given a fresh mandate, the President could rely 
on her goodwill to secure public support for an unpopular tax increase, which would 
also be needed to convince legislators.
Even as she pulled together resources within the executive to craft reform legislation 
and see reform implementation through, she could, apart from applying moral 
suasion and expending political capital, use the vast powers of her office and control 
over budget disbursements, including congressional allocations and civil service 
appointments, to secure legislative support. At the same time, political economy 
considerations required the President to draw on personal relationships to remove 
or reduce resistance from reform losers, especially when these belonged to politically 
and economically powerful groups who could block or influence the direction of 
reform, including through direct ties with members of the legislature.
However, just because the political environment was ripe for reform did not mean 
that new tax measures could easily be pushed, especially an indirect tax like the VAT 
that was widely regarded as regressive. Not only was the issue of fiscal sustainability 
too technical and uninteresting to the person on the street but popular sentiment, 
based on various estimates of tax leakages reaching as much as 8% of GDP,18 was 
that the government needed to direct efforts at catching tax evaders first. Even the 
President, who at the time wanted to repeal the VAT, apparently needed a fair amount 
of convincing before she finally embraced the measure.
With the President on board, the next challenge was Congress, which under the 
Constitution has the exclusive power to tax, that is, reforms in taxation should 
emanate from the House of Representatives. Past reform efforts that involved securing 
legislation from the over 200-member House of Representatives and the 24-member 
Senate showed that navigating the complex legislative environment introduces 
tremendous uncertainty into the reform process in terms of time, reform features, and 
policy trade-offs. The difficulties stem from the narrow interests19 driving individual 
18 Department of Finance estimate for 1997 covering the collections of both the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue and the Bureau of Customs.
19 By putting together information on submitted statements of assets of members of the House of 
Representatives at the time and property records available publicly, Eric Gutierrez (2000) found 
“a House of Representatives drawn from an elite that has wealth, education and political pedigree.” 
Moreover, he noted that many wealthy families with the economic resources to help politicians win 
public office “tend to back politicians they can trust to protect their interests.”
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legislators’ assessments of reform measures, which can be based on economic and 
political considerations rather than intellectual conviction (Gutierrez 2000). Thus, 
increasing the odds of legislative success requires bringing broad political support 
for reform from within and outside government to bear on members of Congress 
(Box 2.1).
Even then, the risk of narrow interests intruding on legislation remains. Quite apart 
from individual motivations of members of Congress, lobbying of vested interests 
(publicly or privately) and vocal stance of mass-based groups using media to turn 
public opinion in their favor can influence the final shape and form of a bill. The 
presence of media—with its demonstrated power to shape public views on issues 
and personalities—raises the stakes, particularly for members of the Senate who are 
elected nationally. Given the multitude of players, there is therefore a high likelihood 
that a final bill approved by Congress will include second-best solutions and policy 
trade-offs needed to make incremental reform possible. These changes to the 
executive’s proposal, in turn, affect reform outcomes.20
A bill passed by Congress is transmitted to the President, who can veto it or sign 
it into law. Once signed, less controversial measures are typically carried out after 
drawing up the Implementing Rules and Regulations and due notice to the public, in 
which case, the challenge is enforcement—“the Achilles heel of Philippine legislation” 
(Campos and Syquia 2006)—and ensuring that the department responsible for 
implementing the law is equipped to do so properly. In the Philippines, resource 
and capacity constraints are perennial problems of the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
and the Bureau of Customs, the government’s two main collection agencies (and 
20 Congress has, in the past, passed watered-down versions of tax measures proposed by the executive, 
e.g., the 1997 Comprehensive Tax Reform Program and the 2004 excise tax adjustment.
Box 2.1
Key Lessons from the 2003 Procurement Reform Experience
1. The need to create a “well-oiled machine” capable of responding to unanticipated 
events as the reform process unfolds. This requires a cadre of reformers within the 
executive, armed with sufficient technical knowledge and tools, who enjoy support 
from well-organized allies in civil society and the business community and have 
developed a strategic and sustained media campaign.
2. The executive branch had to be unified in the effort.
3. Influential legislators had to be recruited to champion the bill in their respective 
chambers.
Source: Campos and Syquia (2006).
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perceived quite negatively by the public, according to corruption surveys).21 Still, it 
has been shown in the past that putting the right person with the skills and integrity 
in charge of these bureaus can raise the chances of reform success, despite constraints.
For more controversial laws, seeking judicial intervention to rule on constitutionality 
has become part of the playbook of parties opposed to the reform. The Constitution 
grants the Supreme Court the power to review tax laws, a process with uncertain time 
frame, resulting in delays in implementation or worse—if it deems certain provisions 
of the law unconstitutional—a repeat of the legislative process to cure infirmities, 
which opens the door for opposition groups to try to block passage anew.
An unpopular law, even if unchallenged by the Supreme Court, is constantly at risk of 
reversal from populist elements in Congress. The risk is highest at times of stress from 
external shocks, as when international oil price hikes are passed through to domestic 
prices, or close to elections (when initiatives dealing with tax exemptions for favored 
sectors proliferate).
Getting Reform on the Agenda
Timing reform is crucial and the chance for a new beginning came after the 2004 
elections. As it turned out, putting fiscal consolidation on the reform agenda was 
not the challenge. The President, a trained economist and at the time mindful of 
her economic legacy, did this immediately after winning the elections. In her first 
State-of-the-Nation Address in July 2004, she identified the budget deficit as the 
country’s “most urgent problem” and asked Congress to pass revenue measures 
that would raise P80 billion annually and balance the budget by 2010.
Rather, the challenge was to convince the President to endorse the VAT which, 
contrary to the position of the Department of Finance (DOF), she curiously wanted 
to repeal. Moreover, the President’s reform package included various measures that 
tax experts found odd, e.g., adoption of a gross income tax system and a windfall tax 
on telecommunications companies’ (telcos) income or steps that were thought to 
have an uncertain immediate revenue impact, e.g., a tax amnesty and a performance-
driven system for retiring nonperforming employees in revenue agencies despite 
protected civil service tenure (the lateral attrition bill).22
Public debate on the President’s measures moved in parallel, largely revealing, as noted 
by a group of economists from the academe, “broad opposition and deep resentment” 
21 For example, in the 2009 SWS (Social Weather Station) Surveys on Corruption, the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue and the Bureau of Customs scored –57 and –69, respectively, in terms of “net sincere” in 
fighting corruption (Mangahas 2009).
22 While the State-of-the-Nation Address itself did not list the measures, the President identified them in 
a speech before the business community 4 days earlier and posted on the website of the Office of the 
Press Secretary on 22 July 2004.
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and raising doubts whether the urgency of the problem “has been truly understood 
and internalized by the political elite and public alike.” This group, composed of 
11 professors from the University of the Philippines (UP) School of Economics who 
were highly respected in domestic and international policy circles, had at one time or 
another held various senior government positions, and regularly wrote opinion pieces 
in the country’s top newspapers, became the beacon for relieving public ignorance 
about the “deepening crisis” through a 26-page discussion paper on “the real score on 
deficits and the public debt” (De Dios et al. 2004).
The main challenge was to translate this arcane subject into language that would 
raise public awareness and impress policy makers, the business community, civil 
society, and media with the severity of the problem and the limited time left for 
the country to act to avert a crisis. Using personal networks, the group approached 
the news editor of the country’s leading broadsheet, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
which on 23 August 2004 bannered the headline “UP economists warn of RP crash 
in 2 years.” This drew immediate reaction from the President, an alumnus of the 
school, who for the first time acknowledged that the country was “in the midst of 
a fiscal crisis.”
A flurry of activity from Congress followed. News reports suggested that congressional 
efforts, reportedly based on the President’s guidance, were directed at a tax amnesty 
bill, the lateral attrition bill, the indexation of specific taxes on cigarettes and alcohol 
(“sin tax” bill), and some form of tax on telcos. But no VAT. Even within the DOF, 
which advocated expanding the VAT to oil and power and raising the VAT rate, the 
general sentiment appeared to be that the VAT proposal was a desirable measure with 
little chance of passage.
The final outcomes of this initial set of measures would eventually lead the President 
to endorse the VAT. In the particular cases of the sin tax bill (the only tax measure 
passed in 2004) and the telco tax (abandoned), press stories revealed the President’s 
involvement to lessen resistance put up by the economically powerful groups that 
would lose from the measures. These stories also demonstrate the role of high-level 
consensus-building interventions for reforms.
The proposal for the indexation of sin taxes was among the first measures tackled by 
Congress after the President acknowledged a fiscal crisis. This is an area that involved 
powerful vested interests from cigarette and alcohol manufacturers. The DOF 
proposal was for (i) a 37% one-time increase in the specific taxes to preserve their real 
1997 values coupled with (ii) automatic biennial increases in line with actual inflation 
and (iii) simplification of the tax structure. Amid lobbying pressure from the losing 
groups, the President reportedly called for a private meeting in her home with key 
officials of the major producers, after which she announced a compromise formula 
and certified the bill as urgent. The final law signed in December 2004 continued 
to have multiple tax rates and provided only for fixed peso biennial increases in the 
specific taxes with the last adjustment ending 2011, a year after the President’s term 
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of office. At the time, estimated revenues from the law were less than P7 billion versus 
the original P14 billion estimate (De Dios et al. 2005).
With the passage of sin taxes, the President reportedly instructed the House of 
Representatives to prioritize the proposal for a telco tax,23 which took various forms, 
including a windfall tax, a franchise tax, an excise tax, and a tax on text messaging. 
Opposing the proposals in all their forms were the telecommunication companies 
who felt singled out for no other reason than that the two leaders, Globe Telecoms and 
PLDT-Smart Communications, were reporting high incomes at the time. Moreover, 
unlike sin taxes, respected economists, including the UP economists, also spoke up 
against the tax, arguing that communication services, unlike smoking and drinking 
or oil consumption, imposed no negative externalities on society. Nevertheless, the 
press again reported of a meeting between the President and officials of the leading 
telcos24 in early December 2004 after which she dropped the proposal and started 
to favor the VAT. Apparently, despite the presence of leading members of Congress 
pressing the telcos to accept higher taxes, they stood their ground and during 
the negotiations (and reportedly with the strong endorsement of the head of the 
President’s economic team), VAT reform emerged as a better alternative.
Hence, with only two of her proposed eight measures green-lighted, several others 
crossed out as unworkable (e.g., gross income tax, tax on telecoms), or delayed (e.g., 
tax amnesty, rationalization of fiscal incentives) and with expected revenues far 
below target, the President, on 7 January 2005, certified as urgent a bill to reform the 
country’s VAT system.
Managing the Complexity of Reform Issues
The basic policy objective was straightforward: raise P80 billion in revenues from 
a number of new measures to enable the government to balance the budget by 
2010. The VAT bill by then was the only remaining measure that promised enough 
new money to make a dent on the budget deficit—according to DOF estimates, 
P35 billion from the existing VAT base for a 2% rate hike. The challenge was to do 
it in the spirit of “burden sharing,” while considering broad equity issues. The threat 
of crisis and the absence of workable alternatives made the reform an easier sell (i.e., 
the pain of higher taxes is much less than the pain of economic collapse), speeding 
up consensus building with members of Congress, the business community, and 
civil society gravitating toward the VAT.
23 Judy T. Gulane. 2004. Tax on Telecom Firms Said Next on Congress’ List. BusinessWorld. 11 October.
24 See Philippine Inquirer (2004) Palace Opts for Hiked VAT over Franchise Tax. 6 December; 
BusinessWorld (2004) Palace Scored for Watering Down Tax Bills. 8 December; and BusinessWorld
(2004) Finance Unaware of Meeting with Telcos. 7 December.
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Program Design Options
Even before the elections, many local and international economists had advocated an 
increase in the VAT rate as a way out of the fiscal bind. While theoretically inferior 
to direct taxes, the self-policing feature of the VAT was thought to provide tax 
authorities a good handle to overcome institutional limitations in tax administration 
and resistance of the elite that had made it hard for Philippine governments to rely 
on direct taxation of the wealthier class. The argument was that the VAT was the 
lesser evil and, rightly implemented, could be more progressive in practice than 
poorly collected direct taxes (De Dios et al. 2005). The challenge was thus how to 
make the VAT right by keeping exemptions to a minimum so that a broad section of 
the economy shares the burden and at every stage of the production chain, has the 
incentive to track VAT payments on inputs and outputs (Box 2.2).
The first major issue raised against the proposal was that a higher VAT rate, which 
would directly feed into prices of goods and services, would hurt the poor—as much, 
if not more, than the rich. Calculations by the National Tax Research Center, showing 
at the time that the VAT was regressive,25 were used by militant groups to claim that 
the VAT was anti-poor. This tended to raise the emotional timbre in public discussions 
and was exploited by interest groups opposing their proposed coverage under the 
VAT net. Some of the options proposed in one of the House bills, supposedly to 
provide the poor with adequate safety nets, included a multitiered VAT structure and 
exempting very specific manufactured products that the poor favored, e.g., sardines, 
instant noodles, and generic medicines. Both were dropped during discussions at the 
bicameral conference committee.
The second issue was the VAT’s low revenue productivity, defined as VAT revenues 
as a percentage of GDP divided by the VAT rate, which was only 0.31 versus the 
0.37  average for developing countries of Asia and the Pacific (Newhouse and 
Zakharova 2007). This was traced to the many zero ratings26 and exemptions not 
typically found in other countries that have limited tax authorities’ ability to take full 
advantage of the audit trail to improve VAT administration and raise the revenue 
potential of the VAT.
The DOF’s position was to repeal all these nonstandard exemptions and zero 
ratings, which included two sectors that proved politically problematic—petroleum 
and power. Quite apart from some tax trade-offs written into the law itself to 
make the changes more acceptable, this decision meant that the executive had 
to (i)  temporarily shelve another one of the eight proposed tax measures, i.e., a 
25 The calculations showed that those earning P20,000 or less pay 5.2% for VAT out of their income 
versus 3.7% for those earning P500,000 and up. The UP-11, however, argued that the more relevant 
base is expenditures rather than income and, on this basis, showed that the VAT is mildly progressive 
(De Dios et al. 2005).
26 Zero-rated firms, unlike VAT-exempt firms, are allowed to claim input VAT credits.
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Box 2.2
Features of the Reformed Value-Added Tax
1. Value-added tax (VAT) rate increased from 10% to 12% by 1 February 2006
2. Additional goods and services that became subject to VAT
a. coal, natural gas, and other indigenous fuels
b. petroleum products and their raw materials
c. power
d. electric cooperatives
e. domestic transport of passengers by air and sea
f. medical services
g. legal services
h. cotton and cotton seeds: nonfood agricultural products
i. works of art, literary works, musical composition
3. Good and services that became zero-rated
a. Transport of passenger or cargo by air or sea to a foreign country
b. Services rendered to aircrafts and vessels engaged in international transport
c. Sale of goods, supplies, and fuel to aircrafts and vessels engaged in international transport
4. Other VAT-related reforms
a. 5-year spread out crediting of input VAT on capital equipment
b. Cap on input VAT crediting at not more than 70% of output VAT for the same quarter
c. Removal of 1.5% presumptive input VAT on public works contractors
d. Uniform 5% VAT withholding on government purchases of goods, services, and public 
works contracts
5. Mitigating measures
a. Reduction of excise tax on kerosene, diesel, and bunker fuel oil
b. Removal of franchise tax on power distribution utilities
c. Removal of franchise tax on domestic airlines and common carriers tax on domestic 
shipping
d. Increases presumptive input VAT of agro-processors from 1.5% to 4%
e. Increase in marginal threshold from P550,000 to P1.5 million per annum; rental 
threshold from P8,000/month to P10,000/month; and real property threshold from 
P1 million to P2.5 million
6. Non-VAT-related reforms
a. Increases corporate income tax rate to 35% up to end-2008, rate automatically reduced 
to 30% by 2009
b. Increases gross receipts tax from 5% to 7% on royalties, rentals of property, real or 
personal, profits from exchange and all other items treated as gross income, of bank 
and nonbank financial intermediaries
c. Removal of income tax exemption of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming 
Corporation (PAGCOR)
continued on next page
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P2 increase in the excise tax on petroleum products27 and (ii) in light of the high 
cost of power in the Philippines (the highest in Asia), delay anew a provision of 
another law, the Electric Power Industry Reform Act, to impose a universal charge 
on power to cover for stranded costs that could no longer be passed on to the 
national government.28
A third issue had to do with VAT enforcement, which was based on allowing firms that 
have paid VAT on their inputs to credit these against their output VAT assessments. 
The observation at the time was that there was rampant abuse of the input VAT 
crediting system, such that many firms ended up with negative net VAT positions. 
While many argued that this was an enforcement rather than a policy issue, Congress 
decided to place limits on the crediting system through imposing a 70% cap on input 
VAT credits and spreading over 5 years the input VAT credit for capital equipment, 
which had been criticized as a tax on investment (De Dios et al. 2005).
Finally, a number of unrelated provisions, including a time-bound increase in the 
corporate income tax rate and a 2  percentage point increase in the gross receipts 
tax, were included when the bill reached the Senate. These were initially introduced, 
despite protests from businesses, because the Senate was reluctant to raise the 
VAT rate. Their inclusion in the law enhanced its revenue impact, helping to take 
government tax receipts above the P80 billion target.
27 Taxing the negative externality from oil use through increased excises remains a policy challenge to 
date, especially with high world oil prices.
28 The Electric Power Industry Reform Act was intended to restructure and privatize the power sector, 
which had been a major cause of the swelling public sector deficit and debt.
Box 2.2
(continued) 
7. Earmarking of incremental VAT revenues
a. 50% of local government units’ share in incremental VAT collections was earmarked for
 i. Public elementary and secondary education, to finance construction of school 
buildings, school furniture, and in-service training of teachers
 ii. Health premiums of enrolled indigents
 iii. Environmental conservation
 iv. Agricultural modernization, to finance construction of farm-to-market roads and 
irrigation facilities
Sources:  Department of Finance. Briefer on VAT Reform Law. www.vatreform.gov.ph; D. Newhouse and 
D. Zakharova. 2007. Distributional Implications of the VAT Reform in the Philippines. IMF Working 
Paper. No. 07/153. www.imf.org
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Reform Design Process
The final bill passed by Congress differed markedly from the executive’s proposal 
(Table 2.1). The DOF proposal started out seeking only to remove the VAT exemption 
of oil products. Following increasing support for the VAT during DOF presentations 
to the House Ways and Means Committee started as early as November 2004, the 
reform evolved into one seeking to increase the VAT rate and expand its coverage. 
The broader scope meant that this one measure alone would allow the government to 
meet its revenue target.
The championship of the chairs of the Ways and Means Committee of the two 
chambers backstopped by bureaucrats in the DOF and other oversight and line 
agencies was necessary for garnering lawmakers’ support for the measure. So was the 
participation of vocal civil society groups, the academe, donors, and even the business 
community, all of whom came out with statements of support, advocacy pieces, or 
promises of more aid that were published in national daily newspapers. Members of 
these groups also served as resource persons during congressional hearings to help 
clear up issues that had been muddied by populist rhetoric. Many of these were seen 
as nonpartisan and thus lent credibility to the need for the measure.
With the President’s urgent certification of the measure by the start of 2005 and 
the House conducting marathon hearings (33 in 40 days according to the chair of 
the House Ways and Means Committee), a bill to address government’s revenue 
requirements by raising the VAT rate to 12% was transmitted to the Senate within 
3 weeks, while a twin bill focusing on enhancing the VAT’s equity was transmitted a 
month later. Until then, the DOF’s proposal had largely been kept intact except for the 
various complications introduced (such as a multitiered rate structure, exemptions 
of very specific manufactured goods consumed by the poor, and a “no pass-through” 
provision imposed on oil companies).
But the major design shift occurred in the Senate. Unlike members of the lower House 
whose electoral chances within their districts are more dependent on presidential 
political largesse, nationally elected Senators have more reason to be viewed as 
independent of the executive, party affiliations notwithstanding. Thus, especially for 
an issue under the glare of media, securing Senators’ buy-in was going to be a big 
challenge. Again, the President had a crucial role in persuading the chair of the Ways 
and Means Committee to champion the proposal in the upper House.
Even then, Senate deliberations took longer. The most basic issue was the Senate’s 
position to retain the VAT rate at 10%, which detractors charged was to safeguard 
many senators’ electoral chances 2  years down the road. To make up for lost 
revenues, several other provisions were introduced, notably a temporary increase in 
the corporate income tax rate (from 32% to 35%)29 and the limitations on creditable 
29 With a sunset provision to reduce the rate to 30% after 3 years, i.e., by 2009.
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Table 2.1
Changes in Reform Features through the Reform Stages
Pre-RVAT Law 
Regulations (RA 8424)
DOF  
Proposal
HB 3555 and  
HB 3705 SB 1950 RA 9337
VAT rate, %
10% 2-step increase 
conditional on VAT effort
12%a 10% 12% by 2007 if:
a) VAT effort exceeds 
2.8%
b) NG deficit ratio 
exceeds 1.5%
Initial VAT exemptions and zero-ratings, VAT exemptions repealed, Additional zero-ratings
VAT exemptions:
26 items including  
non-standard exemptions 
such as legal and medical 
services, power and 
petroleum
Zero-ratings:
a) Export sales, sale of 
gold to BSP and those 
considered export 
sale under EO 226 
of 1987
b) Foreign currency–
denominated sale
c) Sales to entities 
whose exemption is 
under special laws 
or international 
agreements to which 
the Philippines is a 
signatory
d) Services rendered to 
international shipping 
industry
e) Services to entities 
doing business 
outside the 
Philippines
f) Services to entities 
exempted under 
international 
agreements to which 
the Philippines is a 
signatory
g) Services to entities 
whose export sales 
exceed 70% of the 
annual production
RA 8424 exemptions 
repealed:
a) Coal and natural gas
b) Petroleum products 
and their raw 
materials
c) Importation of 
passenger and/or 
cargo vessels of more 
than 5,000 tons, 
including engine and 
spare parts
d) Sale, importation, 
printing, and 
publication of books
e) Medical services
f) Legal services
RA 8424 exemptions 
repealed:
a) Generation of power
b) Petroleum products and 
raw materials used in 
making them
c) Medical and legal 
servicesb
Special VAT rates and  
multi-tiered VAT rates:
a) 6% for “selected food 
items” (mackerel and 
sardines, milk, refined 
sugar, cooking oil, 
packed noodle-based 
instant meals, miki, 
miswa, sotanghon, 
pancit canton, and 
bihon)
b) 6% for locally produced 
generic medicine
c) 8% for imported 
“selected food items” 
and imported generic 
medicine
d) Power generation (both 
private and government-
owned) and petroleum 
products—4% on 1st 
year, 6% on 2nd year, 8% 
on 3rd year, and 12% on 
4th year
New exemptions:
a) Passenger or cargo 
vessels and aircrafts
b) Medical services 
to indigents and 
legal services to 
clients belonging to 
marginalized sectors
c) Fuel, goods, and 
supplies for use in 
international shipping/
air transport operations
d) Pan de Sal
e) Power generated 
through biomass, wind, 
and solar energy
f) Educational services 
rendered by TESDA
g) LPG
Zero-ratings added to  
RA 8424 list:
a) Services rendered 
to international air 
transport operations
RA 8424 exemptions 
repealed:
a) Coal, natural gas, and 
petroleum products
b) Petroleum products and 
their raw materials
c) Importation of 
passenger and/or cargo 
vessels of more than 
5,000 tons, including 
engine and spare parts 
by electric cooperatives
d) Medical and legal 
services
e) NPC, Meralco, and all 
the power generation 
companies
f) Art, literary works, and 
musical compositions
g) Cotton and cotton 
seeds
h) Non-agricultural food 
products
i) Air and shipping 
passenger fares
j) Sales by electric 
cooperatives
k) Export sales by persons 
who are not VAT-
registered
Zero-ratings added to 
RA 8424 list:
a) Services rendered 
to international air 
transport operations
b) Transport of 
passengers and cargo 
by air or sea vessels 
from the Philippines to 
a foreign country
c) Indigenous and 
renewable energy 
sources: solar, 
wind, natural, gas, 
hydroelectric, and 
geothermal
RA 8424 exemptions 
repealed:
a) Coal, natural gas, 
and other 
indigenous fuels
b) Petroleum 
products and their 
raw materials
c) Power
d) Electric 
cooperatives
e) Domestic air and 
sea transport
f) Medical services
g) Legal services
h) Cotton and cotton 
seeds; non-food 
agricultural 
products
i) Works of art, 
literary works, 
musical 
composition
New exemptions:
a) Medical, dental, 
hospital, and 
veterinary services 
not rendered by 
professionals
b) Educational 
services by schools 
accredited by 
TESDA
c) Lease of residential 
houses not 
exceeding P10,000 
monthly
d) Sales of persons 
and establishments 
earning not more 
than P1.5 million 
annually
e) Fuel and goods by 
entities engaged 
in international 
shipping or 
air transport 
operations
Zero-ratings added to 
RA 8424 list:
a) Services to 
entities engaged 
in air transport 
operations
b) Transport of 
passenger or cargo 
by air or sea to a 
foreign country
c) Renewable sources 
of energy
continued on next page
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Pre-RVAT Law 
Regulations (RA 8424)
DOF  
Proposal
HB 3555 and  
HB 3705 SB 1950 RA 9337
Other VAT-related reforms
a) Sellers of petroleum 
products cannot pass on 
to the consumers the 
VAT burden
b) The input tax credits 
shall be equally 
distributed over the 
depreciable life of the 
capital goodsa
c) Tax credits (ex capital 
goods) shall not exceed 
5% of the total value of 
the goods/servicesa
d) Input taxes from 
purchase of transport 
equipment used in 
business are allowed as 
input tax
e) Presumptive input 
taxes of processors of 
mackerel, sardines, 
milk, refined sugar, and 
cooking oil are repealed
f) Public works contractors 
have the option between 
a presumptive input 
tax amounting 1.5% of 
contract price and actual 
input taxes
a) For a person making 
sales that are zero-
rated, the input taxes 
shall be allocated 
ratably between 
VATable and  
non-VATable business
b) Transitional input tax 
credit lowered to 2% 
from 8%
c) Presumptive input tax 
of firms engaged in 
processing of sardines, 
mackerel, and milk 
raised to 4% from 1.5%
d) Presumptive input 
tax of public works is 
repealed
e) 5-year spread out 
crediting of input VAT 
on capital equipment if 
cost > P660,000
a) Cap on input VAT 
crediting at not 
more than 70% of 
output VAT for the 
same quarter
b) Uniform 5% 
VAT withholding 
on government 
purchases of goods, 
services, and public 
works contracts
c) Transitional input 
tax credit lowered 
to 2% from 8%
d) Removal of 1.5% 
presumptive input 
VAT on public 
works contractors
e) Presumptive 
input tax of 
firms engaged 
in processing of 
sardines, mackerel, 
and milk raised to 
4% from 1.5%
f) 5-year spread out 
crediting of input 
VAT on capital 
equipment if cost  
> P1 million
VAT Earmarking
No specific provision for 
VAT revenue earmarking
No specific provision for 
VAT revenue earmarking
No specific provision for 
VAT revenue earmarking
a) 10% of the total 
VAT collection 
shall be allocated 
and divided equally 
between (1) public 
elementary and 
secondary education 
and (2) public health 
services to sustain 
the goal of universal 
coverage of the 
National Health 
Insurance Program
b) P15 million (of the 
incremental revenues) 
shall be allocated for 
public information and 
education program 
to be administered by 
the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue (BIR) in the 
period to 31 December 
2005, explaining clearly 
business and reporting 
requirements under the 
VAT rules
Of incremental revenue 
from VAT, 50% will be 
the share of local 
government units. 
Portions of which will 
be allocated and used 
exclusively for the 
following:
•	 15% for public 
elementary 
and secondary 
education, 
to finance 
construction of 
buildings, purchase 
of school furniture, 
and in-service 
teacher training;
•	 10% for health 
insurance 
premiums of 
enrolled indigents;
•	 15% for 
environmental 
conservation, 
in particular, to 
fully implement 
a comprehensive 
national 
reforestation 
program;
•	 10% for 
agricultural 
modernization, 
to finance 
construction of 
farm-to-market 
roads and 
irrigation facilities.
Table 2.1
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Pre-RVAT Law 
Regulations (RA 8424)
DOF  
Proposal
HB 3555 and  
HB 3705 SB 1950 RA 9337
Non-VAT-related reforms and mitigating measuresc,d
a) Raises corporate 
income tax to 35% 
from 32% until 
end-2008 but brings it 
down to 30% thereafter
b) Repeals franchise tax 
on IPPs, electricity 
distributors
c) Reduces excise tax 
on socially sensitive 
products
d) Zero excise tax rates 
on the following 
goods and services: 
(1) kerosene, 
(2) diesel fuel, and 
(3) bunker fuel
e) Franchise tax of 
domestic airlines is 
abolished
a) Corporate income 
tax rate of 35% by 
end-2008 and to 
30% by end-2009
b) Increases gross 
receipts tax from 
5% to 7% on 
royalties; rentals 
of property, real or 
personal; profits 
from exchange 
and all other 
items treated as 
gross income, of 
bank and non-
bank financial 
intermediaries
c) Removal of 
PAGCOR income 
tax exemption
d) Reduction of excise 
tax on kerosene, 
diesel, and bunker 
fuel oil
e) Removal of 
franchise tax on 
power distribution 
utilities
f) Removal of 
franchise tax on 
domestic airlines 
and common 
carriers tax on 
domestic shipping
g) Increases 
presumptive input 
VAT of agro-
processors from 
1.5% to 4%
h) Increase in 
marginal threshold 
from P550,000 to 
P1.5 million per 
annum; rental 
threshold from 
P8,000/month to 
P10,000/month; 
and real property 
threshold from 
P1 million to 
P2.5 million
RA 8424 = National Internal Revenue Code of 1997.
a  Provision of HB 3555; Note: HB 3555 covers only the increase in the VAT rate (10 to 12) and certain limitations to 
input tax credit; HB 3705 covers the rest.
b  Collection of VAT from services by professionals, registered general professional partnership, actors, actresses, 
talents, singers and emcees; radio and television broadcasters, choreographers; musical, radio, movie, television, and 
stage directors; and professional athletes was suspended until 31 December 2002. Collection of VAT from legal and 
medical services was suspended until 31 October 2005.
c Manasan, Rosario G. 2002. Explaining the Decline in Tax Effort. PIDS. December.
d Bureau of Internal Revenue. EVAT Primer.
Sources: RA 8424, HB 2555, HB 3705, SB 1950, RA 9370, and news reports.
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input VAT, both of which the business sector denounced.30 It was also at this stage 
that various policy trade-offs to mitigate the impact of the reforms on the poor were 
introduced.
The bill stayed in the Senate for about 2.5 months, at the end of which (mid-
April) was a product that differed markedly from the House version, albeit both 
were expected to meet the government’s revenue target.31 The challenge was for 
the bicameral conference committee, composed of 9  Senators and 28  Members 
of Congress, including the two chairs of the respective committees on ways and 
means, to reconcile the two versions without sacrificing revenue potential.
While the bicameral conference committee intended to have a bill ready for the 
President’s signature by the end of April, negotiations on raising the VAT rate 
dragged. This prompted the President to drop her initial noninterventionist stance 
and urged Congress to approve the increased VAT rate, with the DOF warning of 
forgone revenues from delays in passage. The impasse was broken only in May after 
both houses agreed to give the President standby authority to increase the VAT rate 
subject to specific conditions identified in the law.
Thus, the final bill approved by the two chambers in the latter part of May and signed 
by the President on 24 May 2005 included the provision granting the President the 
authority to raise the VAT rate to 12% by January 2006 if VAT collection exceeded 
2.8% of GDP, or if the government’s budget deficit exceeded 1.5% of GDP. Other 
changes introduced by the Senate were also incorporated, and the House’s “no pass-
through” of the VAT on oil was dropped. The law was scheduled to take effect in July 
2005, starting with the broadening of the VAT base to include various previously 
exempted sectors, notably oil and power.
Handling Reform Gainers and Losers
There were two evident losing groups, the consuming public and the newly covered 
sectors—with the oil and power companies posing the strongest challenge. The 
first group was dispersed and not organized to block the reform. This may be seen 
in the results of a March 2005 Pulse Asia nationwide survey revealing that 66% of 
respondents admitted to having “a little knowledge” or “almost none or no knowledge 
at all” of the VAT issue. However, there were genuine concerns about the VAT’s 
adverse impact on low-income segments that in the Philippines and elsewhere were 
often dealt with by excluding basic commodities32 that form a large part of the poor’s 
30 Including the Joint Foreign Chambers of Commerce of the Philippines, which issued a statement on 
15 April 2005. The stock market also fell the day after the Senate approved its version of the bill on 
fears that it might not raise the needed revenues.
31 At the time, the reported DOF estimate of revenues from the House and Senate versions of the proposal 
were P88 billion and P80 billion, respectively. (BusinessWorld [2005] House Speaker Claims ‘Creative 
Compromise’ on VAT Near. 19 April.)
32 Including agricultural products, educational services, and sales of low-cost housing.
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consumption basket. In this instance, while the inclusion of petroleum products and 
power services aimed to make the system more progressive (as these are consumed 
more by the rich), additional price pressures from this move, which in the past had 
set off street protests and transport strikes, were expected.
The most radical (and unworkable) solution agreed in the lower House was to let oil 
companies absorb the cost of the VAT through a “no pass-through” condition that the 
oil companies opposed. Instead, the bicameral conference committee opted to adopt 
lower excise taxes on three socially sensitive oil products—kerosene, diesel, and 
bunker fuel oil. Similar lobbies put up by other sectors relying on the VAT’s adverse 
impact on the poor resulted in other mitigating measures as well, including the 
removal of franchise tax on power distribution utilities.33 In the fray, power and fuel 
sales sourced from renewable energy were zero-rated as part of the policy trade-offs. 
These reliefs, shown to be poorly targeted at the needy (Newhouse and Zakharova 
2007) translated into forgone revenues of about 0.25% of GDP and would appear 
unnecessary in light of the government’s continuing struggle for Congressional 
approval of higher excise taxes on polluting oil products.
A third area of mitigating measures involved the earmarking of incremental VAT 
revenues accruing to local government units. This was intended to pass some of the 
social spending burden onto the country’s subnational administrative units, which 
were then enjoying budget surpluses and under the law were to receive annual, 
formula-based transfers from the national government based on the latter’s tax 
collections. Despite a number of press reports about public spending on education 
and health in later years, it is unclear how effectively this stipulation was carried out. 
The failure to directly link the pain and benefits of the VAT reform may have also 
contributed in time to the public’s opposition to the VAT.
Endorsing Reforms: Committing Government to the RVAT 
From the time she certified it and for the entire duration of the legislative exercise, 
the President stood firmly behind the measure, clearly signaling the urgency for 
Congress to pass the bill and deliver on promised revenues. But while legislation 
was a necessary step, it was only one hurdle. Following its enactment, various groups 
challenged the law’s constitutionality before the Supreme Court. On the day the RVAT 
law was supposed to have come into force and despite arguments that “collection 
of taxes cannot be enjoined being the lifeblood of the nation,”34 the Supreme Court 
issued a temporary restraining order delaying its implementation.
33 Although Newhouse and Zakharova (2007) noted that the repeal of the franchise tax on power and 
the reduction of gasoline excise tax also helped improve the structure of the tax system, the former 
by removing a potential double taxation problem, the latter by equalizing tax treatment of regular 
and unleaded premium gasoline.
34 Dissenting opinion of two Supreme Court judges on the 1 July 2005 temporary restraining order issue. 
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The petitioners, including opposition members of Congress and petroleum dealers, 
questioned the constitutionality of the law on procedural and substantive grounds. 
Procedural issues included the bicameral conference committee’s authority to insert 
and delete provisions and the Senate’s power to introduce new provisions into the 
House bill (considering that the Constitution provides that revenue bills must 
originate from the House). Substantive issues included the standby authority given to 
the President (argued to be “undue delegation of legislative power”), the 70% cap on 
input VAT (argued to be arbitrary, oppressive, and confiscatory), and, more generally, 
the inequity of the VAT and unfairness of the increased rate.
By itself, the restraining order would just have had been another bump on the road 
for state lawyers to handle.35 However, the Supreme Court decision came just weeks 
after the “Hello Garci” election fraud scandal broke,36 which revived the President’s 
legitimacy issue (with an impeachment case filed against her in Congress) and 
plunged the country into another political storm. It was around this time that reports 
of the President’s wavering commitment to the VAT started to come out, showing 
how quickly politicians’ changed incentive structures can affect their appetite for 
reform (even reforms that they themselves had pushed) and thus how quickly the 
reform window can close. It seems that if the political crisis had happened a mere 
2 weeks earlier, the RVAT law in all likelihood would not have passed.
The first sign of trouble emerged a week after the Supreme Court issued the 
restraining order. Ten members of the President’s economic team, led by the finance 
secretary, resigned after calling a press conference, triggering renewed calls for the 
President to step down and prompting external monitors, including rating agencies 
and ADB, to issue statements about the unpredictability of the reform environment.
News stories at the time connected the economic team’s resignation to their suspicion 
that the President had a hand in the Supreme Court restraining order on the RVAT.37
In response to a “show-cause” order issued by the court against him following these 
reports, the recently resigned finance secretary denied claiming that the court was 
influenced by the President in issuing the restraining order but revealed that the 
President had “on several occasions discussed with the economic team the possibility 
of postponing the implementation of the RVAT” and that he felt that the executive 
branch “was not doing enough to have the [temporary restraining order] lifted.”38
35 In this case, the DOF undersecretary charged with pushing the RVAT, himself a lawyer, was on hand to 
make the tax and constitutionality arguments before the court.
36 The scandal involved wiretapped conversations between the President and a senior official of the 
Commission on Elections that suggested the President manipulated the 2004 elections in her favor. 
Following the President’s public apology of her “lapse in judgment” in speaking with the election 
official, calls mounted for her to resign. At that juncture, her entire cabinet still stood behind her.
37 Among those cited by the Supreme Court were: SC Denies Palace Pressed Issuance of EVAT TRO 
(The Daily Tribune, 10 July 2005); Palace Debunks Purisima Claim on EVAT (Philippine Star, 11 July 
2005); The Last Straw that Broke a Cabinet (Philippine Star, 11 July 2005); No GMA Influence on 
EVAT Freeze—SC (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 July 2005).
38 Supreme Court En Banc Resolution: Former Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima Indirect Contempt 
of Court, 1 September 2005. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/168056a.htm
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Some analysts surmised that the economic team’s resignation forced the President’s 
hand, pushing her to demonstrate commitment to the reform by implementing it. 
Nevertheless, as the President’s popularity fell, press reports suggested a continuing 
desire to delay implementing the law, or parts of it. Following the Supreme Court’s 
1 September ruling on the constitutionality of the RVAT and despite the dropping 
of the impeachment case, there were reported moves spearheaded by the President’s 
allies in Congress to pass a joint resolution suspending the VAT on oil and power, 
ostensibly because of rising world commodity prices.39
Statements she made to investment bankers during a trip to the US in mid-
September—essentially saying that the executive would respect Congress’s vote 
on the resolutions and that the government could afford the lost revenues if the 
resolutions passed—raised worries that the President might be less than 100% 
committed to the VAT.40 Legislators also complained of mixed signals from the 
executive41 and, in frustration, the chair of the Ways and Means Committee of the 
Senate purportedly told the President, “You wanted me to vomit this and now you 
want me to swallow my vomit.” As media headlined “Arroyo open to delaying VAT 
on oil and electricity” and a government official, conferring with a credit rater, 
was told that suspending the VAT would be “very, very unfortunate,” the President 
clarified that she remained committed to implementing the law fully.42
By then, the RVAT reform had become the investment community’s gauge of the 
Arroyo administration’s political will to address the country’s fiscal problems. Hence, 
as the political crisis abated, the law was allowed to go into effect.
Implementing Reforms
The law took effect on 1 November 2005 with little fanfare, largely because of the 
delay in implementation that gave the government—the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
in particular—time to prepare the implementing rules and conduct information 
campaigns. Government officials recall little resistance during these road shows given 
the message of burden sharing and the package of measures to mitigate the price 
impact on the poor. On the part of the bureau, except for long-standing enforcement 
39 BusinessWorld (2005) Mixed Signals on VAT. 19 September.
40 In a forum, the President said, “If the resolutions [in Congress] don’t pass, then we will proceed with 
carrying out with the reforms and if the resolutions are passed, we will respect Congress’ advice to 
us, but it does not take us away from our deficit reduction program ... We respect their wisdom.” 
(Philippine Daily Inquirer [2005] Arroyo Open to Delaying VAT on Oil, Electricity. 17 September.) 
41 BusinessWorld (2005) Mixed Signals on VAT. 19 September; BusinessWorld (2005) VAT Freeze 
Order Stays. 20 September.
42 In a statement the next day, she said, “Let me put into the proper context some statements I made 
regarding proposals to exempt power and fuel from the value-added tax. My position remains 
consistent: the VAT Reform Law should be implemented in its entirety if we are to achieve our economic 
reform and deficit reduction goals in a timely manner.” (Philippine Star [2005] EVAT Approval Must Be 
in Toto. 18 September.)
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issues, the key challenge was the expansion in the VAT’s scope, which required it to 
issue some 17 industry-specific memorandum circulars. The bureau’s long experience 
in collecting the VAT helped.
On the whole, the RVAT experience demonstrated that when crisis looms and 
incentives align across broad segments of society, institutions function to ward off 
the crisis, with key public institutions (the civil service, legislature, and judiciary) 
and private agents (civil society, the media, and businesses) performing their roles. 
This good sense to do the right thing to avoid economic collapse prevailed despite 
widespread sentiment to withdraw political support for the President, the principal 
champion of the reform. This suggests some degree of maturity and progress in the 
workings of the country’s democratic institutions.
Yet once the reform urgency passed, interests started to diverge and institutional flaws 
emerged. Inability to sustain the gains from the RVAT reform can be traced to failings 
across the three branches of government—evident in the country’s relatively poor 
scores in governance indicators for corruption, rule of law, and political stability43—
weaknesses that constrain effective policy formulation and implementation.
At the operational level, Tanzi and Shome (1992) had observed as early as 
2 decades ago that “the Philippines is one case in which taxation will be ineffective 
unless major administrative improvements are made.” However, experience over 
the years with efforts to upgrade systems and procedures, including donor-assisted 
computerization initiatives, has met with resistance from within the tax bureaus; 
hence achieving limited success. Likewise, intensified efforts to prosecute tax 
offenders have had to contend with a court system overburdened by case backlogs 
and lacking transparency in case management that has led to long delays and inability 
to show actual imprisonment of large offenders, thus impairing the credibility of 
government programs aiming to raise the risks of tax evasion.
Added to these are systemic corruption and varying degrees of high-level political 
support for anticorruption initiatives and programs to run after tax evaders and 
smugglers. With efforts to plug tax leakages dependent on the character, drive, and 
integrity of politically appointed senior bureau leadership, reform efforts tend to 
backslide. This explains the increasing preference of policy makers and advisors for 
easy-to-collect indirect taxes rather than more progressive direct taxes.
In truth, the revenue targets from the RVAT law were relatively easy to realize given 
that the first phase—widening the tax base—involved two major industries that have 
only a limited number of visible firms that can easily be tracked, while the conditions 
triggering the second phase—the 2 percentage point increase in the VAT rate—were 
low hurdles. The difficulty was enforcing the 70% cap on input VAT credits. While 
the executive had already tried to soften the provision in the implementing rules 
43 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm 
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and regulations44—a common way for the executive to influence reform direction—
numerous small and medium-sized firms opposed it, arguing that it disadvantaged 
low-margin industries. The Bureau of Internal Revenue commissioner at the time45
sided with them, calling for repeal of the provision, which was achieved by law in 
late 2006.
From a macro viewpoint, in terms of meeting the government’s fiscal consolidation 
objective, the RVAT law may be deemed successful. The wider VAT base brought 
in about 1% of GDP, while the higher VAT rate produced about 0.5% of GDP when 
implemented fully. Total revenues from the measure, after netting out the costs of 
mitigating provisions, reached 1.3% of GDP, helping raise the government tax effort 
to 14.3% by 2006 and bringing the overall budget deficit down to almost balance 
by 2007. The measure helped to put the government in a good position to respond 
with countercyclical fiscal spending to the shock from the global financial crisis. 
The downtrend in the government debt ratio also helped increase the economy’s 
resiliency and, in time, contributed to better credit ratings for the country.
The broadening of the VAT base, expected to improve VAT administration by 
strengthening the audit trail, indeed improved VAT productivity from only 0.29 in 
2004 and 2005 to 0.36 by 2006 when the law was fully implemented. Newhouse and 
Zakharova (2007) also found the law to be progressive in its overall distributional 
impact due to the mitigating measures and coverage of petroleum and power, though 
noting substantial leakages to the wealthy due to the energy tax cuts.
Unsurprisingly as well, the study noted that the reform had “a moderate adverse 
effect on poor households” as seen in reduced real income and consumption. This, 
coupled with seeing the full 12% VAT burden reflected in the receipts of their 
purchases—a requirement of the new law—contributed to open public resentment 
toward the tax. Because of its unpopularity, the VAT became an easy target of 
politicians wanting to curry public favor. This was especially true when economic 
conditions deteriorated, for example, during periods when oil prices rose, which 
in light of the absence of oil subsidies in the Philippines were relatively quickly 
passed through to domestic pump prices. During these times, there would be rising 
clamor for the government to suspend the VAT on fuel products, which populist 
elements in Congress would respond to by sponsoring bills to do this. To its credit, 
the government remained steadfast in keeping the oil sector under the VAT net, 
despite persistent high oil prices.
44 Applying only the rule to firms with input VAT exceeding output VAT.
45 Jose Mario C. Bunag.
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Sustaining Reforms
While the core reform itself—expanding VAT and raising the VAT rate—has not been 
reversed, once the crisis passed and fiscal statistics improved, waning commitment to 
the broader goal of fiscal consolidation became evident. After reaching 14.3% of GDP 
in 2006, the tax effort started to slide anew. In part, this was due to built-in sunset 
provisions in the law, mainly a reduction in the corporate income tax rate from 35% 
to 30% by 2009 that was deemed consistent with declining business taxes worldwide. 
Unfortunately, the temporary corporate income tax increase apparently failed to 
achieve lawmakers’ intention to buy time for the Bureau of Internal Revenue to 
improve tax administration. A decomposition of the sources of change in the bureau’s 
tax effort showed that there was, in fact, some relaxation in tax administration after the 
RVAT law came into effect. The calculations suggest that had the bureau maintained 
its collection efficiency at the 2004 level, the improvement in the overall tax ratio 
would have been higher (Manasan 2008). (The commissioner appointed during the 
President’s first term to spearhead systems improvements in the bureau was one of 
the 10 officials who resigned in July 2005.)
Another problem with sustaining the benefits of reform was politicians’ penchant 
to chip away at the government’s tax base in order to win votes as the 2010 election 
neared. On the VAT itself, electricity transmission (a monopoly) was the first to be 
exempted in December 2009, followed by selected purchases of senior citizens in 
February 2010, both of which were signed by the President. These translated into an 
estimated P10 billion revenue loss for the government and a weakened VAT system, as 
seen in the decline in VAT productivity from 0.36 in 2006 to 0.32 by 2010. Other newly 
legislated non-VAT revenue-eroding measures included individual income tax relief 
and tax incentives for retirement accounts and real estate investment trusts. These 
were passed despite DOF’s objections. In these instances, the bureaucrats’ recourse 
was to impose strict conditions in the implementing rules to limit revenue losses.
There have also been no further initiatives since the RVAT law to pass other tax-
related measures despite broad recognition of the need to increase the tax system’s 
buoyancy and equity. In fact, “no new taxes” became a campaign slogan of the 
winning President in the 2010 elections. Proposed measures in Congress, such as 
rationalizing fiscal incentives, indexing specific taxes to inflation, raising oil excises, 
or simply restraining Congress from enacting new expenditures without matching 
revenues, have failed to move forward for many years now.
The failure to maintain the tax effort at desirable levels—at least the 17% achieved in 
1997—has translated into suboptimal allocations for public spending in education, 
health, and basic infrastructure compared with Asian peers. In turn, failure to 
upgrade basic levels of social services and physical infrastructure has not only capped 
the economy’s growth potential but also limited the scope for growth to be more 
inclusive.
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At the policy-making level is the seeming lack of coordination between the executive 
and the legislative branches and thus coherence in their pursued agendas. This leaves 
concerned parties free to pursue their own narrow agendas, as may be seen in the 
many revenue-eroding measures that Congress passed even as the executive struggled 
with its pronounced fiscal consolidation thrust. While a formal process for executive–
legislative dialogue was instituted in 1992 through the Legislative–Executive 
Development Advisory Council,46 the efficacy of this mechanism in ensuring shared 
priorities depends on the frequency of meetings called by the President. In comparison 
to the 6-year Ramos Administration when it met 81 times, this council was convened 
only 25 times during the almost 10-year Arroyo Administration.47
Without these regular, senior-level consultative sessions between the two branches 
that promote deeper understanding of both parties’ policy objectives and, more 
important, individual motivations, reviews of proposed bills at the technical level face 
greater risk of being ignored. Worse, there may be instances when Congress forgoes 
altogether soliciting inputs from executive departments for proposals that may derail 
the executive’s programs and when political circumstances rule out the use of the 
presidential veto.
But perhaps the basic missing ingredient for sustaining policy reform in the 
Philippines is the lack of effective political parties that take the long view of 
national development. As it is, reform efforts are centered on the President whose 
commitment to any particular reform cannot but be influenced by his or her 
changing political fortunes. The “Hello Garci” election fraud scandal illustrates this. 
Even absent external political pressures, the prospects for reform are still dependent 
on the person—gravitas on the one hand and popular support on the other—and 
willingness to exercise political will and spend political capital to push reform within 
a single, 6-year term. 
In light of this, policy making can well degenerate into quid pro quo, transactional 
collaboration with members of Congress that results in policy myopia, especially 
since lower House members have to go through an electoral challenge every 3 years.48
Indeed, the incentive structure is skewed toward reforms that can show immediate 
benefits that the incumbent can claim as his or her own, with lengthier institutional-
type reforms—that threaten established privileges—left to the future.
46 It is chaired by the President with members drawn from the Cabinet and Congress leaders.
47 Joint Foreign Chambers (2010), p. 322.
48 Members of the Senate hold 6-year terms.
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Conclusions and Lessons
The Philippine tax system has been likened to a leaky bucket designed by law and 
exploited by everyone to extract private gain. From time to time, when the water 
in the bucket dips to critical levels, holes are selected for repair, using at times only 
plaster with no lasting impact (e.g., the amendments on sin taxes). The VAT reform 
is a higher-quality, more permanent repair that was supplemented by turning the tap 
more to raise the water level faster. It is notable in that it may well have been the first 
time that the country managed to avoid an economic collapse by achieving broad 
consensus for reform in time (De Dios et al. 2004).
While the ideal reform would involve changing the bucket altogether, the last such 
attempt met with dismal results. When Congress tackled a comprehensive tax reform 
package in 1997, the outcome—a less buoyant system that led to a steadily declining 
tax effort—demonstrated the dangers of such efforts in an environment where private 
interests dominate public choice. For sure, as past reform experiences, including the 
RVAT, showed, such should not be attempted without a strong and credible leader 
who can neutralize influence of the elites and can spearhead the change.
For now, it would appear that the country is stuck with the leaky bucket. The problem, 
of course, is that without continuing efforts to plug the holes, the Philippines will likely 
just go from one crisis-induced reform to another. Current initiatives to improve tax 
administration are a good start but need to go beyond what has been described as 
“hunting in the zoo,” or targeting the existing narrow tax base to pay more.
As it is, finance officials perceive resistance within the tax bureaus for more strategic 
audit measures, either because the tools are not well understood or because they 
disturb ingrained bureaucratic setups. Finance officials recognize that such behavioral 
changes have to be pursued on a continuing basis, but that they will take time and will 
require a more concerted effort to professionalize the revenue agencies and institute 
greater accountability within the bureaus. An information database that has integrity 
and is outside the control of tax authorities also has to be built. In the meantime, 
because of the long lag for such reforms to bear fruit, other complementary reforms 
are needed to bring the tax effort up.
Unfortunately, with the sovereign credit’s recent rating upgrade and general sentiment 
of having put the fiscal problem behind it, how can the Philippines pass reforms 
without the threat of another crisis? The following ingredients in the reform process, 
culled from the RVAT law experience, may help raise the odds of success, although 
they do not, of course, guarantee success.
One
To get reform on the government’s agenda, presidential endorsement is necessary. 
Without it, reforms in taxation will have no chance of passing. Ideally, the President 
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is one who is newly elected, allowing reform to be timed immediately after the 
receipt of a fresh mandate when the chances of securing reform buy-in from 
different segments of society are highest. To secure the President’s backing for an 
unpopular measure, technocrats need to be armed with sound diagnostic studies by 
credible domestic groups, such as the academe, that clearly spell out the problem, 
its causes, consequences of doing nothing, and options and time frame for reform. 
An identification of reform players (especially in Congress if reform requires 
legislation), their motivations, and how to overcome any resistance needs to be 
done, and a measurable policy objective (such as the P80 billion revenue goal) needs 
to be targeted to frame negotiations on alternative reform measures and possible 
trade-offs.
Two
The elements that go into convincing the President to endorse reform assume even 
greater importance when managing reform complexities, as the parties that need 
to be convinced multiply and the robustness of technical analyses are scrutinized 
under real-world conditions, and facts are filtered through the biased lenses of 
interested groups. Hence, reformers should maintain the flexibility to accommodate 
hard demands—keeping in mind that the perfect is the enemy of the good—and 
be sensitive to any adverse impact of reform on marginalized sectors that needs to 
be tackled at program design stage. This will help in securing reform buy-in and in 
increasing the chances of sustaining reform.
At this stage, leadership becomes crucial given that in the Philippines, the only 
reforms that happen are those that the elites can live with. Hence, the President 
needs to stand ready to use the vast powers of the office and spend political capital 
to ensure that the incentives of key actors in the reform process are broadly aligned 
with his or hers. 
The President and team need to be clear-minded about how to approach various 
groups that can influence reform, including understanding the motivations of 
Congress, collectively and individually (regular legislative–executive consultations 
are ideal), and initiating dialogue with entrenched interests to reduce or turn 
resistance around. Reform champions in Congress, who can steer proposed bills 
through their respective chambers without losing sight of reform objectives, need to 
be drafted into the effort. 
Likewise, senior managers in the executive department need to act as a second-tier 
support group for the reform and carry the ball from start to end. In a politically 
unstable environment, this group can provide technocratic stability. Absent 
continuity at the cabinet level, committed and knowledgeable civil servants in lower 
rungs also have a role in providing institutional memory for successive leaderships, as 
was shown in the case in the RVAT.49
49 In the 3 years reforming the VAT (2004–2006), the DOF had three secretaries.
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Nonpartisan groups outside government, echoing the reform message, can help in 
creating awareness of the need for reform and, in the case of civil society groups, 
demonstrate domestic ownership for the drive for change. Media that are kept 
informed of the complexities of reform issues and can be trusted to present a balanced 
view of the issues can help in articulating the rationale for reform in simple messages 
to a wide, nontechnical audience.
Three
In committing the government to reform, as legislation is just one hurdle in the 
reform process, the President needs to remain steadfast in supporting reform and 
intervene as needed to build consensus and clear roadblocks, including in hastening 
the resolution of any legal challenges. The role of civil society, media, and external 
monitors such as donors and credit raters in applying pressure on government at 
critical junctures to keep to the reform path can help in tipping the balance for 
reform, especially when presidential commitment shows signs of wavering.
Four
Once reform gets to the implementation stage, institutional weaknesses become the 
enemy of reform. Thus, for reform to succeed, these weaknesses need to be considered 
at the design stage, exploring alternative solutions that try to go around institutional 
obstacles (hence the push for the VAT), while taking steps to overcome them, even 
incrementally. 
The incentive structure facing bureaucrats tasked to carry out reforms should be well 
understood and, if needed, additional resources need to be deployed to minimize 
leakages and safeguard timely reform execution. It is also at this stage that reform 
losers start realizing fully the adverse impact of reform, particularly when unexpected 
external shocks happen, requiring a quick demonstration of reform benefits to counter 
any moves for reform reversal. Again, presidential leadership and commitment to 
stay the reform course are crucial in blocking such attempts. Effectively showing 
after the event how increased tax revenues directly went into funding earmarked or 
promised public goods and services may also help increase the acceptability of future 
reform programs.
Five
While individual reforms are seldom reversed once the promised benefits are 
realized, it is very hard for a President to sustain the reform environment, especially 
in a country like the Philippines with a short, 3-year electoral cycle where institutions 
that have a long-term stake in development are also lacking. Thus, responsible civil 
society that can take a longer view than politicians (and hold them accountable) has 
taken a more prominent role in pushing for reforms, helping to prop up the reform 
agenda of change agents in government.
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The RVAT was a crisis-induced, stroke-of-the-pen reform that changed tax rules to 
meet macroeconomic objectives without changing the government’s and the public’s 
attitude toward tax compliance. The latter is needed to minimize reversals and 
backsliding but involves a lengthy and knotty process of governance and institutional 
reforms, not just within the executive’s tax bureaus but with the courts’ handling of 
tax cases and Congress’s approach to tax legislation as well. Whether such reforms are 
possible depends on the intersect between governance and politics (David 2010), and 
ultimately, how Philippine society chooses its leaders.
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Annex 2.1
Timeline
25 July 1987 VAT (EO 273) adopted in the Philippines
January 2002 Argentina debt default
April 2002 IMF urges government to consider raising the VAT rate.
February 2003 Government postpones balanced budget target from 2006 to 2009.
April 2003 S&P downgrades sovereign credit from BB+ to BB.
30 November 2003 Finance Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho resigns, later warns of a fiscal crisis.
1 December 2003 Juanita Amatong assumes the post of DOF secretary.
January 2004 Moody’s downgrades the sovereign credit from Ba1 to Ba2.
May 2004 Presidential election
June 2004 GMA declared President; IMF proposes increasing VAT rate to 15%
22 July 2004 PGMA speech before business community—government considering 
repeal of the VAT
26 July 2004 PGMA SONA—chronic budget deficit the country’s “most urgent 
problem”; proposes eight revenue measures
23 August 2004 PDI banner story, “UP economists warn of RP crash in 2 years”
24 August 2004 PGMA—“we are in the midst of a fiscal crisis”
September 2004 DoF proposes to Congress to (a) remove VAT exemptions for six sectors, 
including oil and medical/legal professions; and (b) two-step hike in the 
VAT rate (to 12% in 2006 and 14% in 2007).
6 December 2004 PDI story—“Palace opts for hiked VAT over franchise tax” 
21 December 2004 PGMA signs RA 9334 increasing excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol.
7 January 2005 PGMA certifies as urgent HB 3555, withdrawing certain VAT exemptions.
17 January 2005 S&P downgrades the sovereign credit from BB to BB–.
27 January 2005 House of Representatives approves HB 3555, 126 in favor/11 against; bill 
transmitted to the Senate.
8 February 2005 The President certifies HB 3705 as urgent.
14 February 2005 Juanita Amatong resigns as DOF secretary.
15 February 2005 Cesar Purisima takes over finance department.
16 February 2005 Moody’s downgrades the sovereign credit to from Ba2 to B1.
28 February 2005 House of Representatives approves HB 3705 on the third reading following 
a 156-30-3 (Yes-No-Abstain) voting. 
7 March 2005 The Senate Committee on Ways and Means approves Senate Bill No. 1950.
13 April 2005 Senate approves its version of VAT bill (2nd and 3rd readings), 
14 in favor/6 against.
15 April 2005 Bicameral conference committee starts to reconcile House and Senate 
versions of the VAT bill.
12 May 2005 EVAT bill passed giving PGMA “standby power” to raise the VAT rate by 
January 2006.
continued on next page
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24 May 2005 PGMA signs RA 9337 (EVAT Law) to take effect 1 July.
6 June 2005 “Hello Garci” controversy breaks.
30 June 2005 Opposition members of Congress ask Supreme Court to stop 
implementation of EVAT.
1 July 2005 SC issues stay order against implementation of EVAT law.
8 July 2005 10 Cabinet members, including key economic managers, resign.
11 July 2005 S&P changes Philippine ratings outlook from stable to negative.
12 July 2005 PGMA appoints Margarito Teves as finance secretary.
13 July 2005 Demonstrations demanding PGMA to resign; Moody’s changes Philippine 
ratings outlook from stable to negative.
1 September 2005 SC declares EVAT law constitutional while keeping restraining order.
18 October 2005 SC lifts restraining order.
1 November 2005 VAT law implemented—first phase covers the expansion of coverage 
including oil and power sectors.
1 February 2006 VAT second phase, VAT rate increased to 12%
9 February 2006 S&P changes Philippine rating outlook from negative to stable.
2 November 2006 Moody’s changes Philippine outlook from negative to stable.
21 November 2006 PGMA signs RA 9361, repealing the 70% cap on creditable input VAT.
14 May 2007 Legislative and local elections; Senator Recto lost bid for reelection
28 January 2008 PGMA approves P75 billion economic stimulus package.
1 December 2008 PGMA signs RA 9511 (Transco franchise law).
23 July 2009 Moody’s upgrades Philippine rating from B1 to Ba3.
15 February 2010 PGMA signs RA 9994 (Senior Citizens law).
Source:  Reports from major Philippine newspapers, studies and official documents of the House of Representatives 
and the Senate.
Annex 2.1
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Annex 2.2
Philippines Legislative Process
Action on the billHouse of Representatives (HoR)
First Reading
Second Reading
Third Reading
Senate
First Reading
Second Reading
Third Reading
Approval Veto
Override of veto 
by 2/3 vote of 
both houses 
Bill is returned to the originating 
House with explanation
Bill filed with the Secretary General (labelled as either HB in the HoR or SB in the Senate)
Proposal and suggestions from the President, government agencies,
private individuals, interest groups, and legislators themselves
• Reading of title(s)/author(s)
• Referral to appropriate committees
Committee on Rules includes bill in Calendar of Business
Committee studies the proposals and makes 
recommendations
• If action is favorable, a report is submitted through the 
   Committee on Rules
• If unfavorable, bill is discussed with the authors
• Sponsorship
• Period of debate
• Period of amendments
• Voting (If favorable, calendar for Third Reading; 
 If unfavorable, transmit to the archives)
• Distribution of bill in final form
• Roll call vote
• If approved, transmittal for action to the other House
• If disapproved, transmit to archives
• Ratification of Conference Committee report
• If ratified, bill is printed in engrossed form and enrolled
• Bill is submitted to the President for approval
In case of conflicting provisions, Bicameral Conference 
Committee is constituted to reconcile the bills
Bicameral Conference Committee
Presidential Action
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
If there is no action on the bill within 
30 days after receipt, the bill lapses into law
The Act shall take effect 15 days after the publication in 
the official Gazette or in at least two national newspapers 
of general circulation
Veto
accepted
Sources: House of Representatives and Senate.
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Reforms in the Pacific 
Chapter 3
Richard Bolt50
Introduction
T his case study focuses on reforms and policy-based loans to the Pacific developing member countries (DMCs) of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) during 1997–2007, as well as related advisory assistance. It is largely based 
on a special evaluation study of these reforms by ADB’s Independent Evaluation 
Department (ADB 2009). Expanding on an application of the reform framework 
used in Chapter 1, it also shows how an understanding of the political economy of 
reform can be applied in postevaluation. 
Subregional Context for Pacific Reforms
The Pacific island countries supported by ADB are located in the vast expanse of 
the Pacific Ocean from the western–central to the south Pacific. Some are fragile 
states, and they generally exhibited slow, and even negative, economic growth in the 
1990s.51 Average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth during the 1993–1997 
prereform period was 1.1%, compared with 2.6% during 2002–2007. GDP per capita 
varied from about $803 in Vanuatu to $5,584 in the Cook Islands (see also Box 3.1). 
50 The author acknowledges the significant contributions from Graham Walter and Benjamin Graham as 
co-authors of the evaluation study (ADB 2009) on which this chapter is based.
51 In 2007, seven Pacific DMCs were categorized as weakly performing countries—Kiribati, the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, 
Timor-Leste, and Vanuatu (ADB 2008a).
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Box 3.1
Country Contexts
The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) attained independence in 1986 under a Compact 
of Free Association with the United States (US). The FSM’s 107,000 people inhabit its 
confederation of four States—Chuuk, Kosrae, Pohnpei, and Yap. Each state has its own 
government, languages, culture, and identity. The FSM is heavily reliant on external 
assistance, especially through the Compact with the US, which accounts for more than half 
of government revenue. 
In the early 1990s, the governments of the FSM expressed their concern over near-term 
fiscal sustainability, size of the public sector, and debt obligations stemming from the bonds 
that the government had issued using guaranteed future economic assistance payments 
under Compact agreements. Compact funding step-downs in fiscal year (FY)1997 and the 
possible end to Compact funding in 2001 exacerbated these concerns. Analysis supported 
by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) confirmed that Compact step-downs had left 
the governments facing fiscal deficits and that the solution needed to extend beyond the 
governments’ initial idea of expenditure management such as wage cuts, to deeper cuts 
in public services and a reduction in state-owned enterprises, and revenue-side solutions 
such as tax reforms.
The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), also in the central Pacific, similarly attained 
independence in 1986 under a Compact of Free Association with the US. As with the FSM, 
the RMI government shared similar concerns over near-term fiscal sustainability and size 
of the public sector, and even greater debt obligations, the effects of Compact funding step-
down in FY1997, and a possible end to Compact funding, also in 2001. Analysis confirmed 
the government’s growing unsustainable public service size, the drain on public resources of 
SOEs, and the low tax effort.
Unlike other Pacific island countries, Papua New Guinea has a large land area with a 
population of 5.3 million. It is characterized by wide linguistic and cultural diversity and has 
many natural resources. Rugged terrain, however, makes for high infrastructure costs and 
low population densities, hampering resource exploitation. Complex customary land tenure 
systems, a peace-and-order problem, poor human resource development, and an annual 
population growth rate of more than 3% also constrain development. 
The need for improved public sector performance in Papua New Guinea was a subject of 
analysis and discussions between ADB and the government since early 1998. However, it 
was not until a reformist-minded government came to power in 1999 that the impetus to 
undertake significant public sector reforms was created. ADB provided technical assistance 
to help develop a governance and public sector reform agenda, with the new government 
recognizing that the country’s weak economic performance was the result of poor governance.
Vanuatu is in the South Pacific, west of Fiji. Some 80% of the population of about 200,000 
lives on the eight largest islands. The economic base is agriculture, fisheries, and tourism, 
with offshore financial services contributing. The economy began to deteriorate in 1989, and 
the government’s precarious financial situation, looming fiscal difficulties, and declining 
reserves, as well as weak government service delivery, led the government to recognize the 
need for reforms. 
continued on next page
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Box 3.1
(continued) 
Vanuatu adopted the Comprehensive Reform Program (CRP) developed by ADB, 
largely as it concluded that it had no choice if it wished to obtain ADB support, but the 
reforms were relevant to its needs. Preparation of the CRP began in February 1997, and 
the proposed CRP document was presented to a national summit in June that year, and 
received bipartisan support.
The 15 islands and atolls of the Cook Islands lie west of Tahiti. The Cook Islands faced a severe 
fiscal crisis in the early 1990s, which was not made public until it was imminent. In 1996, 
the government adopted a reform agenda called Pathway to Recovery. The objectives of the 
reform targeted restructuring the economy as a whole, with expectations of transformation to 
private sector–led growth, as well as correction of fiscal and external deficits. This was a high 
expectation, given the scale of the reforms and resource constraints. Restructuring included 
reducing the size of the public sector by more than half.
Tonga acquired its independence in 1970, and is the only remaining monarchy in the Pacific. 
Diagnostic work identified concerns over the stagnant economy and a deteriorating fiscal and 
foreign exchange reserve position in the early 2000s, and the need to improve the efficiency 
of the public sector and SOEs, but the government did not see the need for major reforms. 
Features of the subsequent reform program included revenue-raising measures such as 
value-added tax, and achieving sustainable fiscal balances, strengthened public expenditure 
management, and improvements in public sector efficiency and resource use.
Samoa began its process of economic reform in the late 1980s and was revitalized in 1996 
(following recovery from the 1990−1991 cyclones) through the Statement of Economic 
Strategy, later renamed the Strategy for the Development of Samoa. The performance of 
the economy was buoyant in 1995–1997, with medium-term growth coming from reforms 
that were expected to increase private activity through rationalizing the public sector; 
privatizing  SOEs; and improving the economic, financial, and social infrastructure. This 
reform agenda was expected to result in enhanced private sector capital formation and foreign 
direct investment. ADB’s prior involvement in the finance sector provided the institutional 
experience and a sound basis for supporting the reforms.
The key objectives, scope, and duration of each loan are provided in the Annex.
Source:  Asian Development Bank. 2009. Special Evaluation Study: ADB Support for Public Sector Reforms in the 
Pacific: Enhance Results through Ownership, Capacity and Continuity. July. Manila.
Pacific DMCs were highly constrained by their small land-resource base and 
economic size, remoteness, and dispersed populations, giving rise to diseconomies of 
scale, adding to the high costs of accessing markets. Pacific DMCs had limited access 
to finance and traditional land-rights systems—a frequent disincentive to investors.
These shortcomings often provided the rationale for government intervention in 
private-goods provision which, in many cases, created inefficient public enterprises 
that crowded out private initiatives and further limited the development of already 
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limited markets. Economic structures were dominated by the public sector, and the 
private sector was largely limited to services and primary production with little value 
added. Large trade deficits were the rule. 
Diseconomies of scale from the narrow production base, small domestic markets, 
and limited access to resources and export markets were the key constraints to 
private sector opportunities and growth. Contributions to growth from agriculture 
and industry were low, although subsistence activities continued to play a role in 
most countries. Value addition from primary commodities (such as fish and other 
agricultural commodities) tended to be low, while tourism could be a good revenue 
source but was a localized employment generator (as in the Cook Islands, Samoa, 
and Vanuatu).
At the same time, public goods investments and delivery were costly to provide, with 
mixed efficiency and relatively limited outreach and provision to rural and outer 
islands. Government investment in social infrastructure was low, with most revenues 
spent on government operations, especially salaries and wages. Income tax revenues 
were generally insufficient to finance investment in social infrastructure and improve 
public services because of the thin, formal income tax base. And as public sector 
wages exceeded those of equivalent private jobs, most of the scarce, skilled employees 
worked in the public sector.
Inexperienced and weak institutions, as well as political swings, constrained policy 
responses and service delivery. The result was often imbalanced and inefficient public 
expenditure allocations, with emphasis on recurrent versus capital expenditure. 
Cultural diversity in each country could also hold back modern institution 
strengthening. 
Given the limited public finances and restricted access to local private financial 
capital and limited investment, Pacific DMCs often relied on other external sources, 
including development partners, to finance growth and development. But most of 
the Pacific countries supported by ADB in the 1990s and early 2000s did, in fact, 
recognize that they were facing severe and unsustainable fiscal situations, largely 
owing to oversized public services, underperforming state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
heavy debt burdens, and weakly performing public services and private sectors. Yet, 
beyond that, many problems—and many solutions—were country specific.
Policy Reform Processes
Initiating Policy Reform
Crisis and the Reform Agenda
Individual reform programs and related policy-based loans varied in detail but 
generally they addressed three areas.
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The first area addressed macro-level economic management, which was a relevant 
response to a current or imminent fiscal crisis or deteriorating budget, and sluggish 
economic growth. All countries, except Samoa, were faced with persistent budget 
deficits, some of which had reached crisis proportions (e.g., the Cook Islands). 
Most of the Pacific DMCs had a large public service that budgets could no longer 
accommodate, and most programs included downsizing of the public sector to 
lessen expenditure burdens. This was a priority problem of most of the countries 
in the evaluation, requiring immediate action to address or avert a deeper problem. 
The exception was Samoa where the policy problem was more related to monetary 
and finance sector policy.
The second broad area entailed measures to improve public sector productivity and 
quality. In part, this was related to the worsening fiscal situation, but even prior to 
the reform programs, the provision of most public services in the study DMCs were 
deemed inefficient by, for example, ADB, and improving public service efficiency 
and delivery of services as part of government rightsizing was widely seen by DMC 
leaders in particular as a relevant agenda item.
The third area was to reduce the role of the public sector in the economy; the 
public sector traditionally dominated the economy, particularly in Micronesia and 
in small countries such as the Cook Islands.
ADB’s Role in Setting the Policy Agenda
Turning to the Cook Islands first, there had been concerns within the donor 
community since 1993 over the capacity of the government to finance the size of the 
public sector and public services. The Government of New Zealand, the Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and ADB had all provided 
assistance in analyzing underlying structural problems in the economy, weaknesses in 
financial and economic management, and the looming crisis, helping the government 
develop a reform program. In 1996, the Government of the Cook Islands adopted 
the “Pathway to Recovery” reform agenda, largely developed by consultants, in 
collaboration with the government. Further loans in other countries also tended to 
follow the Cook Islands approach.
The governments of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and the Federated 
States of Micronesia (FSM) requested ADB assistance for policy advisory teams. 
These teams helped develop detailed reform programs, in consultation with the 
governments. In the RMI, the ADB-financed team revised and augmented an existing 
government reform agenda (focused initially only on public sector downsizing), 
although these discussions proved to be insufficient, particularly between the 
executive branch and the Nitijela (National Parliament). The President of the RMI 
was the main reform champion and driving force behind the initial Public Sector 
Reform Program (PSRP) reforms and relied heavily on the team and a Rationalization 
Committee’s recommendations.
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In Samoa and Solomon Islands, reformist governments had developed reform 
agendas, and ADB worked with them in preparing each country’s reform program 
loan for loan approval.
In all other countries, consultants were largely responsible for the analysis 
and development of reform agendas, often adding to existing reform agendas. 
Consultation with government and stakeholders varied widely. In Vanuatu, the 
government recognized the need for reforms due to imminent fiscal difficulties 
and the drop in foreign exchange reserves, and adopted the comprehensive reform 
program (CRP) developed by ADB.
ADB worked closely with the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in Tonga to develop the 
reform program but had less consultation with officials of other ministries and hardly 
engaged with the public at large. The program was driven by the MOF, with other 
agencies and the public informed during implementation. The narrowly focused 
consultation process had implications for reform implementation; while measures 
under the responsibility of the MOF were effectively implemented, other agencies 
showed less ownership and understanding of other measures.
In Samoa, the program was similarly driven by the MOF; the government’s reform 
agenda was broad ranging, but the ADB-supported loan was restricted to finance 
sector reforms (including SOEs).
In all of the reforms mentioned, a key factor in ADB’s influence that affected reform 
relevance was appropriate in-depth analysis of the economy and looming crisis, which 
was shared with, at least, technocrats in oversight agencies. These analyses included 
gaining an understanding of government priorities, and involved varying degrees of 
consultation with officials, politicians, and the public: the extent of consultations in 
respective cases, and acceptance among affected stakeholders, later had a bearing on 
the extent of political and institutional feasibility and sustainability.
Managing Complexity of Reform Issues
In response to external and internal imbalances, the intended effect of macroeconomic 
stabilization is usually to restore balance as a step toward rekindling economic growth. 
At the sector and microeconomic levels, low domestic and international market 
competitiveness—due to chronic inefficiencies in factor use and low productivity, 
falling export prices, or rising costs of imported raw materials—may require more 
specific structural reform action as a subset of first-round reforms. 
Similarly for public services, improvements to allocative and expenditure efficiency, 
as well as to benefit incidence, often require far-reaching human and organizational 
change and capacity development. The sequence, timing, and optimal pace of specific 
macroeconomic and structural reforms and their interrelationship are important 
for both conceptual and practical reasons. To take an example: in the finance sector, 
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fiscal  imbalance and control should be addressed as a prerequisite to attending to 
sector reforms (such as liberalization of the domestic financial system and removal of 
capital flow restrictions) to avoid the risk of inflation and debt overhang resulting in 
capital flight (Agenor and Montiel 1999). 
Complexity of Policy Issues and Program Design
The sequence of reform steps, albeit described above in line with the framework, 
was evident and largely accomplished in Samoa, mainly because the government 
had its own reform road map. For other countries facing fiscal constraints, the 
reform programs’ focus on downsizing the public sector to reduce expenditure, on 
revenue-raising measures, and on tax administration improvements—designed with 
external advice—was also deemed appropriate given the urgency of the problems to 
be addressed. 
But it is also apparent, now, that several program loans had a complex agenda that 
tried to accomplish too much at the same time. Reform programs were generally 
planned for implementation over 3 years, and while some measures could be 
accomplished in the short term, such as budget cuts to quickly reduce budget deficits, 
institution-related reforms necessarily needed a medium- to long-term perspective. 
The heavily loaded program loans also gave the impression of a one-size-fits-all ADB 
model for economic management and reform.
For example, the economic management model was appropriate in the case of 
the Cook Islands where it was essential to downsize the public sector, but during 
interviews carried out as part of ADB’s Independent Evaluation Department’s 
assessment of reforms in the Pacific (ADB 2009),52 survey respondents considered 
that the scale was too broad and the pace too fast. The reform program, as a whole, 
was overly focused on financial recovery, which drove the downsizing program; it 
gave a lower priority to social and cultural responsibilities. The pressure for financial 
recovery also led to a lack of in-depth analysis of some measures.
On the positive side, the reform program focused on three reform pillars of 
legislation, and this was the key to success in that country. The legislation 
institutionalized reform principles and gave the reform program lasting impact. But 
the analysis of the likely impact of downsizing on the outer islands was insufficient, 
and it became apparent that the downsizing should perhaps have been delayed to 
prevent migration to Rarotonga and abroad.
Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the public service was a feature of 
reform programs in other countries too (Samoa excepted). However, service delivery 
52 As part of the special evaluation study of Pacific reforms by the Independent Evaluation Department, 
semi-structured interviews were conducted for a range of stakeholders, including present and former 
ministers, officials, politicians, nongovernment organizations, and business groups, by the evaluation 
team. “Respondents” refer to the generalized views of those interviewed. 
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improvement is a complex task and requires time and inputs tailored to each country. 
Almost all programs set targets for downsizing, but in cases of reductions there 
were insufficient agency-specific analysis and consensus as to which core activities 
government should engage in and thus which activities could be reduced without 
affecting service delivery, and consequently what the right size of the public service 
should be.
In Vanuatu, for example, program targets were set at a 10%–15% reduction in 
public spending, but without the benefit of analysis as to which core activities 
government should remain engaged in and which activities could be reduced. 
Implementation experience revealed that identifying the government activities 
that can be reduced needed more careful assessment and planning, as some valued 
services were excessively reduced or eliminated. In addition, there was an apparent 
contradiction in reducing government expenditures and the number of public 
servants while expecting improved service delivery without marked improvements 
in the productivity of the remaining employees and institutions. Introducing a 
performance orientation into the public service requires attitudinal changes that 
take time to come about. Notwithstanding the pressures of the crisis situation, 
insufficient analysis and planning was made of how to implement such reforms.
Improving the regulatory environment for the private sector was also a feature of 
all reform programs and was appropriate given the need to encourage private sector 
growth. However, expectations of the private sector absorbing retrenched public 
servants, and the ability of former public servants to become entrepreneurs, turned 
out to be unrealistic. Privatization and reform of SOEs was likewise a common 
feature of the reform programs, but again respondents (in the Cook Islands, Tonga, 
Samoa, and Solomon Islands in particular) indicated that too much was expected too 
quickly, with too fixed an idea of what the solution should be. Respondents in the 
Cook Islands, Samoa, and Solomon Islands believed that pressure from the treasury 
to raise cash through sale of SOEs, together with pressure from ADB to remove these 
operations from the public sector, led to this rush.
Reform attempts also came up against influential members on the boards and 
management of SOEs. Greater flexibility was, therefore, needed in designing reforms 
to fit each SOE’s circumstances. Tonga, where reform of SOEs was slow, later saw a 
more tailored approach to SOE reform.
In the FSM, the structure of government—with four state governments and one 
national government—added complexity to both the analysis and consultation 
process. Again, much of the reform agenda was prepared with the assistance of 
an ADB-financed policy advisory team, but economic summits (see next section) 
were held at the national and state levels in 1995 to discuss the need for reform 
which, with prereform analytical and consultative work by the team that year, helped 
raise wider public awareness on the issues. Specific components of the PSRP were 
customized to reflect the circumstances of each government (national and regional). 
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State governments (through internal deliberations) decided in their own different 
ways how to cut wage bills. Although this was a desirable approach, it would 
also have benefited from a systematic institutional analysis. However, two state 
legislatures had not officially endorsed their reform programs before the reforms 
began as consensus had not been reached. There was less consultation and public 
dialogue for the follow-on Private Sector Development Program, although the goal 
of growth in the private sector had been clearly and consistently articulated since the 
mid-1990s, and a private sector development strategy was prepared and presented at 
a second economic summit (in 1999). Thus, in the FSM, the follow-on Private Sector 
Development Program loan was a timely intervention following commitments made 
at that summit to accelerate private sector development. However, approval and 
implementation were delayed until the end of 2001 by the fast-tracking of another 
loan in 2000.
Program Design Process
In addition to offering analytical support through technical assistance, ADB used 
large public meetings or summits to varying degrees to help build awareness of the 
need for reform and the reform agendas themselves. The approach and effectiveness 
of these meetings varied, but in the FSM, the wide and public consultation process is 
credited as being the major reason behind the initial success of the reform program. 
In Vanuatu, public consultations were held, but the views from these consultations 
were that insufficient time was given to wider stakeholder groups to consider the 
reforms, which also gave the impression of an ADB-driven model for reforms in the 
Pacific. However, the provision of large technical assistance projects covering 3 years, 
as in the FSM, was also a new and widely welcomed approach given the extent of 
assistance needed, as was the alternate approach in Samoa of providing a series of 
projects that provided technical support and capacity development over several years, 
which was regarded by the government as key to providing continuity in technical 
support and led to a more effective capacity development outcomes.
In terms of ADB’s approach to support institutions involved with designing reforms, 
within each country the reform programs were developed and coordinated with the 
MOF, the focal point of contact for ADB. These ministries generally had sufficient 
capacity and understanding to carry out the fiscal reforms. Understanding and 
capacity outside the key ministries such as finance, however, varied. Line agencies 
in Tonga and Samoa noted that the reform agenda and implementation were too 
focused on, and driven by, the MOF, with other agencies inadequately involved in 
concept and design. Overall, short-term public sector downsizing measures in 
Vanuatu were relatively straightforward to carry out and, according to the surveyed 
respondents, were sufficiently well understood by stakeholders, despite reservations 
among particular groups. 
Longer-term fiscal adjustment measures were more complex and challenging to 
manage within the program loan time frame, but where the MOF was leading the 
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reform (as in the Cook Islands, Samoa, and Tonga), these measures were understood 
and pursued, the MOF having the capacity to implement them, although as was 
found later, the same understanding was not necessarily shared among line agencies.
Balancing Gainers and Losers in the Reform Design
The near-term adverse social and economic effects of reform measures were generally 
acknowledged by both reformers and vested interests. But, addressing current or 
looming crises with the need to secure stabilization of government finances—as in 
the Cook Islands, the RMI, the FSM, and Vanuatu—there was little, if any, option 
but to move ahead with reforms. The nature of reforms involved public spending 
cuts and changes in the control of public and private assets, such as highly political 
public sector workforce reductions, SOE reform, and a shift to more open trade and 
investment regimes.
All program loans attempted to identify gains and losses. For example, in the RMI, 
the anticipated short-term gains from the PSRP were relatively clear: stabilization 
of government finances through reductions in expenditure and increased revenues; 
a smooth fiscal adjustment to the dramatic second Compact step-down and other 
fiscal pressures; and better positioning for the renegotiation of Compact economic 
assistance beginning in 2001. It was clear that with these gains would come some 
pain in the form of adverse socioeconomic impacts. Almost all the reform programs 
included downsizing the public sector, which had immediate social impacts, although 
mitigation measures, such as lump-sum payments, were included. 
In the cases of the FSM and the RMI, the reform programs, as explained in program 
loan documents, also assumed that the private sector would be able to absorb some of 
the retrenched public servants. Nevertheless, because the scale and scope of reforms 
made under the PSRP were significant (especially the reduction-in-force component 
to cut the wage bill), it was recognized that the near-term social and some economic 
impacts would be swift and heavy. Coalition governments were aware of this and 
governments with slender majorities had to be cautious, needing to keep coalition 
partners on side, and softening reform impacts to keep the public on side.
Most governments—in particular oversight agencies—accepted that to achieve the 
short-term gains of attaining fiscal balance and longer-term fiscal sustainability, there 
would be hardships, particularly for those retrenched from the public service. They 
generally recognized that these costs had to be borne if the economies were to at 
least achieve macroeconomic stability and to establish a basis for growth. To mitigate 
the negative socioeconomic impacts and, in some cases, to create fiscal space for 
improved public spending, program loan funds were provided. For example, a 
program loan provided funds to help repay short-term debts to domestic creditors 
(the Cook Islands), and to help pay for the social costs of the reform programs, such 
as retrenchment of some public servants. 
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Thus, governments recognized the policy-based loan as an appropriate reform-
financing modality. Program loan tranching provided incentives for continued 
reform progress through the promise of additional funds, while for ADB it enabled 
continued policy engagement. MOF officials also felt that the loan sizes were sufficient 
to effect identified reform measures, but indicated that more support, and funding, 
was needed for technical assistance support in implementing reform programs, 
especially given the new experience of reform events and their consequence. Table 3.1 
summarizes the size and specific use of loan financing.
Stakeholders, particularly line agencies, showed less understanding and buy-in of 
public service reforms targeted at improving efficiency and effectiveness, especially of 
measures to introduce performance-oriented contracts for agency department heads, 
and performance assessments of staff. Effective implementation of this required the 
public service commission (PSC) in each country to be the key agency for reforms. 
However, in most countries, the PSC had inadequate capacity to do this. Development 
and application of administrative rules and procedures (e.g., codes of conduct) were 
inadequate, with insufficient attention in particular paid to developing understanding 
in line agencies. Some political interference in appointments continued.
On another level, in some countries (e.g., Solomon Islands, the RMI, and the FSM), 
restructuring plans designed to reduce the number of ministries—amalgamating and 
eliminating functions to improved efficiency—were impeded by political requirements 
relating to the number of ministers needed for the government to remain in power. 
The postevaluation of the RMI public sector reform program concluded that the most 
significant weakness in the program was the failure to get widespread community 
participation or support, and that the need for reform was seen as being imposed 
from outside, with ADB responsible for the resultant hardships. Stakeholders 
recognized obtaining wider community understanding and support for reform as 
a major constraint, especially where governments relied on coalition partners to 
remain in power. It raises the question as to how reform programs can be aligned 
with the political cycle in democratic governments (see also Chapter 5).
Although program loans covered key adjustment costs of reforms and support 
for pro-reform governments and champions, they did not always overcome the 
political inertia against reform. Governments at the time of reforms in Solomon 
Islands were indeed reformist, but a change precipitated by other events led to a 
new administration that did not support them. In the FSM, some politicians (who 
initially supported reforms) lost their seats in the next election and were replaced 
by less reform-minded leaders. In the Cook Islands, the coalition governments 
formed from 1999 have not demonstrated the same commitment to reform as 
they did earlier. Thus, political value of such adjustment payments can be short-
lived if the intended effects of reforms do not materialize as expected. The Cook 
Islands also saw little consultation on the pace of reform, or of alternatives. The 
government, opposition, and the private sector had indicated favoring the reform 
agenda, especially with the introduction of the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
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Table 3.1
Estimated Reform Costs in Pacific DMC Program Loans
Loan Objectives
Key Reform  
Measures
Loan Amount 
Justification
COO: Economic 
Restructuring 
Program 
($5 million)
•	 Public sector 
reform
•	 Promote private 
sector growth
•	 Social equity and 
sustainability
•	 Retirement of a part of 
government’s short-term 
liabilities to domestic 
private sector creditors
•	 Establishment of 
Business Ventures 
Development 
Corporation under 
Cook Islands 
Development Bank 
(CIDB)
•	 Equity injection in CIDB
•	 Given the outstanding 
government arrears 
and other external 
debt totaling NZ$200 
million, the loan size of 
NZ$7.2 million would 
not have bridged the 
gap (Knapman and 
Saldanha, 1999, p. 34)
•	 The loan size was 
based on “the 
significance of the 
policy changes 
and economic 
restructuring being 
pursued and the 
historical levels of 
Bank lending to the 
Cook Islands” (RRP, 
para. 75)
RMI: Public 
Sector Reform 
Program 
($12 million)
•	 Stabilize 
government 
finances in the 
short run
•	 Ensure long-term 
structural stability 
of government 
finances
•	 Create an improved 
environment for the 
private sector
•	 Retirement-in-force 
(RIF) program 
($5.5 million)
•	 Pay off Air Marshall 
Islands’ commercial debt 
($4 million)
•	 Seed injection to 
Financial Reserves Trust 
Fund ($2.5 million) 
(Knapman and 
Saldanha, 1999, 
pp. 89–90)
•	 Based on salaries 
paid in the civil 
service and 
average length 
of service, and 
expected number 
of retrenchments 
(RRP, para. 69)
•	 Two-thirds of Air 
Marshall Islands’ 
outstanding 
commercial debt
FSM: Public 
Sector Reform 
Program 
($18 million)
•	 Reduce size and 
operating costs of 
civil service
•	 Increase domestic 
revenue generation
•	 Restructure 
government 
operations and 
public enterprises
•	 Mitigate social and 
economic impact
•	 Foster development 
of private sector
•	 Direct costs of early 
retirement schemes 
for the national and 
four state governments 
($3 million for the 
national; $5.3 million for 
Chuuk, $4.2 million for 
Pohnpei, $3.5 million 
for Yap, $2 million for 
Kosrae) 
•	 No detailed 
documentation 
in the RRP, but 
the EMPAT team 
(ADTA consultants) 
did the detailed 
estimation and 
also developed 
monitoring schemes 
for the retirement 
program
continued on next page
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Loan Objectives
Key Reform  
Measures
Loan Amount 
Justification
SAM: Financial 
Sector Program 
($7.5 million)
•	 Deepen financial 
markets
•	 Strengthen 
Central Bank of 
Samoa (CBS) 
and enhance 
its operational 
autonomy
•	 Strengthen 
prudential 
and regulatory 
framework
•	 Strengthen the 
National Provident 
Fund and 
Development Bank 
of Samoa
•	 Privatize and 
corporatize public 
enterprises and 
utilities
•	 Incremental budgetary 
cost of issuing CBS bills 
($1.9 million over a 
3-year period)
•	 Temporary 
compensation for the 
loss of revenue from 
elimination of the 
foreign exchange levies 
($1.3 million annually)
•	 Temporary 
compensation for the 
loss of revenue from the 
planned corporatization 
of the Posts and 
Telecommunications 
Department 
($5.72 million annually)
•	 A loan of 
$7.5 million is aimed 
at covering a major 
share of these costs 
to the government, 
with the remaining 
part coming from 
other sources, 
including revenue 
from privatization 
of state-owned 
enterprises (RRP, 
paras. 101–104)
•	 Short- to medium-
term costs of the 
reform program 
were estimated in 
fiscal and balance-
of-payments terms
•	 Incremental cost 
of issuing CBS bills 
was calculated as the 
total incremental 
interest rate 
costs associated 
with interest rate 
differential
VAN: 
Comprehensive 
Reform Program 
($20 million)
•	 Redefine the role of 
government, and 
enhance the quality 
and delivery of its 
policy, regulatory, 
and development 
services
•	 Increase the 
productivity and 
growth of the 
private sector in 
both urban and 
rural areas
•	 Support social 
development of the 
disadvantaged and 
rural population
•	 Restructure and right-
size the public sector
•	 Restructure and 
rehabilitate government-
owned financial 
institutions
•	 Fiscal stabilization 
(reduce the need 
for an inflationary 
domestic financing of 
budget deficit)
•	 The loan amount 
($20 million) was 
to cover 35%, 40%, 
and 25% of the above 
three adjustment costs 
(Knapman and Saldanha, 
1999, p. 152)
•	 Fiscal outlook 
covering 1997–2000 
and government 
funding plan 
1998–2000 formed 
the basis of external 
financing need for 
the reform program 
(RRP, paras. 73–83)
ADTA = Advisory Technical Assistance, COO = Cook Islands, DMC = developing member country, EMPAT = Economic 
Management and Policy Advisory Team, FSM = Federated States of Micronesia, RMI = Republic of the Marshall Islands, 
RRP = Report and Recommendation of the President, SAM = Samoa, VAN = Vanuatu.
Source: Bolt, R. et al. 2003. Economic Analysis of Policy-Based Operations: Key Dimensions. Manila: ADB.
Table 3.1
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Management Act, the Public Expenditure Review Committee and Audit Act, and the 
Public Service Act, but later coalition governments (not foreseen at the time of the 
crisis) have not viewed continued reform as a priority on their agendas. The need for 
deepening reforms also lessened as the economy grew, following the initial reforms.
The need to clarify donor coordination and relative roles became key as reforms 
progressed. In Micronesia, for example, payments to retrenched public servants 
as a result of the downsizing program could not be funded under provisions of the 
Compact, even though the Compact reductions led to the need to reduce the size 
of the civil service. ADB policy-based loan funding thus became key to financing 
civil service downsizing as part of reforms. To address the need for enhanced 
donor coordination, ADB introduced donor and recipient government consultative 
group meetings. The first such meeting for the Pacific was held in Manila in 
December 1995 to discuss the first reform program loans in the RMI and the FSM, 
help donor partners understand the need for reforms and identify funding support 
from respective donors. Consultative group meetings were subsequently held for 
the Cook Islands in June 1996, at which the government presented its reform 
agenda, and, in June 1997, to gain funding support. A meeting was also convened 
for Vanuatu in June 1997. A further complication and need for coordination arose 
when new donors (such as Taipei,China in the RMI and Papua New Guinea) 
entered the scene with aid packages that apparently attached no conditions. This 
additional assistance helped ministries of finance to balance or boost their budgets, 
but also served to undermine reform efforts by reducing the need and pressure for 
reforms requiring budget discipline. 
Post-Program Views on the Design Process
At the time of preparation, most program designs facilitated needed reforms, 
but key stakeholders considered that the preparatory work was too focused on 
macroeconomic aspects and that the micro issues of private sector and public 
service improvements needed further preparatory work to secure the necessary local 
understanding and buy-in to enable implementation. For example, redundancy 
exercises were driven by the need to reduce the burden on budgets of relatively 
large  civil services, but were also generally unconnected to the needed reforms 
and parallel strengthening of key public service agencies such as public service 
commissions and line agencies. It is now recognized that even lower subsequent 
institutional performance risked undermining otherwise successful, short-run 
macroeconomic reforms.
In addition, the reform program designs generally paid insufficient attention to their 
social and wider impact. For example, reducing the size of the public sector had 
impacted on the market for the private sector in most of the countries, as private 
sector activity often catered to the needs of both government and individual public 
servants. Smaller government and fewer civil servants reduced the demand for 
private sector goods and services. 
75Reforms in the Pacific
In all eight countries, ADB helped develop the reform agenda, providing consultant 
advice through technical assistance. Governments’ own efforts—advised by 
consultants—also helped build on an existing reform agendas as well as ownership 
and commitment by reformers. As noted in ADB (2009), most Pacific DMCs 
recognized and owned the need for reforms, notably in the Cook Islands, Samoa, 
and Vanuatu, and initially in Solomon Islands before the change in government. 
Commitment and ownership of the reform design continue to be key factors 
in the success and sustainability of the reform agendas and actions. But, as 
implementation realities emerged, significant challenges to political commitment 
and ownership arose.
Endorsing Reforms: Commitment or Complying 
with Conditions?
Conditions in the program loans supported in the Pacific constituted the primary 
means of ensuring that reforms in government policies have a good chance of being 
undertaken. Conditions were the outcome of consultations—some extensive, some 
less so—that resulted in the setting out of a package of measures to achieve the 
chosen objectives of the program. Government-agreed and -approved conditions 
could be seen by the borrowing government and ADB as an endorsement of reforms. 
Conditions also have an administrative function for loan implementation, including 
preconditions or actions for loan release compliance that trigger access to the next 
credit tranche. Used carefully, conditions could also help reformers follow a sequence 
of changes, ensure consistency over time, and strengthen the hand of reform 
champions over vested interests within national governments. Against this, excessive 
use of fixed versus flexible conditions, or target triggers for loan funds release which 
are now used, and a rigid implementation time frame may not provide a realistic 
perspective for implementation, and do not necessarily gauge the success or failure 
of a policy change.
ADB’s 1996 review of program lending found that many policy conditions included 
in program loans incurred implementation delays relative to the original schedule. 
Second-tranche releases were delayed, by an average of about 1 year, in two-thirds 
of cases where target dates had been set. The review’s key recommendations were 
as follows: (i) each tranche release should be based on a certain number of specific, 
time-bound, and objectively monitorable conditions; (ii) covenanted conditions 
should relate to essential policy objectives only; and (iii) distribution of conditions 
among program loan tranches, including front-loading of key reform measures 
should be balanced. In the Pacific program loans, tranches were generally front-
loaded, but a key feature was the large number of conditions: given that ADB-wide 
program loans since 1987 had, on average, 38 conditions, their proliferation was 
particularly excessive in the Pacific (with the Cook Islands’ reform program having 
ADB’s largest number of conditions in a program loan).
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The conditions in policy reform packages focused on strategic issues (such as the 
preparation of plans) to fiscal management issues (such as budget realignment, cuts, and 
new taxes) to changes in the formal rules of sector operation (such as changes in laws and 
regulations) that can fundamentally change the way of doing business, whether inside 
government or the private sector. As experienced elsewhere in ADB program lending, 
second and third tranches tended to experience delays, in part because of realizations 
of the implications of reforms that causes hesitancy or because of the complexity of 
the steps needed to fulfill a requirement, such as passing legislation. The deeper the 
change in the rules and incentives, the longer the time needed to meet the condition, 
let alone realization of a behavioral response. Further, the second- and third-tranche 
conditions met greater delays, waivers, or cancellations. This suggests that the second 
and subsequent tranche requirements, which are predetermined in multiple-tranche 
program loan designs, needed to better consider the realities of reform implementation.
Implementing Reforms
Operational Complexities Emerge
Immediate fiscal stress required quick-acting fiscal reforms to reduce or reverse 
budget deficits. Short-term fiscal targets, as given in the program loans, were generally 
achieved, and by downsizing government improved the budget situation. Approaches 
included both revenue-raising measures and expenditure cuts. 
Measures to increase domestic revenue generation were generally implemented 
expeditiously, with regulations being developed and passed relatively easily, and 
in fact have been the more resilient part of the reforms in most countries, helping 
increase fiscal sustainability. In the FSM, for example, the valuation basis for import 
duties was changed from free on board (FOB) to cost, insurance, and freight (CIF), 
pushing up receipts by 69%. However, budget deficits reemerged in the FSM, and in 
the RMI, the current surplus is unstable, and both countries remain grant dependent. 
In contrast, the Cook Islands, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu have made substantial 
improvements, and maintained surpluses (in contrast to Micronesia, taxes are 
the main source of revenue in these countries, as well as in Papua New Guinea). 
Nevertheless, a wide difference between Micronesia and the rest of the Pacific is the 
continued dependence on grants as the main source of government revenue. Longer-
term fiscal sustainability is not so assured.
Delays emerged in reforms that addressed more complicated laws relating to foreign 
investment, taxation, and privatization, all of which took much longer to be passed 
than expected (and in any case were reversed). Geographic spread and multiple 
subnational legislatures (e.g., the FSM) also caused further delays in coordinating 
and realizing compliance, sometimes because of different local government views on 
reform measures. In the case of the RMI, delays were caused by tardiness in preparing 
the detailed steps and legislation needed for consideration by Parliament, as well as 
exogenous developments, such as droughts, that resulted in a declaration of emergency, 
as well as issues with debt repayments on bond issuance in the United States.
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In Samoa, the approval of reform measures leading to condition compliance was slow, 
but well managed. The main delay in Samoa, as elsewhere, was in meeting tranche-
condition compliance on SOE privatization due to greater-than-expected resistance 
from SOE employees. In part, this stemmed from the government’s and SOEs’ lack 
of access to continuing technical advice on how to prepare SOEs for privatization 
options (e.g., corporatization, sale, or liquidation). In all cases, conditions that 
required organizational change involved often-painful remedies, the principle of 
which took time to be accepted, in particular downsizing. In addition, legislative 
changes and regulation promulgation involved extensive interagency coordination 
and legal expertise that had to be sourced and often complex drafts explained (in 
cases, if at all) to legislatures. In general, protracted legal procedures outside the 
control of governments slowed a number of policy changes—and thus condition 
compliance, especially those involving the private sector.
Fiscal management measures also involved public service downsizing, mainly to 
help reduce expenditure, and were also generally met in the short term in the Cook 
Islands, the RMI, the FSM, and Vanuatu. However, in all cases, targets were not based 
on strategic plans for a future public service focused on core activities and, while the 
targets were met within 1 or 2 years, employment and wage bills have generally crept 
back up, in cases exceeding previous levels (the RMI and Vanuatu). In the case of 
the RMI, for example, some 400 positions were shed as part of the reform program, 
reducing the wage bill by about $1 million a year. But over the period 2000–2008, 
the public service increased by nearly 1,000 employees, with an increased wage bill 
of $13.5 million. Some of this reexpansion was justified as necessary given that some 
essential services and positions were eliminated, but much of the rehiring was not 
clearly justified.
In addition, the Government of the RMI unraveled a number of organizational 
reforms, reestablishing some enterprises that had been handed over to the private 
sector. “RMI government budget largely depends on foreign assistance and, despite 
annual decrements in compact funding to support budgetary expenditures, is 
characterized by a growing wage bill” (US Government Accountability Office 2007). 
The public sector wage bill, as a share of GDP in Tonga, was one of the highest in 
the region. The 2005 civil service strike pressured the government to agree on a 
substantial civil service wage increase of 60%–80% to be paid in two tranches—fiscal 
year (FY)2005/06 and FY2006/07. Despite a major voluntary redundancy program 
in April–June 2006 reducing personnel by 18%, the total cost of the wage settlement, 
including one-off payments (severance packages), accounted for about 9% of GDP 
(IMF 2008).
Nominal Reform versus Implanting Change
Strengthening public expenditure management was a component of most of 
the reform programs in each country, with several governments introducing 
some form of performance or output budgeting. While macro-level and function 
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expenditure, in particular wage bills, were addressed, at least in the short term, 
budget realignment and reallocations needed for service delivery through line 
agencies was not significantly addressed. Furthermore, it is now apparent that a 
voluntary retrenchment approach can undermine a reform agenda for public service 
improvement, as was demonstrated in Pohnpei State and the national government in 
the FSM and in Tonga where many skilled and experienced public servants left the 
service, reducing its effectiveness.
The Cook Islands, Samoa, and Tonga have introduced a form of output or 
performance budgeting. But few efforts have met expectations. There were different 
perspectives among countries and stakeholders as to what performance budgeting 
actually is, and few governments were aware at the time of what was involved in 
setting up a performance-based budget system—the “how to.” In the Cook Islands, 
output budgeting was introduced, following the New Zealand reform model. 
While somewhat rudimentary and variable in quality across ministries, it has been 
introduced and is the basis for moves to develop a 3-year medium-term budget 
framework. In Tonga, a form of output budgeting has replaced line budgeting; 
however, while requisite skills exist within the Ministry of Finance (MOF), capacity 
in line agencies is much weaker, inhibiting the devolution of output or performance 
budgeting to them. Thus, the first steps in improving allocative and expenditure 
efficiency were attempted. It is now recognized that to analyze, plan, and budget 
for budget realignments require time and skills, and significant sector policy and 
service-specific improvements.
The introduction of regulatory and legislative changes associated with the PBL 
needed to improve government efficiency, and the functions of product and factor 
markets, including privatization efforts, were generally accomplished. However, 
while the legislation could be drafted and enacted in a relatively short time, its 
effectiveness was dependent on institutional capacity to implement, and ultimately 
the behavioral response by markets, people, and interest groups.
In the Cook Islands, for example, three key laws—the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Management Act, the Public Expenditure Review Committee and Audit 
Act, and the Public Service Act—which became the pillars of the reform program 
were passed. The first two acts were effective given the strengths of the agencies 
concerned, but the Public Service Act has had lesser impact due to the weaknesses 
in the PSC and unwillingness to effectively implement a performance-based public 
service assessment system. Political interference in appointments can be a weakness, 
undermining the authority of the PSC. The same weakness was apparent in Papua 
New Guinea, but in Tonga, strong measures were subsequently taken to remove such 
interference and strengthen the PSC. These cases illustrate the fact that it takes time 
to introduce a performance-oriented public service.
Except the loan to the Cook Islands, 11 reform program loans were approved between 
1997 and 2007 to help address and avoid an imminent crisis and as such were timely 
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in that the reform agenda was finalized and approved prior to any crisis actually 
eventuating. In the Cook Islands, an earlier response might have helped lessen the 
depth of the crisis facing government. Nevertheless, technical assistance provided in 
the year prior to loan approval did help the country in developing reform measures 
to address the crisis. In all cases except Samoa, however, officials and others reported 
that the reform time line was too tight given the complexity of reforms. In particular, 
it did not allow sufficient time for effective consultation during detailed design at 
implementation stage. As in other cases, there was insufficient time to analyze core 
areas which government should remain active in, and to develop strategic plans for 
the future operations of the public service.
The FSM Private Sector Development Program faced a different situation: too 
much time for deliberation. This program was designed to follow on from the 
PSRP, reinforcing the reforms while providing greater focus on private sector 
development. However, the 3-year delay in approval and implementation meant 
that much of the reform momentum was lost. On eventual commencement, it met 
resistance and interruptions on issues such as land and foreign investment reforms. 
Some respondents suggested that it might have been better to have taken a two-
stage approach in sequencing, where fiscal crisis was not so pressing, and getting 
key fiscal concerns sorted out first before moving on to large-scale downsizing and 
reorganization of the public service. In fact, this happened in Tonga, where public 
service reforms were delayed until after the main revenue-raising measures had been 
introduced and budget surpluses achieved.
Institutional Capacity Development
An institutional constraint in Pacific DMCs is their limited capacity in economic, 
financial, and development planning, although the Polynesian countries fare better 
than those in Melanesia and Micronesia. There was wide recognition across all of the 
countries that local capacity would have to be strengthened if the reform efforts were 
to be effectively carried out and sustained. Capacity development, therefore, formed a 
critical component of the reform programs and related technical assistance.
While some immediate individual-level capacity improvements were seen in most 
of the countries, structural capacity development efforts (targeting organizational 
and institutional levels) were limited, apart from the Cook Islands and Samoa. 
Stakeholders interviewed in the RMI, the FSM, and Vanuatu held the impression (in 
hindsight) that the reform programs and related technical assistance had generally 
limited impacts. Respondents in these three countries generally felt that neither 
personnel capacity nor that of oversight and line agencies had dramatically improved 
as a result of the reforms. Respondents in the Cook Islands, Samoa, and Tonga were 
generally more positive on the impacts of the capacity reforms.
All program loans had prior, parallel, and, in some cases, postprogram technical 
assistance provided to assist with policy analysis and implementation. Despite the 
80 Managing Reforms for Development
technical assistance, a shortage of local expertise remains in high-quality economic 
policy advice, creating problems for ADB and consultants in developing local 
understanding of the macroeconomic reforms proposed.
A general criticism was made over the lack of attention given to capacity building. 
Ministers in the RMI felt that they had enough reports analyzing problems and that 
more were not needed, but that more “how to” assistance was required. In some 
cases, this was due to the lack of counterparts for the consultants to work with, but a 
focus of consultant inputs was on analyzing, resolving issues, and building awareness 
rather than on capacity building. In the Cook Islands, the severity of the crisis led 
to consultants initially working in fire-fighting mode, with no time for longer-term 
strategic planning or capacity building, although this was in their terms of reference. 
Indeed, team problems developed because of the conflict between providing specific 
policy advice and longer-term capacity development needs. In Solomon Islands, 
respondents noted that assistance was initially late in being provided, but then too 
much was provided, overwhelming the administration.
By comparison, in the Cook Islands and Samoa, ADB-funded policy advice and 
capacity building through a series of separate technical assistance projects, spread 
over 4–5 years. In the Cook Islands, they were provided policy advice prior to the 
loan approval, while two were attached to the loan. However, much of this support 
took on a fire-fighting role rather than focusing on original targets of improving 
policy and planning, and capacity building. The use of both external consultants 
and local skilled people to facilitate some of the change processes was critical in 
managing and communicating the reform change process but fell short in building 
lasting capacity. Nevertheless, in the Cook Islands, legislative reforms did have 
positive impacts on raising overall structural capacity (discussed earlier). Together, 
the passage of these three laws institutionalized reform principles and gave the 
reforms more lasting impact.
In Samoa, advisory and capacity development technical support was attached to the 
loan to strengthen the Central Bank of Samoa, the National Provident Fund, and 
the Development Bank of Samoa. Four further technical assistance projects were 
given over 4 years to provide policy advice and to help strengthen the MOF. The 
technical support projects were presented as phases of a comprehensive program to 
strengthen the macroeconomic analysis, planning, and policy formulation capacity 
of the Treasury Department. A difference in Samoa with other countries was that the 
MOF always had a sufficient cadre of counterparts for consultants to work with and 
train. Furthermore, when ADB technical support projects were completed, there was 
substantial complementary support from the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID) and the European Union, and the MOF was clear on its own 
needs for capacity development which, in turn, helped guide subsequent design of 
technical assistance.
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Pro-reform Advocates and Leadership
A feature of the reforms outside ADB influence that affected the ownership 
and commitment to reforms, and hence the manageability and ultimately the 
effectiveness of the process, was the presence of a strong pro-reform advocate or 
leader—“champion.” In the Cook Islands, the Prime Minister championed reforms, 
and led the program through its implementation period, helping ensure reforms 
were persevered with. He took responsibility for the crisis, assumed leadership of 
the reform effort, and constantly encouraged implementation. When he lost the 
premiership in 1999, the commitment to reform waned under the subsequent series 
of coalition governments.
In the RMI, the President was the champion of reform, but died before 
implementation, and commitment subsequently weakened. In the FSM, where the 
reform program covered the four state governments and the national government, 
progress was good at the national level and in Yap State, where leadership was 
committed to reform, but not elsewhere where there was no real champion. In 
Tonga, the Minister of Finance led the reform effort, which initially focused on 
revenue generation and expenditure controls; progress on public sector and public 
enterprise reforms only really got under way due to changing social circumstances 
(civil disturbances, public service strike) demanding political change, which 
led to pressures for wider reforms. The impetus increased from 2006 with the 
appointment of a new Prime Minister, who then took a lead role in this process. 
However, the public sector reform process has now become intertwined with the 
political reform agenda, the latter providing a sense of urgency for progress before 
the 2010 elections.
In Solomon Islands, the Prime Minister also led the reform effort, but not all his 
colleagues shared the understanding of the need for reform, and the change in 
government following civil unrest (not related to the reform program) led to the 
reform program and loan being canceled. In Samoa, the government itself was a 
reformist government, and while the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance in a way 
were champions of reform, there was a broader acceptance in government as a whole 
of the need for reforms to continue and embrace different aspects of the economy. 
Thus, broad-based support is a more effective way of maintaining commitment than 
reliance on an individual advocate or champion.
Sustaining Reforms
Macroeconomic Outcomes and Sustainability
Most reform programs supported by ADB focused on the immediate need to 
stabilize finances at the macroeconomic level and often achieved the key short-term 
reform outcomes, but the reforms’ sustainability over the medium and longer term 
was more mixed. 
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Budget deficits continued in the FSM and the RMI, but the Cook Islands, Tonga, 
Samoa, and Vanuatu saw improvements, with budget surpluses maintained. Revenue 
increased, and while the RMI and the FSM remain grant dependent, tax income is 
the main source of revenue in Polynesia and Melanesia. Savings–investment gaps are 
unchanged, trade deficits persist in Micronesia and Polynesia, but external debt has 
fallen in all countries. Transfers by remittances have become important in Samoa and 
Tonga. Government expenditure, as a proportion of GDP, has seen a small decline in 
most countries, although government wage bills—after initial reductions—have, in 
cases, risen again.
In Micronesia, the reform program loans helped the governments to undertake (and 
finance) major reform and fiscal adjustment processes that allowed the countries 
to avert what would have been a more serious fiscal crisis. A component was the 
establishment of trust funds for the FSM and the RMI, which ensured that a 
proportion of Compact funds were paid for future drawdown to finance government 
operations. The sustainability of the reforms has, however, been put into doubt by 
the reemergence of fiscal deficits and reversals in the size of the public sector. These 
reform programs were less than transformational, particularly in terms of sustained 
economic growth and development, improved public sector financial management 
and overall productivity, and private sector growth. Improvements to the overall fiscal 
balance were made, but these proved to be short-lived. The objectives of reducing the 
size and costs of the public service were achieved, but subsequently reductions were 
reversed, particularly in the RMI.
The programs in Polynesia were better sustained at the macroeconomic level than 
elsewhere. For example, in the Cook Islands, the reform program—particularly the 
downsizing of the public service and sale of government assets to the private sector—
enabled the government to pull back from bankruptcy and move on to a renewed 
growth path. Cash liquidity was restored within 9 months. In Samoa, the program, 
which addressed aspects of monetary policy to effect finance sector reforms, including 
the introduction of market-based interest rates and other liberalization measures, 
has increased availability of finance for business. Samoa is also making progress in 
reforming and privatizing SOEs.
In Tonga, progress in fiscal reforms was sound, but little happened on public sector 
reforms until the public service strike in 2005 and the reforms in 2006. Civil strife 
in 2006 created a greater urgency for reform. Vanuatu’s economy has been growing 
(though not in the rural areas), and the government remains committed to a reform 
path, but fiscal structural reform has been minimal.
Institutional Impact and Sustainability
While programs supported reforms to improve public sector efficiency and enhance 
the environment for private sector development, outcomes were generally modest. 
Downsizing the public service was largely achieved, but subsequently reversed in 
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cases such as the RMI. Improved public sector efficiency and effectiveness were 
generally not achieved. Some legal and policy improvements were made to improve 
the enabling environment for private sector development, but effects have had a 
limited overall impact on private sector growth, although there were some sector-
specific improvements.
Changes in the government disrupted reform progress in the RMI, the FSM, and 
Solomon Islands, and while seen as exogenous, in fact are endogenous in that 
ADB and the government could have involved opposition parties much more in 
policy dialogue and consultations, both during reform agenda preparation and 
implementation. A champion for a reform program is often a key factor in reform 
success—though reliance on a single champion can have a negative impact if that 
champion is replaced. The most dramatic example was in the RMI where President 
Amata Kabua passed away in 1996 before the reforms were fully implemented, 
which at the time had a detrimental impact on commitment to and implementation 
of reforms.
Efforts to introduce forms of performance budgeting in Polynesian countries had 
limited results, systems largely being partially implemented with links not established to 
planning and public expenditure management. Assessments of financial management 
were largely tracked through the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
(PEFA) indicators in public financial management reports.53 Although the ministries of 
finance in Polynesian countries were relatively sound, institutional capacity for policy 
making, planning, and service delivery, as a whole, remained weak. 
In the Cook Islands, idle government assets were sold, and some started to generate 
immediate returns. The New Zealand reform model had a significant influence on 
reform program design in that country, reflected in the three key acts mentioned 
earlier. The leadership in the Cook Islands was replaced in 1999 by a coalition 
government, but many reforms had become imbedded in the government system and 
were not reversed. While the principles of accountability, transparency, efficiency, and 
effectiveness as the underlining core principles of the three acts have become accepted 
as core values within the Cook Islands government, public service employment has 
been rising, and performance measures introduced in the public service have not had 
the desired results.
Throughout the Pacific, during and after reform efforts (at the time of the 
Independent  Evaluation Department’s assessment), there was a shortage of local 
53 The PEFA Program was founded in December 2001 as a multi-donor partnership between the 
World  Bank, the European Commission, the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development, the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the International Monetary Fund. Public 
financial management reports available at the time of the evaluation for the Cook Islands, Samoa, 
Tonga, and Vanuatu noted that, generally, the budget preparation and economic planning processes 
were handled well, but there was room for improvement in timeliness and accuracy. 
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expertise in high-quality economic policy advice. While having some effect at the 
time, technical assistance was generally insufficient to significantly improve the 
situation. 
Polynesia is better off than Melanesia and Micronesia. In Polynesia, capacity in 
economic management is greater, as is continued commitment to reform. Samoa 
remains committed to its reform agenda and probably has the greatest capacity 
in financial and economic management in the countries covered. In Tonga, the 
government is a demonstration of the major changes in society and in the democratic 
process, and is committed to reform. The MOF has capable staff, but there was limited 
capacity in line agencies for improved financial management and for the introduction 
of a performance-oriented public service. The PSC has been given greater authority, 
however, and the government is committed to improving public service delivery.
In Papua New Guinea, traditions, such as the wontok system of obligations and 
patronage, have constrained the anticipated adoption and acceptance of Western-
oriented public sector behavior and standards, thus inhibiting progress in reforms 
(ADB 2008b). 
In the FSM and the RMI, the impacts of efforts to strengthen public sector 
productivity and effectiveness were very limited. Poor education outcomes in the 
RMI are especially alarming despite expenditure increases. Public enterprise reforms 
have not been implemented as envisaged. Both countries committed large resources 
toward improving the environment for private sector development and shifting the 
economic balance toward the private sector, but without much success, as shown by 
the decline in performance in areas such as foreign direct investment in the FSM.
While some growth has occurred in the private sector since the reforms, the sector’s 
contribution to economic output remains flat, and the public sector continues to 
dominate the economy. The amended Compact, with its new 20-year funding 
program (which is again front-loaded, but with more modest step-downs this 
time), continued confusion over the proper role of the state, and perhaps even 
reform fatigue may have contributed to this eroding of commitment to reforms. 
The  continued shortage of skilled economic managers and advisors is another 
factor, and basic economic literacy among policy makers is also a likely cause. 
The reforms focused on reducing the size of the public sector and this was largely 
achieved in the short term, but as noted, there have been reversals, with increases 
again in the FSM and the RMI. The public sector remains dominant in Micronesia. 
Political patronage is a likely factor in the strong expansionist fiscal policies of some 
of the FSM states.
The reduction in the size of government may have lessened crowding-out effects in 
some economic sectors, but efforts to stimulate the private sector through specific 
institutions and incentive improvements yielded modest results overall. Polynesia 
generally has a better climate for investors with a few key success stories, but major 
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constraints—such as small markets, lack of resources, high electricity costs, and 
inadequate port services—remain. 
In Samoa, the move to market-based interest rates and other financial liberalization 
measures helped the business sector, though the constraints mentioned earlier 
remain. In Vanuatu, the creation of the Vanuatu Investment Promotions Authority 
increased investor confidence. In the FSM, on the other hand, liberalization measures 
seem to be in reverse, with foreign investment apparently discouraged in Pohnpei 
State. Foreign direct investment remains relatively low in all countries. The structure 
of the economies has not changed significantly despite the reform programs, again 
suggesting that assumptions were not realistic.
At the time of the ADB evaluation, evidence was limited in any of the countries 
that there had been significant improvements in public service delivery, and modest 
change in the balance of economic activity between the public and private sectors, 
or growth in the private sector—apart from tourism in the Cook Islands, Samoa, 
and Vanuatu, which became their growth driver. Such changes take time and, while 
appropriate parts of a reform agenda, need to be looked at as medium to long term. 
Key constraints remain. The evaluation concluded that program loans insufficiently 
examined or considered the institutional conditions that ultimately determine how 
macroeconomic policy improvements are channeled through to microeconomic 
agents. For example, policies that increase total government expenditure on services 
may not achieve much in terms of household improvements in accessing service, 
or improvements in interest rate policies may not lead to increased household and 
business investment unless other constraints are removed.
Poverty impact assessments of the reform programs were carried out as part of 
program preparation and were a concern. However, priority was accorded to fiscal 
problems as they were the immediate issue, and as micro and social concerns could 
be better addressed later once the government was in a viable financial position. 
Nevertheless, it is evident now that reform programs needed to take full account of 
the social impact as well as structures and systems that may influence the actions 
of politicians and public service staff. In the Cook Islands, for example, the costs 
to households and communities of reform were much bigger than anticipated as 
reflected in the population’s flight overseas—the public service was cut by more than 
half, and while some retrenched public servants were anticipated to go overseas, the 
massive migration experienced was not expected, with whole families departing, 
not  just working-age people. Many outer islands have lost half their population, 
raising doubts on their viability as self-sustaining communities.
Indeed, a major regional influence on the reform programs is the degree of mobility 
of the population and labor, with countries, such as the Cook Islands, having free 
access to move to New Zealand (and on to Australia), while the FSM and the RMI 
having free access to Guam and the United States. This is not formally the case in 
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Tonga and Samoa, although many people have moved to Australia and New Zealand. 
For Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, new migrant labor laws allow 
temporary seasonal employment in Australia and New Zealand under a quota system. 
For the reform programs in the Cook Islands and Micronesia, this was initially seen 
as a safety valve, but the scale of migration from the Cook Islands, and particularly 
the outer islands, was far greater than expected.
An unanticipated outcome of the reform process was the monopolistic behavior 
of now-private firms. Some monopolies were created in disposing of government 
assets—again, partly a reflection of small market size. Nevertheless, regulatory 
concerns were often overlooked, which is important where a private monopoly is 
created and market size prohibits more than one company (such as power or water 
utilities in small populations). In the FSM, two pro-reform governors lost elections 
during the implementation of the PSRP. Data also show that migration increased, 
rather than redundant workers being absorbed by the private sector. Civil disturbances 
in Solomon Islands led to the fall of the reformist government and the end of the 
reform program (the program loan was canceled).
Influences on the Commitment to Reform: 
Improving the Odds
At the time of the Independent Evaluation Department’s assessment, the status of 
commitment to reform can be summarized by country as follows:
•	 Cook Islands—commitment to fiscal reforms remained strong, although some 
uncertainty arose under subsequent coalition governments; commitment to 
institutional reforms in the MOF stayed strong, but under weak support from 
the PSC, public service reform was stagnant.
•	 RMI—after a strong start, commitment to fiscal and public service reforms 
wavered, then progressed, then reversed again over the span of a decade, but 
with a generally more open policy for private sector development. With the 
return of fiscal pressures, a revival of reform efforts began again shortly after the 
evaluation was completed.
•	 FSM—the country continued to be committed to fiscal reforms, despite individual 
state wavering, while lower indications of commitment to public service reform 
and private sector development implied uncertainty over further progress.
•	 Papua New Guinea—frequent political changes, weak institutions, and 
pervasiveness of the wontok system presented significant risk and uncertainty 
for furthering reforms.
•	 Samoa—commitment to finance sector and other reforms was unwavering with 
a substantially strengthened MOF and central bank, but less progress was seen in 
line agencies where there was more uncertainty over furthering reforms.
87Reforms in the Pacific
•	 Solomon Islands—strong initial commitment but weak institutions, the change 
in government, and reversal of reforms followed by civil strife further weakened 
institutions, making for a risky and uncertain reform environment. After the 
need for external assistance to stabilize the country, the environment was more 
conducive to reestablishing public sector services.
•	 Tonga—commitment to fiscal reform remained strong and had widened 
to a broader reform program following civil unrest. Later moves to change 
democratic processes facilitated wider acceptance of the need for public sector 
reforms, including reform of SOEs.
•	 Vanuatu—government commitment to fiscal reform remained, and public 
and private sector reforms stayed strong, but weak line agency institutions and 
noninclusive growth raised risks of political interference and uncertainty.
The status of these reforms reflected a range of results, from steady progress in Samoa, 
to belated but sound progress in Tonga, to pronounced wavering in the RMI. Both 
the sound progress and fluctuations for this complex set of reforms in each Pacific 
country reflected the importance of ownership, institutional capacity to implement 
reforms, and the need for follow-through support from development partners. 
Overall key findings and lessons identified and cited in the evaluation on the reform 
process were as follows (ADB 2009):
•	 Initiating reforms: (i) an existing government reform agenda facilitated quicker 
development of a program, but substantial addition to the agenda by, for example, 
ADB complicated preparation and apparent commitment; (ii) large and fiscally 
unsustainable public provision of goods and services had an important influence 
on raising the need for private sector development, but where private sectors 
were dominated by nontraded goods and services, potential opportunities were 
likely overestimated.
•	 Managing reform complexity: (i) a single, strong reform champion helped 
to advance reforms, but unless the support had depth among pro-reform 
stakeholders, a change in leadership slowed or reversed the commitment 
to reform; (ii) wide coverage of enabling environment issues was relevant 
and appealing, but a focus on achievable reforms and institutional capacity 
development was more feasible.
•	 Endorsing reform: (i) crisis helped to accelerate reform endorsement and 
acceptance by the public, but fiscal gains were in cases reversed by political 
leadership changes; (ii)  broad, early support for private sector development 
measures was not always met with endorsement once the full legal implications 
became clear to legislators, or passage took much longer than expected.
•	 Implementing reforms: (i) technical assistance (analytical, advisory, and 
capacity development) during implementation was important and needed 
but, as observed by client governments, was generally insufficient to develop 
capacity on “how to” aspects of needed institution building, especially in areas 
such as performance-based budgeting; (ii) fiscal consolidation and government 
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downsizing were often incompatible with public service delivery improvements 
objectives within program loans, emphasizing the need for better sequencing of 
reform measures.
•	 Sustaining reforms: (i) bilateral aid and grants (e.g., the US Compact transfers) 
could have a crucial influence on reform effectiveness, and their effects 
needed to be fully understood for ADB to add value and be complementary; 
(ii)  complementary investment in systemic, sustained capacity development 
of public agencies and service providers through government systems (e.g., 
PSCs) was essential for sustained capacity development; (iii) ADB’s sustained 
engagement in regular policy dialogue and client relationship building was 
crucial to improve the prospects for sustaining reform initiatives.
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Chapter 4
Policy Reform in Viet Nam and 
the Asian Development Bank’s 
State-Owned Enterprise 
Reform and Corporate 
Governance Program Loan
George Abonyi
Background
O n 31 December 2002, the $100 million State-Owned Enterprise Reform and Corporate Governance Program Loan (SCPL) of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to support the Government of Viet Nam’s reforms in the state-
owned enterprise (SOE) sector was closed.54 This chapter, based on Policy Reform in 
Viet Nam and the Asian Development Bank’s State-Owned Enterprise Reform and 
Corporate Governance Program Loan,55 discusses the political economy of reform 
of the SCPL, which aimed at supporting key reforms in Viet Nam’s transition. Since 
the preparation of the original working paper, Viet Nam’s economic performance was 
affected by the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis, which also highlighted the 
need for structural reforms, including SOEs, and have taken on further urgency to 
improve economic efficiency and resilience. Rather than addressing current needs, 
the case study highlights the complex set of factors that influence the road to reform. 
54 The program loan itself was for $97 million, supported by two technical assistance (TA) loans, TA 3353-
VIE: Corporatization and Corporate Governance, $1.6 million, and TA 3354-VIE: SOE Diagnostic Audits, 
$1.4 million, bringing the total package to $100 million.
55 G. Abonyi. 2005. Policy Reform in Viet Nam and the Asian Development Bank’s State-Owned 
Enterprise Reform and Corporate Governance Program Loan. Economics Working Paper. Manila. 
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Setting the Stage
Viet Nam in Transition
From the late 1980s, Viet Nam has been successful in achieving and sustaining 
impressive economic growth, combined with significant gains in poverty reduction. 
The economy has been transformed from inward looking and stagnant to a rapidly 
growing and diversifying “economy in transition,” while maintaining macroeconomic, 
social, and political stability. In this, Viet Nam outperformed all other transition 
economies except the People’s Republic of China. For example, during 1991–1995, 
the economy grew at an average of 8.2% a year.
Viet Nam took a comparatively “slow boat to reform,” implementing a selective, 
“step-by-step” approach that included acting decisively in some areas while moving 
cautiously in others, in a process called Doi Moi initiated in 1986. Market mechanisms 
replaced, step by step, the command style of production and resource allocation, 
while significant structural reforms were implemented in the management of the 
economy. From an institutional perspective, reforms were aimed at making existing 
institutions work better, while gradually introducing new market institutions. From 
a political perspective, reforms were the outcome of domestic debates on economic 
strategy and related institutions, within the framework of the existing one-party 
(Communist) political system.
Reform came as a pragmatic response to deep-seated economic problems. The 
reunification of Viet Nam in 1976 was followed by a difficult decade with periods 
of economic stagnation and macroeconomic instability. The central planning 
system proved to have failings in responding to these problems, leading to tentative 
experimentation with reform. For example, in 1981, reform measures included a 
partial contract system for agricultural production, along with some autonomy 
for SOEs to sell on the open market and set salaries; and between 1979 and 1985, 
administrative decentralization was initiated.
When Doi Moi was launched at the Sixth Party Congress at the end of 1986, Viet Nam 
was facing an emerging economic crisis: annual inflation was over 700%, exports 
were less than half of imports, budget resources were strained by high military 
expenditures and support for loss-making SOEs, there was virtually no foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and official development assistance was very limited. The Sixth 
Party Congress agreed to abolish the system of bureaucratic centralized management 
based on state subsidies, and to move to a multisector, market-oriented economy 
with a role for the private sector to compete with the state in “nonstrategic sectors.”
The scale of reforms that followed was very wide, with no clear pattern of sequencing 
or coordination, and was largely driven by pragmatic experimentation and learning 
by doing. The strategic building blocks of Doi Moi that emerged after 1986 included 
rural, price, trade, and exchange rate reform; a macroeconomic stabilization program; 
and opening up to foreign investment.
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Two key areas of reform that proceeded more cautiously and where significant 
differences emerged with key development partners, in particular international 
financial institutions (IFIs), involved the expansion of the private sector, and the 
related reduction of the role of the State in the economy, particularly in terms of 
SOE reform. Private sector development began with the introduction of measures 
such as the 1990 Law on Private Enterprise and Law on Companies, which provided 
important legal basis for the establishment and operations of private firms, and the 
key revision of the Constitution in 1992 allowing individuals to exercise property 
rights over income-producing assets and personal property. 
Over time, private sector growth made notable contributions to Viet Nam’s 
economic performance, particularly to employment growth. However, the movement 
has been gradual toward the acceptance of a significant active role for the private 
sector and private property in the economy (e.g., through privatization, deregulation 
of the role of the state, and facilitating the establishment and operation  of private 
firms), as distinct from a more rapid and less ambiguous acceptance of the role of 
markets in economic governance and in mediating the flows of goods  and  capital 
(e.g., through the elimination of price support, freer trade, and market-determined 
exchange rates).
With respect to SOEs, issues of enterprise management, control, and—
particularly—ownership were approached cautiously. SOEs therefore continued 
to retain a relatively important role in production and trade, and as recipients 
of financing. Underlying the more measured approach to both private sector 
development and SOE reform was partly the intent of key political stakeholders to 
retain a significant role for the state in the economy, and the domestic debate over 
what that role should be.
Still, the Vietnamese approach to reform was largely effective. The period 1986–2001 
saw rapid and sustained economic growth; inflation was brought under control; 
poverty was substantially reduced; the traded sector (exports and imports) expanded 
significantly; FDI inflows increased substantially; and the economy underwent 
considerable structural transformation with a large contraction of the relative share 
of agriculture, and a corresponding expansion of industry’s.
Policy and institutional reform through Doi Moi is generally seen as having played 
a central role in Viet Nam’s rapid and sustained transformation and development, 
aided by improved incentives, increased competition, reduced trade barriers, import/
adoption of new ideas and technology, and the creation of new market institutions. 
However, substantial challenges remained at the time of the SCPL, including
•	 weak law enforcement, particularly as related to property rights and business-
related dispute resolution, leading to continuing constraints on the further 
development of markets and the expansion and performance of firms;
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•	 lack of transparency and cumbersome administrative procedures resulting in a 
proliferation of new and changing legislation, decrees, and regulations issued 
by numerous agencies and local authorities, creating a confusing and at times 
contradictory tangle of requirements for private business that left considerable 
discretion for authorities at various levels, contributing to a rising incidence of 
corruption, recognized and increasingly addressed by the government; and
•	 finance sector problems, including a still heavily regulated financial system with 
a segmented credit market dominated by four large state-owned commercial 
banks, with considerable barriers to entry through licensing control by the State 
Bank of Viet Nam (SBV), and a significant share of credits still channeled to 
SOEs by the four main banks.
One persistent and widespread problem in the reform process was the gap between 
policy decisions—directives, regulations, legislation—and their implementation. The 
capacity of central agencies to ensure and monitor such implementation by various 
levels of government and implementing agencies was limited within the framework 
of Viet Nam’s political and economic management system.
Political Institutions and Economic Management
A key characteristic of the Vietnamese reform process has been the continuity of 
political institutions and an orderly, if bureaucratic, administrative system.56 This 
has provided a relatively stable environment for policy decisions, enabling the 
government to make decisive macroeconomic decisions and implement significant 
reforms, despite limited development of a formal legal system.
But a significant institutional change at the time of the SCPL involved the growing 
importance of the National Assembly—defined by the 1992 Constitution as the 
highest organ of the state—in the policy decision process. Specifically, for the 
1999/2000 Enterprise Law (related to key reform measures in the SCPL), the National 
Assembly played a strong role in shaping the details of the legislation.
The government operates at four levels: the central government, and three local 
governments (provinces, districts, and communes). There is a large degree of 
autonomy extended to local administration on implementing economic decisions 
and spending allocated budgets.
The formal system notwithstanding, unambiguous statements of policy direction, to 
the time of the SCPL, had been relatively rare. The policy reform process in Viet Nam 
may be described as “behavior led” rather than “rule led.” That is, in practice, many 
formal reforms and regulatory changes often tend to formalize what is, in effect, 
already happening in practice in some parts of the country, or that have initially been 
implemented as “experiments” on a pilot basis.
56 This section is based on Arkadie and Mallon (2003) and Doan (2004).
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The corresponding policy decision system emphasizes collective leadership and 
consensus. This leads to a sharing of responsibility, as well as of political risk. It also 
means that the policy-decision process is often opaque in that it is difficult to identify 
clear decision makers or decision points. Central agencies, however seemingly 
powerful (SBV, the Ministry of Planning and Investment) are generally not in a 
position to impose policy decisions for which a broad consensus does not yet exist.
Within this framework, implementing policy decisions requires a buying in 
by relevant state bodies before a designated agency takes action. Yet individual 
agencies can be quite decisive in matters they see as lying within their mandate. 
As a consequence, cooperation/coordination between line agencies and/or different 
levels of government can be challenging. The implementation of reforms even after 
high-level (including prime ministerial) policy pronouncements and directives 
therefore often has to be negotiated with and among implementing agencies—and 
associated vested interests.
In this domestic-driven process of policy reform, external input—for example, from 
IFIs—was generally limited either to the presentation of international experience, or 
to assistance in analyzing the potential impacts of new types of policy options.
Overview of State-Owned Enterprises
Viet Nam’s economic transition had mixed results by the time of the SCPL. In 
certain areas such as price liberalization, exchange rate unification, tax reform, and 
the liberalization of the trade regime—in the development of the role of market 
mechanisms and related institutions—progress had been substantial. But the 
government made much less progress in transforming the ownership structure of 
the nonagricultural economy in general, and SOEs in particular. Since the start of 
economic reforms in the late 1980s, the share of the state sector in gross industrial 
product had declined only slowly.
Historically, SOEs had played an important role in the economy of Viet Nam, 
but less so than in other transition economies such as the former Soviet Union, 
the People’s Republic of China, or the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. 
Therefore, the consequences of a slower pace of SOE reform in Viet Nam were 
less significant as a constraint on economic growth and development than some 
external commentators, in particular the IFIs, initially predicted.
Around the time of the SCPL, SOEs still accounted for a significant share in national 
income, averaging about 30% of gross domestic product (GDP) between 1986 and 
2000, with non-oil SOEs contributing about 23% to the state budget (40% including 
oil SOEs). The share of SOEs in industrial output was about 50% in 1991, falling to 
about a still considerable 36% by 2000. The relative share of employment by SOEs 
was historically modest, employing about 7.5% of the total labor force in 1990, falling 
to about 5% by 2000. Large-scale, capital-intensive SOEs were relatively few, and the 
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vast majority of enterprises employed less than 500 people, with many employing 
less than 100. Generally sound macroeconomic management, particularly since the 
initiation of Doi Moi, limited government budget resources used to subsidize SOEs, 
thus hardening the budget constraint. However, a significant share of state-linked 
bank credits continued to be channeled to the SOE sector in 2000.
Key Elements of the SOE Reform Process up to the SCPL
The need to strengthen the performance of SOEs was a recurring subject of debate 
well before Doi Moi.57 However, fundamental to this debate was a continuing 
commitment to a key role for the state in the economy, and therefore for SOEs in 
economic development. Over time, there was increasing focus on the role of the 
private sector in long-term economic development, and on the relationship between 
SOEs and private enterprises. SOE reform and the development of the private sector 
were interrelated in Viet Nam’s reform and transition process. SOE reform had a 
dual purpose: strengthen the performance of SOEs so that they can perform more 
efficiently and effectively in an increasingly market environment and, at the same 
time, reduce the burden on government finances; and help develop the private sector 
by shrinking—within limits—the scope of SOEs in the economy.
Private sector development and SOEs. SOEs were seen as a key constraint on private 
sector development, a central feature of Doi Moi. The government gave preferential 
treatment to SOEs and, in effect, restricted private enterprise from moving much 
beyond smaller businesses that could compete with SOEs. Constraints on the 
development of private enterprise included lengthy, cumbersome, and expensive 
business registration procedures; licensing requirements from the Ministry of 
Trade, including needed support from local “people’s committees”—who often 
had a stake in maintaining the dominant position of local SOEs as, for example, a 
source of revenues, and were therefore threatened by potential new private entrants; 
preferential access of SOEs to land and foreign investment; and preferential lending 
by state-linked banks to SOEs. An important dimension of SOE reform therefore 
related to “leveling the playing field” between state enterprises and private business 
through effectively reforming the SOE sector and formulating and implementing 
measures facilitating private business.
Viet Nam had taken a cautious approach to SOE reform, involving two tracks. Along 
one track, the focus was on exposing SOEs to the pressures of markets—termed in 
the reform process “commercialization”—by forcing them to compete, on a gradually 
more level playing field with each other, with imports, and with a growing private 
sector. At the same time along the second track, the focus was on developing a new 
policy and regulatory framework for the SOE sector to force individual enterprises 
to restructure, and to alter the landscape of the SOE sector as a whole through 
57 This section is based on Arkadie and Mallon (2003). 
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ownership reform measures such as “equitization” and liquidation. This second track 
stood in marked contrast to the rapid privatization in the former Soviet Union and in 
Eastern and Central Europe.
Commercialization of SOEs. In late 1987, the former Soviet Union and Eastern and 
Central Europe drastically reduced trade and financial flows to Viet Nam, causing 
SOE performance to deteriorate. This triggered a focus on shifting SOEs to a more 
commercial (market) basis, with greater autonomy and increased responsibility for 
their own financial viability. Decision 217/HDBT, in November 1987, marked the 
first post–Doi Moi step toward a broad-based SOE reform program. It involved giving 
SOEs the autonomy to formulate their own operating plans, within the framework 
of broad government guidelines on development priorities. The key operational 
change involved a shift to market-based relationships with suppliers and customers 
through the introduction of economic contracts as the basis for transactions among 
enterprises and businesses. Within this framework, SOEs now had to purchase inputs 
directly from suppliers, and could sell their products in the open market.
Reregistration, reorganization, and liquidation. Decision 217/HDBT also allowed 
for the decentralization of authority to establish SOEs. This, in turn, led to a 
proliferation of new SOE registrations, particularly at the local level. By 1991, 
Viet Nam had about 12,300 SOEs with a total capitalization of 34,000 billion dong 
(D), or approximately $2.4 billion at the current exchange rate. This helped trigger 
a second round of reforms focusing on reorganizing and consolidating SOEs. The 
government issued a decree in November 1991 requiring all SOEs to reregister or 
close, and made commercial viability as the main criterion for establishing SOEs. As 
a consequence, by April 1994, the number of SOEs shrank to about 6,300 enterprises 
through liquidations (about 2,000) and mergers (about 3,000). Total capitalization 
of new SOEs increased to about D53,000 billion (about $3.8 billion). In practice, 
most liquidated and merged SOEs were small, locally managed enterprises with 
fewer than 100 employees and D500 million in capital (about $45,000); and the total 
assets of liquidated SOEs accounted for less than 4% of total SOE assets. Following 
government instructions in March 1994 for a second phase of reregistration, a new 
wave of mergers and liquidations reduced the number of SOEs to about 5,500 by the 
end of 1997. This led to the retrenchment of more than 1 million SOE workers, many 
of whom were absorbed by private businesses.
Equitization and divestiture. Following the Seventh Party Congress’ call for the 
dissolution or change of ownership of SOEs not seen as essential for state ownership, 
the National Assembly approved a pilot equitization program in December 1991, 
which was implemented by the government. Equitization was a politically sensitive 
concept, in effect, a form of partial privatization (though not explicitly stated so), 
with the state in most cases to retain a share in the enterprise and, in principle, a 
commitment to worker control through share ownership. Operationally, SOEs were 
to be transformed into joint-stock companies, with a proportion of state shares in the 
enterprise required to be sold, and with employees given preferential access to such 
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shares. The objectives of SOE equitization were to create a new type of enterprise with 
diversified owners, leading to a more efficient use of state assets, and the mobilization 
of investment in the new types of SOEs. However, progress was very slow, despite 
follow-up policy directives. For example, although the Prime Minister issued another 
decree in March 1993 to accelerate the pilot equitization program, nearly 3 years later 
at the end of 1995, only five SOEs were equitized.
To accelerate the process, in May 1996, the government issued a further directive 
to extend the scope and scale of equitization, requiring SOE-controlling agencies 
to select enterprises for equitization. This was further strengthened by subsequent 
decrees and decisions in 1997 and 1998, including listing steps that had to be 
followed in the equitization process. Nevertheless, the pace of equitization during 
1998–2000, although much faster (it increased to about 550 enterprises from just 17 
in 1992–1998),58 remained slow at the time of the SCPL. However, in practice, 
equitization generally targeted only smaller SOEs with capital less than D10 billion 
(or $700,000).
Legal framework for SOE activities and corporate governance. This framework evolved 
slowly, but gradually reduced differences in treatment between SOEs and private 
businesses. Steps in this direction included National Assembly approval of the Laws 
on Foreign Investment in 1987, and on Private Enterprise and on Companies in 1990. 
A key measure was the inclusion in the Constitution in 1990 of the rights of the 
nonstate sector to operate alongside the state sector. To facilitate improved corporate 
governance and closure of nonviable SOEs, the 1993 Law on Bankruptcy and the 
1995 Law on State Enterprises were introduced. The latter provided the first legal 
basis for the operation of SOEs, including rights and responsibilities of enterprises 
with respect to equitization and divestiture; and it legitimized the autonomy of SOEs 
in making business-related decisions.
In practice, however, implementation of these laws was limited. For example, up to 
the time of the SCPL, few bankruptcy cases were brought to the economic courts, 
and the law was seen as providing little protection for creditors. Similarly, few SOEs 
published financial reports as required under the Law on State Enterprises. One 
perspective on the poor implementation was that understanding was limited of the 
purposes of these laws, with little real domestic consultation or sense of ownership.
State corporations. In March 1994, government instructions for reregistration also 
issued instructions for consolidating SOEs into two categories: state enterprises 
and state corporations. This was a categorization of enterprises, and did not 
involve changes in enterprise behavior or incentive framework (as distinct from 
“corporatization,” a concept introduced under the SCPL). It was intended, in 
part, to streamline SOE administration, separating state ownership from state 
regulation—a key issue in the domestic SOE reform debate. The administrative 
58 The exact figures vary among different sources.
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grouping of enterprises under umbrella organizations was intended to help facilitate 
this separation. The further grouping of SOEs with similar orientation was intended 
not only to rationalize SOE supervision but was also aimed at creating competitive 
advantages, especially in international markets, through increased scale. However, 
there was considerable debate about both the desirability and the utility of the state 
corporation model in the context of SOE reform.
Key Issues at the Time of the SCPL
By the time of the SCPL, the SOE sector had seen many changes and much progress 
in its structure and operations from pre-Doi Moi days. But several key problems 
remained.
Financial constraints. Given the slow pace of reform, the burden of financing SOEs 
(especially those with deteriorating performance), although off the books of the 
state budget was now borne by the weak, state-linked banking system—an issue 
of particular concern to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For example, in 
2000, SOEs still absorbed approximately 45% of the total credit to the economy. 
Furthermore, by the end of 2000, roughly 20% of bank loans to SOEs were estimated 
as nonperforming.
Slow pace of liquidation. Limited progress was made in liquidating nonviable 
SOEs. This was due, in part, to a cumbersome legal framework and procedures for 
liquidation that made it difficult to enforce creditor rights and for the authorities 
to declare bankruptcies. This reflected government concern about the impact on 
social stability of higher unemployment, likely to result in the short term from 
the liquidation of the worst-performing enterprises, especially larger SOEs. The 
resistance of powerful vested interests both within and outside particular SOEs was 
also important.
Slow pace of equitization. The pace remained slow, constrained by an administrative 
process that was cumbersome; some SOEs were not suited to equitization given that 
they were not commercially viable enterprises; others were too small to operate 
under a joint-stock management structure; there were difficulties in the valuation 
process and in resolution of enterprise debts; and vested interests—including 
controlling agencies, SOE managers, and SOE workers who feared loss of control, 
revenues, and jobs—offered resistance. In addition, poor accounting and auditing 
standards made the scrutiny of many enterprises’ financial performance difficult, 
further discouraging potential investors.
Constraints on restructuring larger SOEs. A key part of SOE reforms were measures 
to encourage large enterprises to restructure and downsize in order to reduce losses 
and unserviceable debts, and to improve competitiveness. However, restructuring 
large SOEs that were under state control had been addressed in only a limited way.
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Role of the state in the economy. Perhaps the most fundamental factor in the limited 
scope and slow pace of SOE reforms related to a continued commitment by the 
Communist Party to the role of the state in the economy and, consistent with this, 
maintaining a significant role for SOEs. Official commitments to accelerating SOE 
reform notwithstanding, resolutions of both the Eighth (1996) and Ninth (2001) 
Party Congresses maintained that the state was to continue to play a leading role 
in economic development. At the same time, national consensus was lacking—
the Party had basic disagreements—on the relative roles of the state, markets, and 
private enterprise in the economy. This was reflected in the gap between policy 
pronouncements and change in the operations or status (or both) of particular SOEs.
The Policy Reform Process and the 
Viet Nam State-Owned Enterprise Reform 
and Corporate Governance Program Loan
Initiating Policy Reform: Getting on the Policy Agenda
The need to strengthen the performance of SOEs and to reform the SOE sector was on 
the government’s policy agenda as a priority issue well before the Doi Moi reforms, and 
remained on it throughout the reform process. However, although there was a basic 
consensus on the need to reform SOEs, the scope and focus continued to be debated 
as the reforms evolved, and there was no domestic consensus on what reform entailed, 
especially in a context of continuing deep commitment in the political system to a key 
state role in the economy, and therefore to maintaining a significant, if evolving, role 
for SOEs. Although a stated and demonstrated priority of the government, SOE reform 
has proven to be a complex and sensitive issue that touches the core of Viet Nam’s 
economic, social, and potentially political transformation.
Reform and restructuring of the SOE sector also emerged as an area of attempts 
by IFIs to shape the definition and scope of the issue, as well as associated reforms. 
However, the policy agenda, as related to SOE reform, remained firmly domestically 
driven. Although the SCPL seems to have been initiated as part of ADB’s interest in 
providing financial and technical support for Viet Nam’s reforms,59 the government 
saw it as generally responding to a key issue on the domestic policy agenda where 
external support was useful—as long as it conformed to domestic definitions of 
relevance and feasibility.
The policy decision process in Viet Nam was domestically driven and the resulting 
decisions reflected national priorities and ownership. External financial assistance 
59 Based on interviews with ADB staff and management, key ADB consultants, and senior government 
officials.
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had played a negligible role in the critical initial stages of reform in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. National policy makers did not therefore see external policy advice 
as the means to external financing, but assessed it based on relevance to domestic 
priorities, and likely feasibility given domestic conditions and constraints. This 
general attitude did not change substantially as interaction with key IFIs increased 
in the mid-1990s.
The experience of three IFIs before the SCPL illustrates that the policy reform 
process was under strong domestic control, with national ownership. Reforms 
that were part of policy-based lending by IFIs were likely to be agreed to and 
implemented only to the extent they were seen as relevant and feasible by the 
government, and subject to a domestic consensus being in place. Following 
normalization of relations, negotiations between the IMF and the government on 
policy reform were held in 1998. SOE reform was a key part of the IMF agenda 
in Viet Nam because of the macroeconomic significance, in particular the fiscal 
implications, of financing SOEs.
The strong advocacy position taken by the IMF, for example, in May 1999’s Article IV 
consultations, emphasized the need to reduce the role of the state in the economy; 
the requirement for a comprehensive reform framework; and a wider and faster SOE 
privatization program, with particular emphasis on the larger SOEs. By contrast, the 
government’s position was one that advocated a continued sustained role for the state 
in the economy, and therefore a gradualist approach. 
The government’s general approach to SOE reform focused on improving enterprise 
performance, creating greater autonomy and accountability particularly of the larger 
SOEs, divesting itself of smaller SOEs, and leveling the playing field between private 
firms and SOEs. A key concern of the government was ensuring that jobs existed in 
the emerging private sector to accommodate workers released by downsizing the 
public sector (through SOE reforms), in order to maintain social and political stability. 
Furthermore, the lack of consensus and expected political resistance by vested interests 
(such as SOE workers and management, and controlling institutions) were additional 
key factors in a need for slower SOE reform.
The World Bank’s approach to policy reform in general—SOE reform in 
particular—evolved in Viet Nam (as with the IMF), increasingly accommodating 
the domestic reform process. Emphasis shifted from an emphasis on the scope 
and pace of SOE privatization toward private sector development. It stressed the 
demonstration effects of privatizing medium-sized SOEs. The World Bank’s first 
Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC I) focused on enhancing transparency 
of SOE operations and the effectiveness of the SOE equitization process. 
The  World  Bank’s approach continued to evolve under PRSC II, approved in 
May 2003, partly reflecting a tacit acknowledgment of the continued resistance by 
the government to externally pushed privatization, and the practical difficulties of 
implementing enterprise reforms.
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ADB’s experience with the loans supporting policy reforms, before the SCPL, 
seemed to indicate that Viet Nam was likely to implement measures that it saw 
appropriate, and often already in the reform pipeline before the loan—for example, 
the Agriculture Sector Program Loan, where domestic consensus was already in 
place. The timing of the implementation of reforms also could be uncertain, given 
Viet Nam’s consensus-based approach to policy decisions. Reforms where domestic 
consensus was not yet in place were unlikely to be rushed because of loan funds, 
particularly with measures involving legislation—for example, the Financial Sector 
Program Loan.
Managing Complexity: Design of the SCPL
Complexity of Policy Issues and Program Design
Improving the efficiency of SOEs is a function of factors such as the structure of 
the industry within which enterprises operate, systems and procedures that relate 
to enterprise operations, the quality of personnel, operations management, and the 
broader environment that constrains or facilitates SOE performance. These factors 
also represent different leverage points where reform initiatives may focus. Similarly, 
improving the efficiency of the SOE sector as a whole could involve focusing primarily 
on larger SOEs through measures such as equitization or on smaller SOEs through 
measures such as divestiture and leasing—with potentially different outcomes. 
The many interconnections can make it difficult and somewhat arbitrary to define 
boundaries for what should be part of a particular reform program. As introduced in 
Chapter 1, how a policy issue is posed or structured has a major role in shaping the 
reform measures intended to address it.
Selected Reform Issues
The design of the SCPL took place against a backdrop of complicated discussions 
between the government, the IMF, and the World Bank, reflecting fundamental 
differences between the government and the IFIs. These differences had not been 
resolved when the SCPL was prepared, and were also reflected in design-related 
discussions and negotiations between the government and ADB.
At first, ADB pushed for expanding the scope and accelerating the pace of 
equitization-as-privatization—much along the lines of the other IFIs—but this 
was unacceptable to the government. ADB then spent much time clarifying and 
trying to reach common understanding and agreement on key policy issues and 
reform measures. The design of the SCPL took almost 4 years from the inception 
of the project preparatory technical assistance from ADB in 1996 to the finalization 
and approval of the design of the SCPL. The actual design-related discussions 
between the government—led by SBV and ADB—took almost 2 years, with ADB 
Board approval of the SCPL in December 1999 and loan “effectiveness” declared in 
October 2000.
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Learning through the program design process, ADB shifted its position from 
treating the transfer of ownership as the core issue in SOE reform. In particular, 
the concept of corporatization emerged as an important focus in the design of the 
SCPL. Corporatization had been introduced earlier in the context of SOE reform, 
including support by other donors, but with slow progress in implementation. 
ADB proposed it as a core focus of the SCPL as a kind of intermediate stage toward 
possible equitization, divestiture, or liquidation of selected enterprises. It was 
aimed at changing the status of SOEs classified as state corporations that were not 
subject to the earlier provisions of the Law on Companies. The concept implied the 
incorporation of these enterprises as a state-owned joint-stock company or state-
owned limited liability company, requiring an amendment to the Law on Companies. 
Operationally, transforming state corporations into joint-stock companies meant 
subjecting them to hard budget constraints, corporate governance requirements, and 
market-related incentive structures. It also aimed to separate ownership (by the state) 
and management functions, so as to provide for greater management autonomy and 
flexibility.
The government regarded corporatization as sensitive and complex. It and ADB 
took much time in reaching agreement on the relevance, role, and operational 
meaning of corporatization. In these discussions, at first there were basic differences 
between the two sides’ approach to the issue, and more generally to the SCPL design. 
The government saw ADB as generally taking a very bureaucratic and legalistic 
approach to key issues, not appropriate to the reality of Viet Nam.60 In particular, the 
government initially viewed ADB’s approach to corporatization as very similar to 
equitization, that is, an attempt at pushing backdoor privatization. The government, 
however, wanted a less legalistic approach, focused more on the kind of behavioral 
changes it wanted to induce in relevant SOEs. It therefore wanted a more flexible 
definition of the concept, and focused more on consistency with local conditions 
and constraints, with particular attention on existing institutional capabilities, rather 
than focusing on conformity with international best practice.
Key issues in SCPL design, in particular the concept of corporatization, were in fact 
so complex and politically sensitive that they required resolution at the party level. 
Government participants felt that ADB did not fully appreciate the full implications 
of these issues. Thus, the issues touched the very core of the domestic debate on 
Viet Nam’s transition and reform strategy. The overall approach taken and the core 
measures in the SCPL had to be consistent with the more gradual, step-by-step 
approach to SOE reform, and with existing or emerging domestic consensus on 
issues. Similarly, a critical dimension of reform measures in the policy matrix such 
as corporatization required—in the eyes of the government—an accommodation 
to the realities of the political and institutional preparation needed for effective, 
nondisruptive change.
60 From interviews with senior government officials and ADB staff and management, and key consultants.
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Differences over the meaning of “satisfactory progress” as related to implementation 
of measures in the policy matrix also took time to resolve. In this case, it was the 
government that wanted a clear and relatively precise definition of the term, while 
ADB wanted to leave it more open-ended and discretionary. This led to government 
concerns of potential future problems relating to differing interpretations of what was 
effective implementation and compliance.
Many key senior government participants in the SCPL design felt that there were 
initially fundamental differences between ADB and the government on key issues 
in the program design, feeling that ADB (including international consultants, who 
are important sources of knowledge on “international best practice”) did not often 
fully understand the Vietnamese context—for example, in terms of the constraints 
it placed on implementable reform measures. Over time, however, what started as a 
wide gap narrowed through an iterative process of discussion and mutual adjustment.
An important issue in the design of the SCPL, against the background of the 
decentralized Vietnamese context, was the limited involvement of implementing 
agencies. The design process involved central agencies primarily, particularly SBV 
and ADB, and therefore the organizational requirements and potential institutional 
constraints on implementation were not a key focus in preparing the policy matrix. 
This led to implementation and sustainability issues (discussed later).
Still, corporatization was an important breakthrough in the government–ADB 
joint design of the SCPL, and in the approach to SOE reform in Viet Nam. It was 
consistent with the government’s step-by-step approach to SOE reform, and provided 
a preparatory or transition stage between commercialization (implemented under 
the State Enterprise Law) and equitization/divestiture/liquidation (implemented 
under the Law on Companies and the Law on Private Enterprise).
Outcome of Program Design
The SCPL was formulated by ADB as a $100 million loan to be disbursed in two 
tranches of $50 million each, and supported by two technical assistance projects. 
The first tranche was to be released on loan effectiveness (actually disbursed on 8 
December 2000), and the second tranche was planned to be released about one and 
a half years from the initial disbursement (actually disbursed on 18 December 2002).
The overall objectives of the SCPL were to “promote industrial growth by 
restructuring the industry sector to (i) facilitate FDI inflows, (ii) support the 
development of private enterprises, and (iii) accelerate industrial SOE reform and 
improve corporate governance of enterprises.” To achieve these objectives, the 
SCPL was very comprehensive, including a wide range of measures, many with 
sub-measures, and involving a number of implementing agencies. There were 
15 first-tranche conditions, and 13 second-tranche conditions that had to be met 
for funds disbursal. The SCPL timetable required the government to implement 
the program of reforms within some 36 months.
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The policy matrix generally addressed important issues in Viet Nam’s reform 
process. The core focus of the SCPL was on industrial SOE restructuring, that is, 
on improving the policy and institutional framework for SOE reform. Particularly 
important was the introduction of the concept of corporatization and related 
measures, including enactment of the revised Enterprise Law. These were potentially 
significant contributions that addressed important gaps in the SOE reform process, 
and facilitated private sector development.
At the same time, there was a view that the SCPL design was overly ambitious: too 
wide in scope, with too many conditions, and included measures whose feasibility 
was likely to be uncertain. For example, issuing a policy directive—Prime Ministerial 
Decision (No. 833/CP-QHQT)—for the corporatization of 60% of the medium-
sized and large SOEs under the SCPL was one thing, implementing such wide-scale 
changes at the enterprise level—given the sobering experience with actual SOE 
reform to date—was likely to prove to be a rather different matter. The inclusion of 
measures requiring approval by an increasingly active National Assembly—such as 
revised bankruptcy procedures and a law on accounting—was also a potential source 
of uncertainty in both timing and final content of reform measures.61
Endorsing Reforms: Approval of SCPL Reform Measures
Policy reforms are usually endorsed through a process of political decision making 
within a country’s existing institutional framework. This has both formal and informal 
dimensions. In Viet Nam, such endorsement is a multilevel and multi-stakeholder 
process involving, formally, the Communist Party, the National Assembly, the central 
government, and lower levels of government. Informally, given the consensus-based 
decision process, implementing agencies and key enterprises generally also need to 
buy into proposed reforms—indicating their actual endorsement. All these levels 
were relevant to the endorsement of the SCPL reform measures.
The government’s signing of the SCPL (technically, SBV, on behalf of the government) 
signaled its official endorsement of the reform measures in the policy matrix. 
However, as a practical matter, the reform measures in the SCPL could be seen as 
falling into three categories. First, to the extent that policy measures are consistent 
with the existing domestic reform program and are within the powers of the central 
government to approve, agreement by the government to the SCPL can be seen as 
constituting endorsement in the sense of a commitment to implement, e.g., the Prime 
Minister issuing Decision 36/2003 to allow foreign investment in equitized SOEs 
(first-tranche condition). As noted, the concept of corporatization, as reflected in the 
SCPL, required prior approval at the party level—involving significant time, effort, 
and discussion within the political system, given the complexities and sensitivities 
involved, before the government could endorse it in the SCPL.
61 Based on interviews with senior government officials, and ADB consultants and staff.
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The second type of reform measure requires endorsement or formal approval 
ultimately through the political decision system, in particular, involving the National 
Assembly. Here, the government can “endorse” in the sense of agreeing to submit 
such measures but cannot, in practical terms, approve these measures nor guarantee 
their ultimate form. The power to approve, modify, or even reject the actual reform 
measures rests with the National Assembly, as for example, in the requirement for 
the People’s Supreme Court to submit the revised Bankruptcy Law to the National 
Assembly (second-tranche condition). Even the National Assembly’s endorsement of 
a measure such as the revised Bankruptcy Law should not be interpreted as necessarily 
leading to effective implementation.
The third type can be endorsed by the government, but such endorsement—even 
with the best of intentions—cannot guarantee that the reform will be implemented 
as planned, by particular agencies and enterprises (or even by different levels 
of government), such as the government issuing a policy directive aimed at 
corporatizing 60% of SOEs by 2005 (first-tranche condition). However, this type of 
endorsement cannot be taken to mean that implementation will then follow, given 
the gap between government intentions and enterprise behavior in SOE reform. 
Effective implementation of this reform measure would require actual agreement 
by individual enterprises and the agencies controlling them (such as ministries, 
provinces, and districts).
The preceding discussion suggests that even if policy reforms are formally endorsed 
by the government, it may not be certain that all the reform measures will have 
the necessary formal and informal approval at other points in the policy decision 
system. Furthermore, as the examples suggest, endorsement and implementation 
of reforms are closely intertwined. In practice, it may be difficult to identify in the 
policy decision process a “stopping point” that results in a binding or irreversible 
commitment to reform. In some cases, only when reforms are actually implemented, 
e.g., SOEs are corporatized not only in terms of legal status but also in terms of their 
operational performance, can it be concluded that they have (or had) the necessary 
endorsements at key points in the policy decision process. The implication is that 
the endorsement of reforms is a continuing activity throughout the policy reform 
process, including and even beyond implementation, giving the possibility of reversal 
of reform measures.
Implementation
Implementing Measures in the Policy Matrix
ADB’s internal review concluded that almost all of the specific reform measures of 
the SCPL were implemented satisfactorily, including the 15 first-tranche conditions, 
and 12 of the 13 second-tranche conditions. Given the progress in implementing 
the SCPL measures, the program was closed a  year earlier than planned, in 
December 2002.
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Implementing these measures made several important contributions to the 
country’s reform process. The adoption of the Enterprise Law (in 2000) was a 
fundamental reform that greatly improved the institutional environment for private 
business, for example, by greatly reducing the cost and time needed to register 
new businesses. It  also provided the necessary legal framework for transforming 
SOEs into shareholding/joint-stock and limited liability companies, allowing key 
corporatization measures.
The SCPL also supported the establishment of the National Steering Committee 
for Enterprise Reform and Development (NSCERD) to oversee the formulation 
and implementation of the SOE reform strategy. Further contributions were the 
introduction of the concept of corporate governance through the drafting of model 
corporate charters by selected enterprises, and the strengthening of accounting and 
auditing standards for all enterprises through the preparation of the Accounting Law.
The government did not implement one measure on eliminating the minimum 
wage differential between domestic and foreign-invested enterprises. The design of 
the measure had ambiguities—should, for example, the gap be eliminated by raising 
the lower minimum wage of domestic enterprises or by lowering it for foreign 
enterprises. This turned out to be a politically more sensitive and difficult measure 
than anticipated, since increasing the minimum wage—the measure favored by the 
government—by applying it to SOEs, as well as private businesses, had potentially 
significant budgetary implications. ADB eventually waived this condition after it was 
satisfied that the planned reform measure of the government of gradually increasing 
the minimum wage was relevant and appropriate.
Another measure not implemented at the time of the closing of the SCPL related to 
the requirement for the Ministry of Labour, Invalids, and Social Affairs to submit a 
Social Securities Act for approval to the National Assembly. This related to a critical 
issue in SOE reform, that of putting in place an effective social policy to address the 
impact on workers of enterprise equitization and divestiture. The social impacts of 
SOE reform was an important concern to SOE labor unions and a key source of 
resistance to reform.
The delay associated with the Social Securities Act is an example of a wider issue—
where reform measures in the SCPL involved new or amended legislation requiring 
approval by the National Assembly, significant delays were often involved. For 
example, while the SCPL closed in December 2002, in addition to the delay in the 
approval of Social Securities Act, the Law on Accounting was approved in June 2003 
and came into effect on 1 January 2004; implementation of land-use rights measures 
under the Land Law became effective in July 2004; the revised Law on Business 
Bankruptcy was approved on 15 June 2004 and came into effect on 15 October 
2004; and the law related to the collection of uncontested debt was approved in 
2004 and came into effect in January 2005. Although the reform measures in the 
policy matrix related to such legislation were implemented on time in terms of the 
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government submitting proposed legislation, the actual approval of the legislation 
often took considerable time, and involved extensive consultations, modifications, 
and political debate.
Nominal Reform versus Implanting Change
The SCPL took significant steps to support SOE reform, though the actual 
implementation of measures prompts a more cautious attitude. Many of the measures 
involved issuing directives, and drafting laws, decrees, and regulations. But the 
fundamental challenge in policy reform is the implementation and enforcement of 
such measures, which generally involve a long-term process of institutional change.
For example, issuing a policy directive to corporatize 60% of SOEs by 2005 followed 
the policy matrix, but this was not the same as changing the fundamental behavior 
and operational performance of a large number of often powerful enterprises—a task 
that is likely to (and did) prove to be more challenging over an extended period.
The limited participation of implementing agencies (SOEs) and related institutions 
in the design of the SCPL was likely to provide a further constraint, given the need 
for SOEs and agencies that control them to buy into the reform process for effective 
implementation. The resistance by SOEs to be placed on the audit list in preparation for 
corporatization—a key activity under an SCPL technical assistance project—for fear 
of this leading to privatization is an illustration of the challenges of implementation 
at the enterprise level. Setting up the NSCERD provides a further example. Although 
this institution was nominally established to oversee the SOE reform process as 
required under the SCPL, its actual capabilities and power to ensure and monitor 
compliance of enterprises were limited.
Sustaining the Reforms
To sustain reforms implemented under the SCPL, challenges since the completion of 
the SCPL involved operationalizing and enforcing enacted decrees, legislation, and 
regulations so that they lead to changes in incentives, behavior, and performance of 
enterprises. Given the track record of implanting changes among individual SOEs 
before the SCPL, this implied the need for continued strong political support. This, 
in turn, needed continuing attention to implementation, organizational capacity of 
enterprises to implement reform measures, and the buy-in of individual enterprises.
Equitization and divestiture reduced the number of SOEs from almost 6,000 in 1997 
to about 4,000 by mid-2004 (further reduced to about 3,000 by 2005). However, 
these reforms mainly involved smaller SOEs. Furthermore, the total capital of 
SOEs involved was minimal. Still, reforms seem to have led to improvements in 
SOE performance, largely attributable to the success of the commercialization and 
corporatization measures that led to the hardening of the budget constraint and 
forced greater competition in product markets.
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More fundamentally and over the longer term, SOE reform measures through 
corporatization, equitization, and divestiture should be seen not as end points but 
as initial steps in their transformation (ADB 2004). Sustaining reforms by creating 
vibrant and competitive enterprises from previously state-nurtured SOEs requires 
ongoing efforts at organizational change and business development, particularly in 
the case of the larger SOEs.
An important issue addressed in the SCPL relates to the impact of SOE reform on 
workers—critical stakeholders in the reform process—and more widely, the need to 
build consensus. The SCPL recognized the problem of labor mobility, and focused 
on making the social insurance system more flexible. This was important since SOE 
reform meant that workers at the majority of SOEs were threatened by retrenchment 
or the loss of a range of critical social subsidies and health care benefits. However, as 
the delay in carrying out relevant measures in the SCPL (such as the Social Securities 
Act) indicates, this was a complex and sensitive matter. Labor mobility is part of a 
larger and deeper problem with important political and social implications, involving 
significant social impacts of reform measures such as equitization and divestiture. 
The majority of SOEs in 2004/05 were small and labor intensive, involving limited 
technology. An estimated 1.6 million people worked in this sector, and most were 
unskilled women with low levels of education (see Evans 2004).
Trade unions played an important role in drawing attention to the social costs of 
equitization, providing strong political opposition to the SOE reform process. Their 
concern was with what they saw as an absence of an effective social policy to address 
the impact of measures such as equitization, such as the government’s failure to 
effectively implement the Labour Code, the requirement for new types of skills, and 
difficulties of workers transferring pension rights from the state to the private sector. 
These related to the delayed measure in the SCPL.
Furthermore, surveys indicated that a majority of workers in equitized enterprises did 
not understand the conditions of their new employment, revealing a basic need for 
more effective public education of the implications of reform, including the behavioral 
changes needed for adjusting to a market-based economy. The sustainability of SOE 
reform requires addressing effectively the social impacts of key measures.
SOE reform is also a function of the wider reform process. Viet Nam is a success 
story—but with significant remaining challenges. Despite considerable policy, legal, 
and institutional changes in 2 decades of reform, important constraints on enterprise 
development remained in Viet Nam at the conclusion of the SCPL, including weak 
law enforcement, lack of transparency, and cumbersome administrative procedures.
To address remaining challenges—to sustain and accelerate reforms—there is a view 
that the historical approach to policy reform needs to change. This view asserts that 
further development of Viet Nam’s economy in the 21st century will likely require 
substantial fundamental reforms aimed at creating more effective institutions 
110 Managing Reforms for Development
necessary to support markets and the increasing role of a diverse private sector in 
the economy. The implication is that the “step-by-step,” experimental approach to 
institutional reform may not be as effective in the future as in the past—that it would 
unduly constrain further private sector development by creating uncertainty and 
discourage large, longer-term private investment. This view stresses the need to focus 
on the implementation and enforcement of existing rules to create a stable business 
environment that will lead to competitive domestic enterprises, rather than creating 
yet more laws and regulations (see Doan 2004).
Subsequent Developments in SOE Reform Relevant to the SCPL
By mid-2007, the number of SOEs was reduced to about 2,000, with a total capital of 
approximately $31 billion, or about 31% of GDP. However, the SOE reform process 
reached a critical phase, involving the restructuring of large SOEs. The government, 
at this stage, planned to retain about 550 SOEs as wholly state-owned entities, and 
equitize the remaining ones, with an “equitization pipeline” for 2007 estimated at 
$10 billion. A plan to equitize and list 71 large SOEs by 2010 was approved by the 
Prime Minister. “Strategic economic groups” were to be created in key sectors.
By 2007, the government was aware that a reform strategy of creating general 
corporations from large SOEs was not as effective as had been hoped. Therefore, 
the next major step in the SOE reform process was to group these corporations, 
along with various other SOEs, into 19 large conglomerates. In many cases, these 
conglomerates had a near monopoly in their product markets, particularly in the 
heavy industry sectors. This strategy also reflected a concern by SOEs of competing 
under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules that removed various government 
support to SOEs (including high tariffs, subsidies, and local content requirements) 
once Viet Nam joined the WTO in January 2007. At that stage, it was not clear that a 
conglomerate-based approach would result in competitive SOEs.
The more recent SOE reforms took place in a Viet Nam that was facing an 
overheating economy before the global economic crisis—challenges of success 
through rapid sustained growth—reflected in high and rising inflation, and a 
widening trade deficit driven by surging imports. The SOEs played an important 
role in this through aggressive investment that has contributed to a sharp increase 
in public sector borrowing in 2007, and crowding out what are seen as potentially 
more productive private sector borrowing and investment. 
Accelerating SOE reform, including equitization and improved corporate 
management, was therefore seen as potentially improving the efficiency of public 
sector–related investment and the scaling back of unproductive projects. This was 
consistent with the basic objective of SOE reform and of the SCPL—to transform 
state enterprises into “competitive enterprises” accountable for their own operations 
and profitability, through reorganization, corporatization, and ownership 
diversification, including equitization. This remained a challenge, as reflected in the 
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poor profitability of SOEs. Furthermore, although larger SOEs soaked up as much as 
half of all business investment, they created far fewer jobs than either the nonstate 
sector (which also includes a large number of partially state-owned firms) or the 
foreign-invested sector.
Still, the government remains committed to retaining a key role for the state in the 
economy. However, there is also an awareness of the need to continue to improve 
the efficiency and productivity of SOEs. The long-term sustainability of reforms 
initiated under and linked to the SCPL is a function of continuing strong political 
support. This, in turn, requires building and maintaining a national consensus on a 
continuing reform strategy and its key measures—and the institutional capacity to 
implement change.
Bumps on the Road to Reform: 
Politics and Institutions
Political acceptability and institutional feasibility play a central role in shaping 
reforms throughout the policy process. It is this role of politics and institutions 
that transforms the reform process from an exercise in technical problem solving, 
or “optimal policy design,” into a process of long-term societal change shaped by 
political economy factors. Many key political and institutional issues related to SOE 
reform in Viet Nam have already been noted at various points in the chapter. Based 
on the above discussion, this section highlights key issues related to the role of politics 
and institutions in SOE reform. These factors are also sources of uncertainty and 
risk in “government commitment,” the assumed guarantor of reform in policy-based 
lending (PBL), and the focus of the last part of this section.
The Politics of Policy Reform
Policy reform as consensus building. SOE reform touches the very core of Viet 
Nam’s transition to a market-based economy. In managing this transition, there has 
been a continuing commitment to retain a key role for the state in the economy, 
and therefore for SOEs in economic development—but there have been sharp 
differences and debate among key stakeholders over what that role should be. 
SOE reform involves political decisions—a problem in collective choice. From this 
perspective, as discussed, Viet Nam is a politically complex society: a multilevel, 
“multiplayer” environment for SOE reform, where key decisions based on national 
consensus are made. The politics of reform involves as players not only the 
government—meaning, central agencies such as SBV—but also the Communist 
Party, the National Assembly, different levels of government (provinces, districts, 
and communes) and ministries that control particular SOEs, as well as SOE 
management and labor (trade unions).
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In addition, some of these players may themselves include differing perspectives 
that need to be reconciled, for example, different positions in the party on the role of 
the state in the economy and, therefore, on SOE reform. Within the policy decision 
process these players, singly or in combination, may be able to delay, block, or even 
reverse enterprise-level reforms. It is necessary to build and maintain consensus 
for change at various levels in shaping the endorsement, implementation, and 
sustainability of SOE reforms; where consensus has the game-theoretic meaning 
of ensuring either a preference for or indifference to such reforms by all players 
(and coalitions of players) with the power to block proposed reforms. This takes 
time and resources, and the outcome of the process, in terms of both the design 
and the implementation of particular reform measures, may be uncertain. In sum, 
SOE reform in Viet Nam is an extended—and continuing—exercise in political 
consensus building.
Political ownership of reform. The concept of ownership of policy reforms, as 
a fundamentally political concept, is reflected in the SCPL case. Given the 
multiplayer, consensus-based environment of reform in Viet Nam, the concept of 
“ownership” of reforms is complex and potentially uncertain. It requires that all key 
players with the interest and power to influence policy reform decisions and their 
implementation buy into the reform process. Ownership of reforms by government 
represented by a central agency such as SBV or even by prime ministerial decrees 
is necessary, but far from sufficient. Ownership of reform in this environment 
requires a collective ownership of reforms by all relevant political players with the 
power to shape outcomes.
Role of bureaucratic politics. The role of bureaucratic politics requires emphasis. 
The SCPL design reflected a bias toward high-level political decisions on reform in 
the form of specified government decrees and approvals by the National Assembly. 
However, an equally important factor in SOE reform related to the role of lower-level 
bureaucratic politics associated with the preferences, behaviors, and relative influence 
of both individual state enterprises—particularly the larger SOEs—and the institutions 
that control them (ministries, provincial and local governments). These agencies, 
through their actions, can modify, or even block, the implementation of high-level 
policy decisions. Effective reform requires ensuring in practical terms their support 
for particular measures at the enterprise level, or creating conditions under which they 
cannot exercise an actual veto over planned change. In the SCPL, setting targets for the 
corporatization of SOEs without an appreciation of the likely position of the enterprises 
involved introduced uncertainty and risk. Similarly, the limited involvement of 
state enterprises and associated agencies in the SCPL design process led to a lack of 
cooperation in the audit process required in preparing for corporatization.
Politics as preparation for change. People react to perceived threats to their quality of 
life; and what they do not understand they often see as threatening. Politics (formal 
and informal) is a way for groups in society that feel threatened by particular 
developments to attempt to exercise a veto over proposed changes. Therefore, a 
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lack of understanding of the implications of SOE reform and the corresponding 
behavioral adjustments needed in a new type of economy is an important factor in 
opposition to reforms. As noted earlier, surveys indicated that perhaps a majority 
of workers in equitized enterprises did not understand the conditions of their 
new employment. Confusion over the implications of equitization should not be 
surprising given the complexity of the changes involved, as reflected in higher-level 
political debates or in the extended negotiations over corporatization between ADB 
and the government.
Institutions: Shaping and Implementing Change
Institutions as rules of the game. The SCPL was aimed, to a large extent, at helping 
change the rules of the game of economic management in Viet Nam. Many of the 
reform measures involved introducing new regulations and laws intended to change 
the institutional foundations of the economy. A key issue from this perspective is 
ensuring that the new rules of the game are effectively implemented to bring about 
desired changes in behavior over the long term. While the focus was on introducing 
institutional changes as new rules of the game, there was relatively less attention in the 
design of the SCPL on the behavioral and organizational requirements for implanting 
such change over time.
Institutional capacity constraints. A critical success factor in policy reform involves 
assessing and building the necessary institutional capacity for implementing 
change at the level of specific institutions and organizations. From this perspective, 
corporatization or equitization is, in effect, the end of the beginning of an extended 
process of organizational change required for transforming an enterprise (from its 
previous state as an SOE) into a viable firm. Change in legal status or transfer of 
ownership rights does not automatically bring about the necessary organizational 
skills needed for success in increasingly competitive product markets. Additional 
support may be required to build the necessary organizational and business-related 
capabilities that transform a former state enterprise into a competitive enterprise that 
must function in a new environment.
Institutional design and uncertainty. Policy reforms often involve the creation of new 
institutions, or the extensive redesign of existing institutions (or both). Although this 
may be an important and necessary part of the reform process, new institutions and 
institutional redesign involve significant uncertainty and risks. The establishment of 
the National Enterprise Reform Committee in 1998 (transformed in 2000 into the 
NSCERD to oversee SOE reform) was an important element of both the SCPL and 
the reform process, and an example of the issue. Although in principle, the overall 
role of NSCERD was clear (as reflected in the SCPL, for example), its effectiveness 
in practice was uncertain. As a new institution with a mandate to oversee overall 
SOE reform, it met resistance from institutions (government agencies and local 
governments) that had controlled particular SOEs, as well as from powerful SOEs. 
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It  was also constrained in its technical and organizational capacity to address key 
issues related to reform, in particular, in its capabilities to monitor and enforce change 
at the level of implementing agencies and enterprises.
Creating new institutions or modifying significantly existing institutions involves 
an extended process of organizational design/change that requires building the 
requisite capacity for expected performance, and negotiating the effective role of the 
organization in the context of the existing network of related institutions.
Government Commitment: Stability of Expectations
Government commitment is assumed to be the guarantor that planned reforms 
will be implemented and sustained, providing a level of stability of expectations 
and reducing risk and uncertainty for stakeholders such as investors and for IFIs in 
their PBL. Changing government commitment to reforms is a key proximate cause 
of risk in policy reform and in PBL. Changes in commitment can result from shifts 
in government intent to implement reforms, or from constraints on its capability to 
do so. These are very different in nature, as illustrated in the SCPL case.
Government commitment is usually used to refer to the intent of government to carry 
out reforms. In the case of the SCPL, indications are that the (central) government was 
committed to the reform measures in terms of the intent to undertake them. In fact, it 
was not prepared to commit to any proposed reforms until it felt politically ready to 
implement such reforms. The debate with ADB over corporatization is an example, 
as are the extended negotiations with the IMF over structural reforms. In both cases, 
the government was not prepared to agree to proposed reform measures until it felt 
they were consistent with its own reform agenda—the product, to a large extent, of a 
process of national consensus building—and therefore ready to act on them. At that 
point, government commitment—as formal endorsement of the SCPL with the intent 
to implement its reform measures—was perceived as generally credible.
With respect to government commitment as the capability to undertake reforms, 
the SCPL example suggests that different types of reform measures can have widely 
differing implications. One type of policy reform involves actions that are within the 
power of the central government and its agencies to fully implement. An example of 
this is the issuance of prime ministerial decrees. A second type of reform measure 
is dependent on the formal political decision process. In this case, government 
commitment means submitting measures to this process, but it cannot guarantee the 
outcome (such as the time taken for approval, or the ultimate form of the reform 
measure). An example is the submission of draft legislation to the National Assembly. 
A third type of reform measure is where government can enact reforms but cannot 
guarantee, even with the best of intentions, that these will be implemented as 
planned at the level of particular agencies and enterprises. This uncertainty arises 
either because political power related to the implementation of particular measures 
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(ministries, lower levels of government, individual enterprises) is diffused or because 
the institutional capacity to implement is not in place. The unmet targets for SOE 
corporatization and equitization provide a recurring example.
Overall, even if government commitment is in place in terms of intent, it is essential 
to understand commitment also as the capability to implement with respect to 
particular reform measures. The central issue is the extent to which the government 
can control the policy reform process sufficiently to act as a guarantor that specific 
reforms will be endorsed, implemented, and sustained, particularly as circumstances 
change. In the case of the SCPL, SOE reform is politically sensitive and institutionally 
complex and, therefore, government commitment has to be carefully assessed and 
monitored over time.
Lessons Learned: Improving the Odds
The SCPL case presents relatively few “bumps along the road to reform” for a specific 
loan. However, in the broader context of SOE reform in Viet Nam, the bumps become 
more visible, and are, to a large extent, related to broader political economy factors 
conditioning the policy reform process. What general lessons may be drawn from 
the SCPL case with respect to the political economy of reform to improve the odds 
for design and implementation of reforms and, in particular, lead to more effective 
PBL supporting such reforms? The lessons from the case may be grouped into three 
general categories, as now discussed.62
Preconditions for Policy Reform and Policy-Based Lending
Understanding the players and the game. As stressed throughout the case, SOE 
reform in Viet Nam touches the very core of the country’s economic and social 
transformation. Therefore, it is politically sensitive and institutionally complex; and 
policy reform decisions are the outcome of a distinctly national process of consensus 
building and mutual adjustment. It is therefore essential to understand the policy 
reform process as it operates in Viet Nam with respect to SOE reform. This includes 
an appreciation of the key stakeholders—their potential power (individually and in 
coalitions), motivations, capabilities, constraints, and interrelationships—as relevant 
to SOE reform issues and potential reform measures; the political decision process, 
including how issues related to SOE reform are placed on the policy agenda, and 
endorsed for implementation; and how the implementation and the sustainability of 
SOE reforms are facilitated or constrained by the existing political and institutional 
environment.
62 These are meant to be general lessons related to policy reform. For lessons specific to ADB, and 
perhaps of wider relevance to IFIs in approach policy-based lending, see ADB (2004).
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Scope and focus of policy reform program and related diagnosis. Program design defines 
the scope and focus of reform, and sets both its political and institutional boundaries. 
Given the complexity of policy issues, defining program scope and focus—what to 
include and exclude, where to concentrate attention and resources—is a balancing 
act that requires effective diagnosis of the policy issues and identification of potential 
leverage points where reform initiatives can make a difference.
In the case of the SCPL, the policy matrix embodies a very wide, diverse, and 
ambitious reform agenda. There can also be advantages to focusing on fewer 
essential reforms in defining the scope and focus of a program to ensure both 
relevance and feasibility of reform measures from the longer-term perspective 
of effective implementation and sustainability. A variety of program designs are 
likely to be consistent with a given set of reform objectives. In the SCPL case, an 
alternative formulation of the program could have led to a different scope and focus 
(on removing domestic impediments to private sector development arising from a 
large number of small SOEs), with different political and institutional implications 
for implementation. It is advisable to explore explicitly alternative program designs, 
particularly from the perspective of implanting feasible and sustainable reforms 
under existing conditions in a given setting.
Timetable for reform. Formulating, implementing, and sustaining policy reform 
generally involve a complex, uncertain, and long-term process of change. Given the 
particular political and institutional complexities of SOE reforms in Viet Nam, time is 
an especially critical variable in the reform process. Time is needed to build political 
consensus, to strengthen institutional capacity, and to put in place necessary enabling 
conditions for SOE reform in a transition economy (such as changes in the tax system 
and a social safety net). If the objective of reform and associated PBL is to implant 
change, as distinct from simply putting in place stroke-of-the-pen reforms involving 
changes in rules, regulations, and decrees, program design has to reflect the long-
term and uncertain nature of the reform process.
Political Acceptability
Assessing political acceptability. In the case of the SCPL, there were uncertainties 
about the political acceptability of core reforms. As a consequence, the 
endorsement, implementation, and sustainability of key reform measures—in the 
sense of implanting change—were uncertain. Examples include the enterprise 
corporatization targets, effectiveness of the NSCERD in managing the SOE reform 
process given powerful competing interests, and implementation and enforcement 
of various legislation. A key requirement for effective reforms and supporting PBL is 
to assess the political acceptability of specific proposed reform measures, e.g., who 
are the key stakeholders and coalitions likely to support particular reforms; and who 
are the stakeholders and potential coalitions likely to attempt to block such reforms, 
with what options for action, and under what conditions. This is not a one-time task. 
As the experience with corporatization and equitization illustrates, political support 
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for particular reform measures may fluctuate over time. Within this context, as 
reflected in the SCPL case, implementing agencies are also important stakeholders 
in the reform process, and may have the incentive and even the power to modify or 
block particular reform measures.
Promoting public awareness. As reflected in the case, there was limited public 
understanding of the implications of key reforms such as equitization, and of options 
for adjustment to their impacts. A requirement for feasible reforms is to promote 
effectively public awareness and understanding of both the nature of the policy 
issues and of the implications of proposed policy responses (reform measures). This 
is particularly important when reforms change the rules of the game in a society 
with respect to jobs, incomes, and social services. Certain vested interests—reform 
losers—are inevitable in a process of change. However, it may be possible to expand the 
base of support—or at least reduce the resistors to change—through effective public 
education, supported by appropriate economic and social adjustment programs.
Linked nature of policy issues and political sequencing of reform. Policy issues are often 
interrelated, or linked. Touching the very core of the economic transition in Viet Nam, 
the SOE reform program is intertwined with a wide range of policy issues and reforms. 
For example, reform of the financial system has direct implications for SOE reform 
given the role of state bank–related SOE debt, while the implementation and reform 
of the Labour Code and social safety net legislation has important implications for 
the social impact of measures such as SOE equitization and divestiture. In addition 
to technical sequencing of reforms in economic adjustment, political sequencing is as 
important. That is, if certain conditions are needed to be in place for particular SOE 
reform measures to be politically acceptable, introducing the SOE reform measure 
prematurely is unlikely to be effective and may undermine introduction of those 
reforms again at a more appropriate time.
Institutional Feasibility
Assessing institutional feasibility of proposed reforms. As the SCPL case illustrates, 
policy reforms are generally “institution intensive,” requiring institutions/
organizations that have both the capability and the incentive to implement such 
reforms. A key challenge in designing feasible reforms is to assess the institutional 
requirements for implementation, and to ensure that the necessary organizational 
capabilities are there (or are put in place in time). If institutional analysis reveals 
significant gaps between existing and required capacity, either the program design 
needs to be adjusted to reflect such constraints, or the capacity of implementing 
agencies needs to be strengthened.
In the case of SOE reforms and the SCPL, examples of institutional constraints 
relate to the capabilities and intentions of individual enterprises to implement 
planned reforms such as equitization, and to make the transition to market-driven 
organizations, as well as the capabilities of NSCERD to manage the implementation 
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of the SOE reforms at the enterprise level. Policy reform is fundamentally about 
ensuring that the requisite institutional capacity is in place in time, which in turn, 
may require time and resources, particularly if it involves significant changes to 
existing organizations or the creation of new institutions.
Participation of key central and implementing agencies in program design. Reform is 
ultimately about implementation and sustainability. In this context, it is essential to 
ensure that key central agencies with the power to influence outcomes are part of the 
design process. Furthermore, the institutional feasibility of program design can be 
significantly strengthened through participation of key implementing agencies that 
must, ultimately, undertake the proposed actions.
In the case of the SCPL, the primary participants in the program design process 
involved SBV and the ADB team. Powerful central agencies—the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Planning and Investment, and line ministries that controlled 
particular SOEs, as well as key enterprises responsible for implementing specific 
reforms, were generally not core participants in the program design process, although 
they were consulted. Thus, the likelihood of effective and timely implementation of 
core reforms at the enterprise level was uncertain, as reflected in the corporatization 
targets for example. There was evidence of resistance to change based, in part, on 
insufficient understanding of planned reforms, as in the reluctance by some SOEs to 
participate in precorporatization audits. Considerable time and resources, to a large 
extent insufficiently anticipated at the program design stage, were needed to enlist the 
necessary cooperation of individual enterprises and related agencies. The implication 
is that it is important to involve organizations with key roles in the implementation 
of policy reforms early in the design process to ensure that the planned reforms 
are feasible and that the implementing organizations understand—and do not 
block—reforms.
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Chapter 5
Assessing the 
Political Economy 
Factors Important for 
Economic Reform
Ron Duncan
Introduction
T he need to understand the political economy context of a country in order to design and implement economic reform effectively is now fairly widely accepted. Much progress has also been made in identifying the political 
economy issues that need to be understood to achieve effective reform design and the 
important factors in achieving effective implementation of economic reforms.
Chapter 1 described a framework to assist policy makers in understanding the 
political economy context and process to help in designing and managing policy 
reforms. Chapters 2–4 used country case studies to illustrate how the framework can 
be applied in ADB operations. 
This final chapter outlines ways in which practitioners looking to design and 
implement reform can assess the importance of specific political economy factors of 
an industry, sector, or country to give priority to those factors most likely to inhibit 
or promote reforms at each stage of the process. Whether assessed in quantitative 
or qualitative terms, having a better understanding of specific factors that make up 
the political economy of a country can help inform judgments as to whether reform 
is possible, and to focus on what can be done to improve the chances of adopting 
and implementing reform. The chapter draws on selected economics literature and 
studies carried by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), 
the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom (UK), 
the United Kingdom’s Overseas Development Institute (ODI), and the World Bank. 
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Understanding the Political Economy 
of Economic Reform
Over the past decade or so, development agencies have expressed awareness of the 
need to undertake development assistance—especially assistance involving economic 
reform—only when it is underpinned by a good understanding of the local context. 
However, they placed little emphasis, until recently, on appreciating a client country’s 
economic, political, social, and cultural characteristics and the interactions among 
them. They gave even less emphasis to understanding the political economy of 
economic reform processes.
Understanding the economic, political, social, and cultural characteristics of a society 
and the interactions among them is broadly the field of political economy—an area of 
interdisciplinary study that draws mainly on the disciplines of economics, politics, and 
law to explain how institutions, politics, and the economic system interact, whether 
nationally or internationally, to produce economic outcomes. Other disciplines, 
such as sociology, anthropology, and human geography, also make contributions to 
political economy.
Economic reform can mean changing existing institutions, policies, laws, and 
regulations. Such change will rarely be easy, since these elements have been shaped 
by existing political, economic, and cultural forces. Hence, understanding the local 
context to provide assistance in designing, getting accepted, and implementing 
reform also implies some knowledge of how to change the status quo.
Early Research
Two early political economy research projects on the success of economic reform 
in developing countries were Williamson (1994) and Bates and Krueger (1993). The 
Williamson volume concluded that the evidence strongly suggested the need for a 
strong political base, for visionary leadership, and for a coherent economic team for 
reform to succeed. It also concluded that authoritarian or right-wing governments are 
not necessary for successful reform. However, Williamson offered few insights into 
the political processes or the institutional arrangements that make possible effective 
implementation of reform (Duncan 1995).
The Bates and Krueger volume was somewhat more insightful. They suggested that 
the outcome of reform is subject to such uncertainty that interest groups’ decisions 
are influenced more by ideology than by statements about the incidence or impacts 
of policies. They concluded that, because of uncertainty over the future size and 
distribution of the benefits of reform, and the more immediate and concentrated 
nature of reform’s costs, the status quo is likely to be maintained unless there is a 
change of government. They pointed to exceptions, however, such as Mexico. They 
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suggested that in countries with one-term presidents, such as Mexico, reforms may 
be undertaken that would not be considered if the president was running for office 
again—different from those democracies where the political term is not fixed and 
leaders struggle to remain in power.
Bates and Krueger also pointed to the importance of a well-trained team of policy 
advisors who are somehow protected from interest-group pressure. This conclusion 
highlights the importance of education in developing cadres of highly skilled, 
local advisors, as well as the need to understand countries’ political, cultural, and 
institutional systems.
Following the Bates and Krueger and Williamson studies, there was little in the 
way of political economy research of the factors underpinning economic reform 
and why some reform attempts succeed and some fail until, following the seminal 
work on institutions by North (1990), there was more widespread realization of the 
importance of state institutions in explaining behavior related to development, and of 
understanding the local context, for development assistance to succeed.
The new institutional economics (NIE) approach pioneered by North has played 
an important role in studies of the political economy of developing countries with 
respect to economic reform. The NIE approach focuses on the basic institutions of a 
society and the rules of behavior that they establish. These rules provide the incentives 
to which the various stakeholders involved in the process react. Institutions may be 
formal, such as constitutions, electoral systems, and property rights, or informal, 
such as the norms of traditional societies or the behavioral norms of groups such as 
accountants and real estate agents.
Linked to the NIE approach has been extensive study of the political economy of 
economic reform in developing countries over the past decade or so. Initially, the 
studies focused on the interactions between economics and politics in the reform 
process. But these studies led to staff frustration in the development agencies, 
particularly officers in the field, who argued that these political economy issues were 
reasonably well understood; what staff really wanted to know was how to bring about 
change. The most recent studies have been more focused on this particular question.
The World Bank began its institutional and governance reviews in 1999. These were 
relatively narrowly focused on the institutional roots of government performance, 
although still taking account of the country’s political realities. In 2002, DFID 
published its first study on drivers of change (DOC). Around the same time, ODI 
began studies of reform processes using a framework that it described as a blend of 
political science, sociology, and anthropology. In 2005, ODI also initiated studies of 
reform using the DOC framework. The DOC analysis was seen as a way “to describe 
in a robust, evidence-based way the underlying factors which shape the incentives for 
economic, social and political change” (Booth et al. 2005). In particular, it was seen 
as an attempt to explain the “lack of political will” commonly identified as being the 
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main obstacle to economic reform (Booth et al. 2005). However, the DOC analysis 
offered no suggestions as to priorities for action or for how progress in any one of 
the political or economic DOCs could be brought about. In fact, it presented no 
analytical basis from which to identify priorities for action or the means to bring 
about changes—a reason for operational staff frustration.
A 2006 World Bank study of a successful effort to reform the legal infrastructure 
governing public procurement in the Philippines—the Government Procurement 
Reform Act 2003—generated useful operational recommendations (Campos and 
Syquia 2006). While this reform related to passing a law, it had lessons for how 
to generate successful policy reform, the main one being the need to create a 
coordinated team capable of responding to problems—unforeseen or anticipated—
as the reform process unfolded, including mechanisms to deal with obstacles on a 
daily basis. Other elements important in getting the law passed were the production 
of in-depth technical studies of the implications of the law, a well-thought-out 
communications strategy to mobilize public action, and the fostering of support 
from knowledgeable legislators.
The year 2007 saw a larger number of development agencies become interested in 
these political economy issues. For example, AusAID commissioned a DOC study on 
Vanuatu (Cox et al. 2007), which identified various economic and political obstacles 
to better economic and development performance, but without any prioritization 
of the changes needed or advice on how to achieve them. Also, under a regional 
technical assistance project, Strengthening Country Diagnosis and Analysis of 
Binding Development Constraints in Selected Developing Member Countries, ADB 
initiated a series of studies on binding constraints.
Where Are We Now?
In 2008, the World Bank hosted a workshop on sequencing public financial 
management reform. Edward Hedger of ODI summed up what that organization had 
learned from its many political economy studies about the factors contributing to 
the success of such reform. He identified six success factors: political commitment 
(leadership), senior technocratic leadership, organizational strategic management 
capability within the public sector, domestic demand for reform from outside the 
executive, appropriate and coherent external technical advice (and pressure), and 
logic and coherence of technical reforms.63
Except for the fourth factor (domestic demand for reform from outside the 
executive), these lessons replicate those that can be drawn from Bates and 
Krueger  (1993) and Williamson (1994). The fourth factor is now generally 
understood as the necessity of promoting domestic “ownership” of reforms if they 
63 http://blog-pfm.imf.org/pfmblog/2008/07/from-diagnosis.html
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are to be successful. The World Bank study on the passage of public procurement 
legislation in the Philippines (Campos and Syquia 2006) confirms the success 
factors identified by ODI, as well as the need for a well-developed communications 
strategy to mobilize public action.
A more recent study by ODI, funded by DFID, illustrates the progress that has been 
made in thinking about the role of political economy analysis in assisting with the 
implementation of economic reforms (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2009). This study 
adopted what it called a “layered” approach to the political analysis of road reform in 
Uganda, and added a wider range of political economy tools than DOC analysis had 
previously used. The layers were
•	 identification of systemic constraints, through the use of, say, binding constraints 
analysis or DOC analysis;
•	 analysis of the pattern of stakeholder interests, direction, and extent of their 
influence, and the factors influencing their choices (essentially, what incentives 
are they responding to?); and
•	 assessment of the “room for maneuver,” or scope for different outcomes.64
This approach recognized that political economy analysis must go beyond 
describing the relationships between economic, political, social, and cultural 
factors, and move toward identifying the incentives to which the stakeholders are 
responding and determining whether the incentives can be changed in order to 
generate different behavior.
Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2009) examined whether there was scope for 
movement  on the needed reforms with respect to (i) a shift in presidential 
priorities, (ii) recent institutional changes opening opportunities for reform, or 
(iii)  the dynamics of the reform process. They decided that (iii) offered the most 
realistic possibilities for donor-supported action to “tip the balance in a pro-reform 
direction.” While they made no formal analysis of the incentives that the various 
stakeholders were responding to, the authors’ overall approach took research in this 
area closer to the goal of generating operationally useful recommendations.
The point that political economy studies reached in Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 
(2009) is similar to that reached by Duncan (2009) in an ADB report on Kiribati. 
An earlier study carried out for the World Bank (Duncan and Nakagawa 2007) had 
identified the binding constraints to economic growth in Kiribati as being clientelist 
politics, resulting in nepotism, corruption, and conflicts of interest in contract awards 
rather than the provision of widespread public goods. Duncan and Nakagawa (2007) 
argued that politicians operating in such an environment prefer not to support 
security of property rights and contract enforcement—institutions that encourage 
private sector development—as establishing them will undermine the payoff from 
rent seeking.
64 This layer draws on the work of Grindle (2002).
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In the Duncan (2009) study, the Institutional Analysis for Development (IAD) 
framework developed by Ostrom et al. (2001) was used to investigate the role of 
political economy in preventing collective action leading to the provision of public 
goods. In an effort to understand how it may be possible to bring about economic 
reform, Ostrom et al. (2001) placed the new institutional economics into an IAD 
framework to gain an understanding of the behavior of the groups that have an 
influence—for better or worse—on economic development in a country.
The IAD framework is based on the assumption that most problems in development 
result from the inability of a society to take the necessary collective action to deliver 
public goods and manage common-pool resources effectively. However, if the 
established incentives, or “rules of behavior,” of the society provide weak or perverse 
incentives to individuals or groups to act collectively for their common good, the 
delivery of public goods and management of common-pool resources will be 
adversely affected.
As Ostrom et al. (2001) correctly point out, it is difficult, if not impossible, to change 
the characteristics of public goods or services or to change the culture of a society. 
Trying to change the incentives faced by the stakeholders involved is usually the 
only avenue open to achieve a different outcome. But as they also point out, any 
transformation of the incentives needs to take full account of the characteristics of 
the community and its physical, economic, political, and social circumstances. Most 
important, it must be understood that those currently advantaged by the status quo 
will resist any changes in the rules that do not benefit them.
Duncan (2009) finds that, in Kiribati, the full range of economic binding 
constraints to growth appear to be in place: access to credit is limited, returns on 
private investment are very poor, and there are constraints on the scope for firms 
to acquire the full value of any returns on private investment. However, these are 
clearly not the primary obstacles to better economic growth. These obstacles are 
dominated by the welfare-dependency mind-set that prevents collective action from 
adopting economic policies that would lead to improved economic performance. 
The necessary collective action is not taking place because the costs to individuals 
from collective action to adopt reform policies—which entail forgoing dependence 
on the state—are perceived as outweighing the benefits of the reforms. Moreover, 
the costs to individuals of giving up their dependence on the state are very obvious, 
while the benefits of economic reform in terms of more jobs, higher incomes, and 
improved public services are highly uncertain.
Similar to Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2009) on Uganda, Duncan (2009) identified 
that “room for maneuver” for reform in Kiribati was provided by the President’s 
interest in reforming some of the many state-owned enterprise (SOEs) dominating 
the economy and the presence of a small group of senior public officials who 
understood and sympathized with the need for reform. Duncan (2009) also 
recommended the provision of technical assistance to develop material to promote 
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public understanding about the reforms as well as provide continuing support to the 
President and his team.
ADB has noted these political economy studies and in 2010 took a political economy 
approach to evaluating its support for public sector reforms in Pacific developing 
member countries (see ADB 2010; and Chapter 3, this book). The analytical approach 
adopted for the evaluation followed the five-step framework outlined in Chapter 1 of 
this book. The evaluation of public sector reform in the Pacific confirmed many of the 
lessons identified such as the importance of identifying leaders of the reform and the 
need to build lawmakers’ understanding of the reform; the need to promote public 
ownership of reforms; the pursuit of moderate, sequenced reform may be the most 
realistic approach where institutional capacity is limited; consideration of the cultural 
context is important in the Pacific; and there may be the necessity for continuous 
support from appropriate development agencies over a long period.
A report from the World Bank (Beuran, Raballand, and Kapoor 2011: 3) recognized 
that translating political economy analysis into action “remains a challenge.” It 
examined the outcomes of the many political economy studies carried out by the 
World Bank in Zambia through interviews with World Bank task managers to assess 
the relevance of the studies to the design and implementation of policy reform. 
The study showed that reform of the telecommunications and energy sectors was 
enhanced by changing the focus of the policy dialogue.
In telecommunications, the focus of the policy dialogue was changed from an emphasis 
on how the reforms would enhance the efficiency of the sector to emphasizing that the 
high utility costs were hurting consumers and Zambia’s competitiveness. In the energy 
sector, the policy dialogue was changed from an emphasis on the need to increase 
the low electricity tariffs to the objective of improving access for a large part of the 
population, especially rural. Hence, understanding the political economy can help 
in “selling” reforms. In both these cases, it appears that a focus on the distributional 
impacts of the reforms was more helpful than a focus on the resource allocation 
impacts (but a somewhat esoteric issue as far as the noneconomist is concerned).
A research project funded by ADB on the political economy of economic reform in 
the Pacific (Duncan 2011) confirmed and added to the earlier lessons. It confirmed 
the importance of political and senior civil service commitment (leadership); 
organizational, strategic management capability within the public sector, such 
that it can respond to events as the reform process unfolds; a well-constructed 
communication strategy designed to inform the public and develop and sustain its 
support (“ownership”) of the reform; and appropriate and coherent external technical 
advice (and pressure).
The experience of successful reforms in the Pacific demonstrates the importance 
of reform champions in both the political and bureaucratic arenas, according to 
Duncan (2011). Moreover, stability in this leadership during the lengthy reform 
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processes was critical, as was leaders’ influence in widening support among the 
various stakeholders. The reform leadership also benefited from having a support 
team capable of responding to events over the life of the process; in-depth studies 
to support the reform leadership; and comprehensive communications strategies 
to generate public understanding of the reforms, allow concerns to be expressed, 
develop ownership of the reforms, and mobilize public action. National summits, 
or retreats, involving all stakeholders have also featured prominently in public 
consultations in the Pacific.
Duncan (2011) draws additional reform lessons: the reform champion need not 
necessarily be an individual—the champion may be an organization, as in the case of 
the Papua New Guinea telecommunication reform where the champion was the PNG 
Independent Consumer and Competition Commission; an international treaty with 
“teeth” (such as those of the World Trade Organization) can be a useful mechanism 
for initiating and sustaining (locking in) reform; local actors may well perceive the 
changes involved in reforms as much larger than do the development agencies or 
consultants providing technical assistance, and so consideration must be given to 
local perceptions of reforms, and it may be helpful to take a piecemeal approach; 
the demonstration of widespread consumer benefits from earlier reforms or reforms 
in other countries can stimulate current reform efforts, a point that ties in with the 
importance of generating in-depth studies to demonstrate the benefits of the reform; 
it may be important to ensure that the reforms are in harmony with cultural practices. 
This last lesson was also identified in ADB (2010). Although it may be possible to 
bring about some change in culture, expectations about the extent of such change 
should be realistic—thus, reforms should give thought to adapting institutions and 
policies to fit with the existing culture.
Assessing Political Economy Factors
We now have a good idea of how to go about implementing an economic reform. 
But we still do not have a good idea of the political economy factors that will be 
important in whether or not an attempt at reform will be successful. These are the 
factors that are identified through analysis such as the IAD framework of Ostrom 
et al. (2001). In particular, how intense is the resistance to the reform by the various 
stakeholders likely to be? Stakeholders include politicians, bureaucrats, businesses, 
unions, SOEs, nongovernment organizations, and society at large (as consumers, 
taxpayers, and special interest groups) (see Table  5.1). Further, where does most 
effort have to be given in influencing the views held by the various stakeholders or to 
eliminate or offset the perverse incentives to which stakeholders resisting the reform 
may be responding?
If we are to have measures of the factors influencing the depth of support for—
or resistance to—a reform, we need to be able to measure these factors in some 
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quantitative or qualitative manner. For example, on the position of governments and 
politicians to a reform, do they have a direct (pecuniary or other) interest in the status 
quo; or is their resistance due to an ideological or philosophical position? There is, 
of course, the possibility that the current government will not remain in power. This 
problem of time inconsistency with respect to governments is an issue that is never 
absent and therefore it may well be an issue that reformers should, in the end, ignore.
As far as bureaucrats are concerned, to what extent do they exercise salutary control 
over the public’s behavior as regards the status quo—for example, regulations provide 
a “lever” for bureaucrats to extract monetary or other rewards from the public. 
Businesses may benefit from the status quo through the provision of monopoly 
positions as a result of government policies—for example, the establishment of tariffs 
or other barriers to imports. Businesses may have relationships with politicians that 
benefit both parties. Unions may also benefit from the establishment of monopoly 
business positions, as through import restrictions. They, too, will thus share a 
common interest in maintaining the status quo. SOEs are usually already in privileged 
positions as the result of government restrictions on the entry of private investors into 
the sector. Unions associated with labor employed in SOEs will usually support the 
continuation of the restricted entry.
As far as consumers/taxpayers are concerned, what is the extent of public 
understanding of the benefits and costs of the status quo and of the potential 
benefits and costs of the proposed reform? Is there a perceived lack of society support 
for the reform for cultural reasons or for other ideological reasons? The resistance 
to a reform by politicians, businesses, unions, SOEs, and other pressure groups will 
likely only be overcome through societal pressure. Therefore, a judgment will have to 
be made as to the likelihood that societal resistance to the reform can be overcome 
through the provision of information about the potential benefits and costs of the 
reform. But how likely is it that the government will respond to societal pressure? 
In a society where decision making is a top–down process, with people generally 
unwilling to challenge the government or other elite, there may be less room for 
optimism about influencing reform through societal pressure.
In assessing the acceptability of the reform to society as a whole, consideration will 
also need to be given to the social context of the reform. For example, are the costs 
of the reform likely to be concentrated by region or by industry? Will the reform 
improve income equality in any way? Further, as seen in Zambia (Beuran, Raballand, 
and Kapoor 2011), it may be important to assess how best to “sell” the reform to 
the various stakeholders (promoting the reforms in terms of improving income 
distribution rather than resource allocation). 
To take another example, the experience with tax reform in the Philippines 
(Chapter 2) pointed to the difficulty of promoting tax reform to the public on the 
basis of the existing fiscal unsustainability as being “too technical and uninteresting 
to the man on the street.” The popular sentiment, as often the case, was that the tax 
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deficiency could be overcome by the government directing its efforts toward catching 
tax evaders. It was not until a group of highly respected economists from a leading 
university publicized the critical nature of the fiscal problem that the public began to 
change its mind about where attention should be directed.
Therefore, for a particular reform, it would be highly desirable to undertake an 
IAD analysis to identify the stakeholders likely to be involved and the incentives 
determining their present behavior. Such analysis will also help in identifying the 
changes that may be needed in the stakeholder incentive structure to generate support 
for the reform. The attitudes of the various stakeholders toward a proposed reform 
could be measured by means of opinion surveys of the stakeholders themselves.
We can see from SOE reform in Viet Nam (Chapter  4) how numerous important 
stakeholders may be and the variety of incentives involved. In that case, the design 
and implementation of the reform program had to take into account the Communist 
Party of Viet Nam, the National Assembly, the central government, the three levels 
of local government, the managers and workers in SOEs, the unions, the many 
implementing agencies, as well as the private sector. But too little attention was given 
to the views of the implementing agencies (including the SOEs), which eventually 
caused difficulties in carrying out the reforms. Also, the incentives that had to be 
taken into account ranged from the ideological position of the Communist Party on 
the role of the state in the economy to the social issues concerning workers likely to 
be displaced by the reform.
It is important that all interested reform stakeholders be identified and the strength 
of their resistance to, or support for, the reform be measured. Failure to do this 
underlies many of the difficulties experienced in implementing and sustaining 
reforms. For example, Chapter 3 on reform in the Pacific notes that the design team 
worked closely with the ministry of finance in developing the reform program but 
had limited consultation with other ministries and with the public. The lack of 
ownership by other ministries had adverse implications for the implementation of 
the reforms for which they had responsibility. By contrast, the use of widespread 
public consultation in the Federated States of Micronesia is credited with the initial 
success of the reform program.
It is anticipated that a good understanding of the political economy factors that will 
be important in determining whether a reform will be successful will influence the 
five steps in the policy reform process—initiating reform, managing the complexity 
of policy issues, endorsing reform, implementing reform, and sustaining reform. 
The understanding of stakeholder interests in the reform should allow anticipation 
of the problems likely to be faced in each of these steps and assist in devising ways 
to overcome the resistance.
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Indicative Measures of Political Economy Factors
For a general assessment of the likelihood of policy reforms being accepted, it is 
proposed that the attitudes of the various stakeholders (governments, politicians, 
etc.) to the policy reform process be assessed by the use of proxy, or indirect, 
measures that are hypothesized to test whether they are likely to be in favor of or 
opposed to reform (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1
Changes in Reform Features through the Reform Stages
Stakeholders Indicators of Potential Resistance
Government/Politicians Extent and level of trade restrictions
Barriers to foreign investment
Extent of licensing of businesses
Number of SOEs
Political stability
Governance indicators on Voice and Accountability and Rule of Law
Bureaucrats Share of public service employees in total employment
Extent and cost of regulations applying to business and other 
private activities
Capacity of the public service to design and implement reforms
Governance indicators on Corruption and Rule of Law
Private businesses Extent and level of trade restrictions
Barriers to foreign investment
SOEs Number of SOEs
Share of SOE employment in total employment
Unions Extent and level of trade restrictions
Barriers to foreign investment
Involvement in SOEs
Nongovernment 
organizations
Media freedom
Voice and accountability
Recognition of such organizations by government
Society (consumers, 
taxpayers)
Voice and accountability
Distributional impact of reform (by region/industry/income category)
Media freedom
SOEs = state-owned enterprises.
Source: R. Duncan.
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The selection of these measures is based on the proposition that most stakeholders 
respond to incentives—usually monetary incentives of some form. These general 
measures could also give some guide to the ways by which to assess the likelihood of 
adoption of a specific reform. These measures are only indicative and the analyst should 
choose measures that appear to be appropriate for the kind of reform considered.
Governments/Politicians: It is proposed that the more widespread the use of 
government intervention in what is usually considered to be private sector activities, 
the less interested politicians and governments will be in economic reform. Areas 
where such restrictions may be applied are the following: trade, investment, 
SOEs, and business licensing. Restrictions in all of these areas create “rents” that 
governments and politicians can distribute to curry favor with selected special 
interests. Restrictions on imports create monopoly power for local firms; these may 
be domestically financed firms or they may be established foreign firms that wish 
to have a monopoly position against the threat of other foreign firms entering the 
market. For small, developing countries, where most goods used by consumers and 
producers are imported and where administrative costs of most taxation measures 
are high, a case can be made for the use of a low tariff applied to all imports. In these 
cases, the tariff is essentially the same as a value-added tax but without the much 
higher administrative costs of levying the tax.
Barriers to foreign investment are established primarily to protect domestic 
interests—whether financed by local or overseas investors—against competition 
from other foreign investors. Such barriers foster unhealthy relationships between 
existing investors and politicians/governments. Licensing businesses can also create 
rents for politicians in much the same way as barriers to trade and foreign investment. 
Conflicts of interest between ministers’ responsibilities and their personal affairs 
should also be scrutinized.
Arguments for setting up SOEs to undertake activities that the private sector is well 
equipped to carry out have been widely negated, and the continued use of SOEs is 
now seen essentially as a rent-creating device. This is even true of the use of SOEs to 
continue what were once seen as natural monopolies. However, even for such utilities 
(power, water, and telecommunications), the economic arguments for the state 
undertaking these activities have largely disappeared given that the “unbundling” 
of the activities and the introduction of competition have led to the proper role of 
government being seen as solely that of regulator. Still, politicians and governments 
are usually supportive of existing SOEs as they usually have some control over the 
activities of the enterprise. As well, board and managerial positions of the SOE are 
usually filled by government appointees, which means that the government is thereby 
able to reward supportive behavior.
As seen, political stability is a positive factor. On the other hand, coalition 
governments—which are often unstable—can lead to poor governance and to 
difficulty in introducing economic reforms, as observed in the Pacific (Batten 2011). 
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Minor parties or individual politicians who can exercise some control over a 
coalition government can exercise undue influence over the policies adopted. As seen 
in Chapter  3 (the Pacific), the high incidence of changes in governments due to 
no-confidence votes and slender majorities or minority governments has put on hold 
or reversed many of the reforms undertaken. Ultimately, however, the sustainability 
of governments and therefore of reforms cannot be guaranteed.
The level of “voice and accountability” in a country is now recognized as an important 
indicator of the ability of broader society to have influence over government policies. 
The greater the power exercised by elite groups, the less will society’s voice be heard 
in discussions of possible change from the status quo.
Bureaucrats: A large share of public service employees in total employment is 
usually a sign of significant intervention in an economy’s activities. Such employees 
and their unions will usually be resistant to any policy change that threatens their 
number or influence. For bureaucrats, regulations can establish beneficial control 
over the activities of businesses and society more generally (such as licenses to 
establish a business or to license and drive a motor vehicle) and thereby provide 
scope for monetary or other reward. Bureaucrats can be expected to be reluctant to 
give up any such “levers.”
The capacity of the public service to implement reforms must also be considered. 
For example, in the small Pacific states, the personnel and skill levels available in the 
public service are often very limited. The migration of one or two skilled personnel 
can devastate a ministry’s ability to carry out reform in, for instance, legislation or 
SOEs under their jurisdiction. Chapter 3 noted that weaknesses in the Public Service 
Commission in the Cook Islands lessened its ability and willingness to implement 
a performance-based public service assessment system. Capacity development 
and/or capacity supplementation may therefore be necessary before reforms are 
attempted. And as seen in Chapter 2 on tax reform in the Philippines, difficulties 
were experienced in implementing the reform due to governance failings in the 
public service because of the high level of corruption and poor adherence to the 
rule of law. Institutional reform to overcome such problems may be essential before 
implementing reforms that depend upon good governance in the public sector.
Private sector businesses: The higher the level of trade restrictions and the more 
extensive they are, the more likely will existing local businesses resist reform, 
particularly of trade policy. Existing businesses are also likely to be less supportive of 
reform, the more that use is made of barriers to foreign investment and licensing of 
businesses, as such regulations generally act to protect existing businesses.
State-owned enterprises: SOEs can be expected to oppose any reforms that introduce 
competition into their area of operations. The number of SOEs and the share of SOE 
employment in total employment are good indicators of the power that SOEs will be 
able to exert over changes in policies related to their area of operations.
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Unions: Unions affiliated with businesses that benefit from trade or investment 
barriers or business licensing requirements will usually resist changes in these 
policies. Therefore, measures of the level and extent of trade and investment barriers 
and use of business licensing requirements will give a good indication of the 
resistance likely to come from such unions.
Nongovernment organizations: The greater the media freedom and the more 
open and transparent the government, the greater the ability of nongovernment 
organizations to influence the government. Of course, not all these organizations 
favor the economic reforms proffered by policy makers. For their part, some 
governments are unfavorable to these organizations’ activities and place restrictions 
on them. Such restrictions can be seen as a measure of the government’s attitude 
toward openness.
Society (consumers/taxpayers): Similarly, society’s ability to influence debate over 
economic reforms will depend, to a large extent, on its access to government as 
measured through indicators such as voice and accountability and media freedom. 
The likely distributional impacts of the reform (both costs and benefits) will point 
to where resistance to the proposed policy change is likely to come from and where 
support may be found. Measuring the likely distributional impacts will generally 
require some in-depth study, but this should also be an integral part of the analysis of 
the reform proposal.
The Influence of Culture
Cultural characteristics heavily affect a society’s attitudes toward policies and changes 
in policies and indeed on many of the stakeholder indicators listed in Table 5.1. How 
can we classify societies with respect to how culture may affect attitudes toward 
reform? Some of the most useful writings in this field are by Geert Hofstede on the 
classification of societies by cultural characteristics. The fact that the classification is 
operational is appealing. Moreover, it is consistent with the views of economists, such 
as North (1990), on the role of institutions in economic development.
Hofstede (1980) classified societies along four cultural dimensions: uncertainty 
avoidance—a society’s tolerance for risk and uncertainty; power distance—the 
extent to which members of a group will accept that power is distributed unequally; 
concepts of masculinity and femininity—the expected gender roles in a society; and 
individualism versus collectivism—the degree of individual or collective orientation. 
In later work (Hofstede and Bond 1988), a fifth dimension was added after studying 
successful East Asian economies: long-term versus short-term orientation—long-
term orientation values thrift and future rewards, short-term orientation values the 
past (respect for tradition) and social obligations.
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All these “dimensions” or characteristics of a culture have implications for its 
economic development and for its attitudes toward policy change; there is also 
interaction among them. A culture that has a higher risk preference is more likely to 
invest in new ideas and be more willing to undertake policy change. One can think 
of Chinese culture with its very high savings rate as valuing thrift yet tolerating high 
levels of risk in undertaking policy change.
A society that has a higher tolerance for hierarchical inequality will likely tolerate 
more income inequality and will probably have more difficulty in achieving good 
governance because of its unwillingness to sanction the politically powerful. Societies 
that tolerate men having a more powerful role than women in society will suffer 
because, in doing so, they forgo the full value that women can offer. One can think of 
Pacific island societies as conforming to these characteristics.
Whether a society is basically individualistic or collectivistic will also have an 
important impact on acceptance of change. This is not meant to imply that some 
societies that are essentially individualistic may not also have some more sympathy 
for collective action than others. But if a society is essentially collectivistic, the value 
placed on sharing is uppermost. On the other hand, we associate an individualistic 
society with personal achievement, saving and investing, and individuals looking after 
their own families. The differences between the indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian 
peoples of Fiji with respect to these cultural characteristics are quite obvious, with, 
for example, Indo-Fijians being more willing to save and invest in their children’s 
education and indigenous Fijians being less willing to save but focus instead on 
current consumption, often following cultural traditions.
Reference to the cultural characteristics of a society is important because it has 
always to be kept in mind that culture changes only very slowly. Therefore, the 
adoption of a reform should not be based on an assumption that the society’s culture 
can be changed.
Measuring Indicators of Stakeholder Behavior
Many of the stakeholder behavior indicators discussed are amenable to direct 
quantitative measurement, such as level and extent of trade barriers, number of 
SOEs, and share of SOE employment in total employment. Single indicators are not 
available for others, such as political instability or conflicts of interest with respect to 
ministerial responsibilities, but these may be assessed through reports, for example, 
on the number of changes in government or the difficulties experienced in getting 
legislation through parliament.
Qualitative measures of other indicators, such as voice and accountability, media 
freedom, and extent and cost of business licensing, are available through published 
information such as the Governance Matters Indexes and the Cost of Doing 
Business Indexes periodically published by the World Bank Group. For example, 
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the World Bank’s annual Cost of Doing Business Index provides assessments of the 
costs of starting a business, registering property, and closing a business.
We have seen that it is important to understand the stance that will be taken by 
various stakeholders to proposed economic reforms if the chances of successful 
design and implementation are to be maximized. Moreover, it is desirable to be able 
to measure, in some way, the attitudes that stakeholders are likely to adopt toward 
reform. This will show where most effort will need to be directed in attempting to 
influence the uptake of the reform.
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